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Abstract
“But The Heart Stays Turkish”:
Identifications of Immigrants and Boundaries of Belonging in America
by
Zeynep Selen Bayhan
Advisor: Richard Alba
This dissertation focuses on the symbolic boundary-making processes of firstgeneration Turkish immigrants in New York and New Jersey, where Islam has been
tainted with negative meanings and symbols. By focusing on the characteristics, salience
and endurance of ethno-national, religious and gender boundaries that immigrants
perceive and experience in the U.S., it examines the possibilities of social inclusion and
assimilation/integration of immigrants into the mainstream society. The dissertation
addresses following research questions: What sort of symbols and markers, as well as
narratives do immigrants use in order to construct boundaries regarding American
society? How do Turkish immigrants, in the aftermath of September 11, situate
themselves vis-à-vis other Muslims in general, and those in the U.S. in particular? What
is the nature of the religious boundary Turkish immigrants experience in their every day
life in the U.S.? How does gender play role in immigrants’ identification processes as
well as their experiences in America? It studies these questions using 52 in-depth
interviews with first generation immigrants residing in New York and New Jersey, as
well as participant observations in community events and religious gatherings. By
identifying the markers, permeability and strength of these boundaries, this project
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contributes to the literature and debates on immigration, identification, integration and
symbolic boundaries in receiving societies.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In a speech he delivered in August 1925, only two years after the establishment of
the Turkish Republic, the founding father Mustafa Kemal said, “Our thoughts, our
mindset will be civilized. We will not care what others say. We will be civilized. We will
take pride in it. Take a look at the entire Turkic and Muslim world. What great disaster
and misery they are in, as their minds could not keep up with the scope and ascent
requested by civilization. This is also the reason why we fell behind and as a result got
mired down in disaster until now” (Ataturk Vecizeleri 2018). This perception not only
underlines the direction of progress the Republic was aspiring to follow, which was the
Western civilization, but also puts a great distance from the Ottoman past, and other
Muslim nations, which are looked down upon because of their lack of vision for
modernity and development. It also lays down the groundwork for the emergence of the
Turkish identity crisis in the decades to come.
While there was a strong emphasis on Turkey being a modern, Western nation in
the early Republican period, backed by official narratives and political reforms, over time
a competing definition of Turkish identity, underlining its religious aspect and claiming a
place in the Muslim world, became more vocal especially with the rise of political Islam
to power in the 1970s. The main actors of the Islamic movement were denouncing the
European Community, which was criticized for its consumer culture, and was deemed a
place not suitable for Muslims who were not supposed to seek worldly pleasures.
Although the political elite that became prominent in the early 2000s was loyal to the
image of a “Muslim Turkey” just like their predecessors, they adopted a different
approach vis-à-vis Europe. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to
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power in November 2002, initiated the accession negotiations to the European Union for
Turkey’s full membership in October 2005. Yet, they continued to underline Turkey’s
place in the Muslim world whenever possible. Moreover, this assertion was intensified
with their claim to the heritage of Ottoman imperial past, which the early Republic once
had put great effort to distance itself from. Since the issue of Turkish national identity has
been a ground for battles for such a long time, freighted with competing yet sometimes
overlapping symbols and meanings for different groups, this dissertation research is
motivated by the following question: How do these narratives on ethno-national identity
fare for first generation Turkish immigrants in the United States where September 11
attacks took place and where Islam has been treated as a security issue in the political
discourse?
While research on Muslim experiences in the U.S. has tremendously increased in
the aftermath of the attacks, they predominantly focus on Muslim Arabs (Bryan 2005,
Jamal and Naber 2008, Bayoumi 2008, Cainkar 2009), and South Asian Muslim groups
(Foner 2005, Cainkar 2008), hence omitting the experiences of Turkish immigrants. Part
of the reason is that Turkish immigrants constitute a very small group in the Muslim
population in the U.S., and therefore they are not as visible in the mainstream as others.
Moreover, as far as research on Turkish immigrants is concerned, the main bulk of
academic writing concentrates on immigrants in Western Europe, where their density and
hence visibility is higher than their counterparts in the U.S. Motivated by these two
issues, this research produces knowledge on Turkish immigrants in two major respects.
First, it carves up a space for the experiences of Turkish immigrants among other Muslim
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groups in America, and second, it provides a comparative angle vis-à-vis the situation in
Western Europe.
An issue that complicates the Turkish identity crisis further is the European
reluctance and at times rejection of Turkey as a European nation. Prominent French
politician Valéry Giscard d'Estaing once said Turkey should never be allowed to join the
EU because “[it] is a country that is close to Europe, an important country ... but it is not
a European country” (Black 2002). Considering European-ness merely in terms of
physical geography, he also added “Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population are
outside.” While not all members of the Union were so vocal about their reluctance
regarding Turkey’s membership as d’Estaing, they were not too eager for it either.
Turkey applied to become a full member to the European Union (which was called the
European Economic Community back then) in 1959, and it took them over 45 years to
start the accession negotiations. Moreover, the Turkish immigrants spread across several
Western European countries including Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Sweden, are often perceived as proof that Turkish culture is not compatible with that of
Europe. The ethno-national and religious stigma, which constitutes a highly bright
boundary for Turkish immigrants in Europe, reduces their assimilation prospects into the
mainstream society. Blamed for not being able to assimilate, immigrants were
instrumentalized in the political discourse as verification that Turkey is not a European
country both geographically and culturally.
The setting of this research, the United States, offers a highly different context
than Western Europe for Turkish immigrants for several reasons. First, immigrant
demographics differ in terms of their education level and socio-economic status, where
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Turkish immigrants in the U.S. have higher academic and occupational achievements
than those in Europe. Second, although Turkish immigrants in many European countries
have been perceived as Muslim “others,” Turks in the U.S. are not singled out as such.
Moreover, as it will be discussed in detail in the remaining chapters, Turkish immigrants
are also perceived highly different from other Muslim communities in the U.S. Third,
while Islam carries negative meanings and Muslims are associated with terrorism in the
U.S., Turkish immigrants are not perceived as culturally incompatible with the
mainstream society as they are predominantly seen in Western Europe. Therefore, this
project also examines how Turkish identification processes play out for immigrants in a
Western yet not European societal context. Although it is not a comparative study, it
offers knowledge on the scarcely known American case to be juxtaposed with the vast
literature on Europe.
When I first went into the field eight years ago, doing preliminary interviews and
asking questions about Turkish immigrants’ experiences after September 11, I was
expecting to see non-religious Turkish immigrants deny any resemblance to non-Turkish
Muslim groups as they do not define their identity on religious terms, while I thought
religious Turks would identify with the Muslim population in New York, for their
identity, I assumed, puts religion before ethnicity. I could not have been more wrong.
While non-religious interviewees denied any resemblance to non-Turkish Muslims, as I
expected, my religious respondents also distinguished themselves from other groups,
using culture, a narrative they imported from Turkey, to underline their differences. This
was unexpected and surprising and I was intrigued since it was a demonstration of the
fact that categories of secular and religious that we often take for granted are more
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complicated than they appear. So this research also investigates the role of narratives on
ethno-national Turkish identity in preventing the formation of a transnational Muslim
identification in the U.S.
Since the major aim of this project is to understand how immigrants experience
life in the United States, the maintenance and transformation of gender relations occupy a
central place. According to the current census data, half of the Turkish population in the
U.S. is male and the other half is female. As a crucial element constituting and regulating
relations between sexes, partners, couples, etc., a focus on gender is imperative to
comprehend what happens when immigrants socialized with certain gender norms arrive
at a new country and encounter with a different gender ideology. Moreover, the
experiences of hijabi Turkish women, who can be easily singled out on the street, would
be different than those of non-hijabi women, who can easily pass as non-Muslims, in a
country where September 11 backlash has resulted in hate crimes, bias incidents, etc. In
other words, not all Turkish immigrant women would be experiencing their gender in a
similar way. Therefore this project also explores the gender dynamics within the
immigrant Turkish community in the U.S.
To sum up, this research project studies the experiences of the first generation
Turkish immigrants in New York and New Jersey with a focus on their ethno-national,
religious and gender boundary-making processes. In other words, it examines how these
people, after immigrating to the United States, construct and negotiate their ethnonational, religious and gender identifications influenced by their socialization in Turkey
and their interactions with the American society. It investigates the type of boundaries
immigrants either construct or are faced with, as well as the type of actions they follow as
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a result. It analyzes under what circumstances the boundaries immigrants employ become
visible and durable, or blurry and changeable. Focusing on Turkish immigrants in a
geography that demonstrates historical and structural differences from Western Europe,
this research traces the possibilities of becoming American in the backdrop of the tragic
events of September 11 and perceptions of Islam as potential source of threat for a very
long time.

Conceptual Framework
Identity and Boundary-Making Paradigm
The boundary-making paradigm is closely associated with the tendency to
establish social classifications that exist in almost all societies. Researchers agree that
individuals are inclined to categorize each other because the automatic and pragmatic
aspects of categorizing make it easier for them to interact with others (Fiske 1998). Social
Identity Theory (SIT), developed in the 1970s in Europe, attempts to understand
intergroup behavior, and asserts that individuals’ identification processes are closely
linked to their social groups as they categorize their in-group vs. out-group where the
former carries positive and the latter carries negative connotations (Tajfel & Turner
1986). These social categorizations are constituted “as cognitive tools that segment,
classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the individual to undertake
many forms of social action” (Tajfel & Turner 1986:15-16). Self-identification of
individuals is a ‘relational’ and ‘comparative’ process, meaning individuals take their in-
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group as point of reference to determine their similarities, and use their out-group to
measure their differences and hence gauge their own self worth. Moreover, evaluations of
group identification by the members of the in-group or out-group have to be consistent in
order to have influence on individuals’ social identification. This argument runs parallel
to constructivist perception of ethnic identity seen as the product of a dialectical process,
including self-assertion made by group members as well as ascriptions made by larger
society (Weber 1912, Barth 1969, Nagel 1994, Jenkins 1997).
Epstein (2010: 150), in her essay On Boundaries, jokingly says “human culture
depends on the ability to create conceptual boundaries and we, as sociologists would be
out of business if they did not do just that.” The sociological literature has long been
preoccupied with the notion of boundaries without using the term: from Durkheim (the
realm of the sacred vs. the realm of the profane) to Marx (classes) and Weber (ethnic
groups vs. status groups) (Lamont & Molnar 2002). The interest in boundaries lies in a
joint effort to understand “the role of symbolic resources (e.g., conceptual distinctions,
interpretive strategies, cultural traditions) in creating, maintaining, contesting, or even
dissolving institutionalized social differences (e.g., class, gender, race, territorial
inequality)” (Ibid: 168). The extensive sociological literature on boundary-work can be
grouped under following categories 1) in terms of their scope: macro-level (structural
formation of social categories) vs. micro-level (everyday practices and interactions of
individuals), 2) in terms of their themes: ethnicity/race (Barth 1969, Waters 1999,
Sanders 2002), religion (Straughn & Feld 2010, Yukich 2010), gender (Epstein 1992),
culture (Edgell & Hartmann 2006), etc., and 3) in terms of their analytical approach:
studies on the consequences of boundaries such as social stratification and social
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inequality (Anthias 2001, Massey 2007) vs. studies with a constructivist approach on the
nature of boundaries including their establishment, salience and permeability where
immigration research constitutes a significant share (Zolberg & Woon 1999, Alba 2005,
Jimenez 2009). This study falls in the category of micro-level immigration research with
a constructivist focus on the meanings, strength and durability of boundaries.
The sociological literature offers conceptual frameworks in order to define and
analyze the notion of boundaries and the processes of boundary making. The pioneering
piece by Lamont and Molnar (2002) in boundary-work literature introduces two types of
boundaries: symbolic boundaries defined at the intersubjective level and social
boundaries defined at the group level. Symbolic boundaries refer to “conceptual
distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time
and space” (168). These are classifications that individuals and groups constitute and use
in order to make sense of their reality. They help individuals understand the meanings
attached to oneself through the invention of the other. Social boundaries, on the other
hand, “are objectified forms of social differences manifested in equal access to and
unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities”
(Ibid). While the constitution of a social boundary is dependent on a common
understanding of a symbolic boundary, not all symbolic boundaries lead to social ones.
Underlying the daily and mundane aspects of boundary-work, Alba and Nee
(2003:59) define boundary as “a categorical distinction that members of a society
recognize in their quotidian activities and that affects their mental orientations and
actions toward one another.” Wimmer (2008a) offers a similar explanation and defines
boundary as having two dimensions: categorical and behavioral. He indicates that “the
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former refers to acts of social classification and collective representation; the latter to
everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of connecting and
distancing” (Ibid, 975). While the first dimension refers to “us” vs. “them” divide on a
conceptual level, the second one involves individual’s actions based on those
classifications. This project is situated in this conceptual framework by setting its focus
on both the conceptual and behavioral aspects of boundary making in the United States.
While claiming an identity creates boundary between those who identify with it
and those who do not, these boundaries are not necessarily fixed or stable but rather fluid
and changeable (Barth 1969). They regulate everyday practices, decisions, beliefs and
notions regarding others (Alba 2005). Boundaries also guide interactions within as well
as across groups by creating and nurturing feelings of belonging and distinctiveness
simultaneously. They could be social (Barth 1969), symbolic (Lamont & Molnar 2002),
bright or blurred (Alba 2005), or exist between inter- or intra- ethnic-groups (Jimenez
2008). Moreover, boundaries are path dependent; the nature of a boundary is based on
“materials available in the social-structural, cultural, legal, and other institutional
domains of the receiving society, as well as on characteristics and histories that the
immigrants themselves present” (Alba 2010:169). Factors such as access to political
power, labor markets, residential concentration, social institutions (when access is denied
to some groups), culture and daily experiences (such as constant discrimination by the
majority group) affect the way the boundaries are instituted (Cornell and Hartmann
1998). In a similar vein, Wimmer (2008a) asserts that boundary making rests upon three
factors of the political field: the institutions (nation-state), distribution of power, and
political networks (of state elites). Therefore, the structure of boundaries tend to change
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from one society to the next, affecting the experiences of social groups and their life
chances accordingly.
According to Zolberg and Woon (1999), change in the structure of boundaries
could take place in three possible ways: individual crossing, blurring, or shifting.
Individual boundary crossing takes place when immigrants acquire certain characteristics
of the mainstream society such as language integration or naturalization. However, in
boundary crossing the structure of the boundary remains unchanged unless the crossing
takes place in large scale for a period of time (Alba and Nee 2003). Blurring, on the other
hand, brings changes to the boundary structure where previously unaccepted cultural
characteristics are now seen as part of the mainstream (i.e. the institutionalization of the
immigrant religion or mixed marriages). It creates ambiguity regarding the structure of
the boundary so hyphenated identities such as Hindu-American make their way into the
mainstream. Finally, boundary shifting refers to the reconstruction of the boundary in a
way to include the previously excluded groups, such as the assimilation of Irish, Italian
and Jews to the mainstream in the U.S. Wimmer (2008b) offers a new taxonomy where
he expands the list of possible changes that could happen to boundaries by including
expansion (more inclusive boundary), contraction (more exclusive boundary),
transvaluation (changing the status of a group in social hierarchy either through reversing
or equalizing the existing order), repositioning (boundary crossing as an individual or
group), and blurring.
Bail (2008) argues that transformation or persistence of a boundary is closely
associated with the interests of majority groups (39). In a similar vein, Epstein (2010)
indicates that not only the powerful but also the subordinated groups may be resistant to
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change in a boundary because it gives them comfort, familiarity, and closure. Wimmer
(2009) points out that for the subordinate groups, keeping a boundary in place might even
be a strategic move so they could dissociate from other minority groups and receive the
approval of the majority group. Analyzing the assimilation processes of immigrants in the
United States, Alba and Nee (2003) argue that for new immigrant groups, the available
options regarding boundary change include individual crossing and boundary blurring. In
both cases, the individuals take on certain characteristics of the mainstream society, and
manage to pass as members of the majority. However, not all individuals from a minority
group manage to pass. Moreover, some boundaries are too bright and very resistant for
change to occur in its structure.
Stigmatized identity constitutes a good example to a bright boundary that is
difficult to transform. Defined as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified from
full social acceptance” by Goffman (1963:11), the term stigma is originated in Greek
where it refers to signs that were inflicted on the human flesh, signaling the moral status
of the bearer. Today, scholars mostly refer to an attribute that reduces the value of one’s
social identity (LeBel 2008). However, the stigma is not fixed but rather relational
(Goffman 1963), which means the attribute that devalues one’s worth may take on
different meanings in other contexts. For instance, a headscarf or a beard does not
inherently carry the meaning of stigma. It is “the normative cultural values and social
relations of class and power” that determine how these characteristics are perceived by
others (Gole 2003:810). Moreover, a personal characteristic that is considered as stigma
in one society/context/culture may not be perceived as such in another. Therefore, stigma
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is dependent on the relationship between the un-stigmatized, “normal” members of the
society and the stigma bearers.
Goffman (1963) discusses three types of stigma. First, there are deformations of
the body such as deafness. Second there are the “blemishes of the individual character,”
in other words flaws and imperfections that result from personal character such as alcohol
abuse and drug addiction. Finally, there is “the tribal stigma of race, nation and religion”,
into which an individual is born. Scholars have studied the effects of stigma across a vast
variety of groups: people with disabilities (Fine and Asch 1988), mental patients (Page
1997), people with excess body weight (Granberg 2011), HIV patients (Parker and
Aggleton 2003), Holocaust survivors (Stein 2009), LGBT community (Cain 1991),
African-Americans (Wacquant 2009) and alcohol/drug addicts (Dean and Rud 1984). For
the last ten years, studies focusing on a brand new “stigma” have joined the academic
bandwagon: Muslim identity in western societies.
The literature offers various strategies that the stigmatized may opt to choose
from in order to deal with the effects of stigma. According to Goffman (1969), one way
of encountering stigma is to conceal or obliterate stigma symbols such as trying to pass as
a non-stigma bearer. This strategy resembles to the individual boundary crossing where
the person takes on certain features of the majority group in order to blend in. By hiding
the stigma, the individual may pass, whereas the boundary for the stigmatized group
remains intact as the meanings attached to the stigma has not been altered. Second, a
stigmatized person may choose to present the signs of stigma as signs of a different
attribute. And finally, a stigmatized individual may decide not to pass as someone s/he is
not, and accept and embrace the stigma. This option reminds of the transvaluation of the
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boundary introduced by Wimmer (2008b), and the notion of reactive ethnicity (Rumbaut
2008), which thickens ethnic boundaries and motivates people to embrace their ethnic
identity when they are faced with hostile conditions in a society. While the first two
strategies are passive options, the last one is an active strategy that is more likely to
destabilize the structure of a boundary between the stigmatized and the majority group
than the first two, which are about total denial.
Importance of Social Context: Western Europe vs. the United States
Immigration paves the way for the creation of new boundaries in the receiving
society. Studying immigrant groups in France and the United States, Zolberg and Woon
(1999) argue that all integration debates boil down to two basic questions: “How different
can we afford to be, and how alike must we be?” (7). However, the literature suggests
that boundaries are path dependent, which means the same immigrant group in different
contexts may not be faced with a similar type of boundaries. For instance, Wimmer
(2009) asserts that “in the U.S. sticking to one’s religion and ethnicity is an accepted
feature of becoming national, while proving one’s distance from the commands of God
and the loyalty of one’s co-ethnics is necessary in many European societies” (257).
Although Muslim presence in the West is a highly problematic one, full of strains
and difficulties and has episodes of discrimination, injustices and even violence, the
literature suggests that there are remarkable differences in terms of Muslim experiences
on both sides of the Atlantic that should not be ignored. Some scholars, while
acknowledging the diversity in the degrees of accommodation offered to Islam in these
societies and hence the plurality of Muslim experiences across the continent, claim that
on the whole there are generalizable differences between Europe and the United States
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(Zolberg and Woon 1999, Alba 2005, Casanova 2004, Alba 2010, Foner and Alba 2008,
Alba and Foner 2015). While Islam, heavily freighted by discourses constituting it as the
cultural Other, signifies the incompatibility of Muslims with mainstream values and
norms in Western European societies, in the United Sates it is seen as a national security
issue rather than a cultural threat to societal values and institutions (Papademetriou et. al
2016). This major gap in the perception of Islam is claimed to be rooted in three
historical and structural differences that set these contexts of reception apart (Foner and
Alba 2008). These differences include the demographics of Muslims, the religiosity of
the receiving society, and the institutionalization of religion in Western Europe and the
United States.
There are significant distinctions in terms of the demographics of Muslims in
Europe and the United States. Perhaps the primary differentiation lies in the way these
contexts perceive immigration. While the American mainstream has a widely held belief
that U.S. is a country of immigration since its foundation, many Europeans see
immigration to their country as a novel and unprecedented phenomenon (Foner
2005:207-208). Another remarkable difference is the proportion and visibility of Muslims
among all immigrants in these two contexts. In the United States, Muslims constitute
only a small share of all foreign-born population (5 percent), and the largest group of
immigrants in the country is the Mexicans (25 percent) who are mostly Christian (Alba
and Foner 2015:131). Moreover, almost one third of the Muslim population in the U.S.
consists of African Americans, making it difficult to construct Islam as a non-American
religion (Foner and Alba 2008). In Europe, on the other hand, non-Western immigrants
are predominantly Muslim. They represent 8 percent of the total population in France, 6
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percent in the Netherlands and 5 percent in Germany (Ibid). Besides, in some cases in
Europe, Muslim immigrants tend to come from a single state or region, such as Turks in
Germany and Maghrebi immigrants in France, whereas in the United States, Muslim
immigrants come from at least 77 different states or regions (Casanova 2004,
Papademetriou et. al 2016). Furthermore, in Europe, many of the Muslim immigrants are
concentrated at the bottom end of the socio-economic ladder, with poor schooling and
occupational skills. In the U.S. on the other hand, Muslims constitute a highly educated,
middle class immigrant group (Foner and Alba 2008, Alba and Foner 2015). Therefore,
in the western European context the immigrant, the Muslim and the socio-economically
disadvantaged tend to be conflated in one group, contributing to their stigmatization as
the cultural other (Zolberg and Woon 1999, Casanova 2004).
The level of religiosity of the receiving country is the second main difference
across the Atlantic. Casanova asserts that since the establishment of the European
Economic Community in 1957, “western European societies have undergone a rapid,
drastic, and seemingly irreversible process of secularization” (Casanova 2004:88). This
process was also accompanied by a narrative, which constructs secularism as a “normal
and progressive” development in modern societies (Ibid: 90). Therefore, Muslim
immigrants in western European societies stand out not only as non-Christian but also as
non-secular and therefore un-modern. Under the “hegemonic knowledge regime of
secularism,” as defined by Casanova, the presence of Muslim immigrants, and demands
regarding the observance of Islam, create serious challenges and strains for European
societies (Ibid: 97). The U.S., on the other hand, is still a highly religious society where
religion and religious observance are considered as core mainstream values. According to
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a recent Gallup study, eight out of ten Americans identify with a religion, which is
predominantly Christianity (Gallup 2016). Religious identification is considered not only
a mainstream value but also a catalyst of immigrant adaptation. Membership in religious
institutions helps immigrants preserve their ethnic identifications, access social networks
and seek assistance on issues such as housing, employment, and education (Gap Min
1992, Papademetriou et al. 2016). Therefore, immigrants in the United States have a
tendency to become more religious than they were in their home societies (Casanova
2004). In other words, while religiosity eases immigrants’ way into becoming American,
it constructs bright boundaries in the case of Western Europe (Lucassen 2005, Levitt
2007).
The third and final major difference is the institutionalization of religion in
society and the nature of deeply embedded relations between state and mainstream
religion(s). In the United States, religious diversity among former colonies paved the way
for the establishment of the First Amendment in the Constitution, which foresees
religious freedom and strict separation between church and state (Alba and Foner 2015,
Casanova 2004). The constitution does not allow state to establish its own religion, and
prohibits it from providing funding for religious organizations. The secular nature of the
relations between state and religion made it possible for new religious faiths to establish
their own institutions and communities. Although the arrival of Catholicism and Judaism
with a new wave of immigrants at the turn of the 20th century was not greeted
enthusiastically, over time they managed to achieve parity and acceptance from the
mainstream society (Alba and Foner 2015). Therefore, the religious plurality in the U.S.
grants non-Christian religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam a space where they
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could establish their own congregations and provide services to the followers of the faith;
in this way, new religions reaffirm freedom of belief and transform the American
religious mainstream (Foner and Alba 2008, Casanova 2004). The history of state and
church relations in Western Europe, on the other hand, paints a different picture. The
western European societies have undergone processes of secularization since the second
half of the 20th century, but deeply ingrained relations between state and church are still
maintained. While the separation between state and religious affairs has been secured
under the ideology of laïcité in France, Catholic churches continue to enjoy their
privileged status compared to other religions (Alba and Foner 2015). The constitutionally
secular German state continues to provide funding for Protestant and Catholic churches
through a state tax, at the expense of isolating Islam from the mainstream religions. In
Sweden, although the church lost its privileges long time ago, the legacy of the state
church system renders Islam a marginal status in society (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012).
Therefore, the presence of such strong relations between state and religious institutions
prevent Islam from finding a fair ground to establish itself as a mainstream religion and
achieve parity with other faiths.
These three historical and structural distinctions are perceived as the reasons why
Islam has been constructed differently in Western Europe and the United States. First, the
demographics of Muslims in the U.S. and Europe set two distinct examples. While
Muslims in the U.S. have several different ethno-national backgrounds, those in
European countries are more likely to come from a single nation-state. Moreover,
Muslims in the U.S. enjoy higher education and socio-economic levels compared to their
counterparts in Europe. For instance, Turkish immigrants, who constitute a tiny group
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among Muslims in the U.S., are doing a better job than immigrants, who compose the
dominant Muslim group in Germany, in terms of their educational and occupational
accomplishments. Second, against a secular mainstream backdrop in Western Europe,
Muslim immigrants are reduced to a representation of non-Christian, non-secular, and unmodern individuals with lower socio-economic status. This is clearly exemplified in the
bright boundary that Turkish immigrants experience in European countries such as
Germany (Alba 2005). In the religious United States, on the other hand, the diversity of
Muslims’ ethnic background, their higher socio-economic status and their marginal
proportion compared to other immigrant groups prevent them from becoming the
problematic “Other” in society. Third, while Islam cannot enter the mainstream religious
arena in the European context due to deeply rooted relations between church and state,
the American secularism where state does not fund any religious organization gives Islam
a chance to establish itself on an equal footing and transform into an American religion.
This could be seen in the way Turkish mosques are organized in the U.S., which is
explored in depth in the chapters to come. As a result, despite the presence of negative
feelings and attitudes toward Muslims on both sides of the Atlantic, Islam emerges as the
cultural other in Western Europe but it is seen more of a security issue in the United
States. Therefore, the literature suggests, Islam forms a bright boundary only allowing
individual boundary crossings in Western Europe, while it constitutes less of a bright
boundary in the American context (Papademetriou et al. 2016). Although this project is
not designed as a comparative study, it offers insights on the situation of Turkish
immigrants in the U.S. and makes it possible to juxtapose the findings with the abundant
literature on Turkish immigrants in Western Europe.
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Gender and Migration
The history of immigration has been told mostly from the male perspective since
the scholarly attention predominantly focuses on the experiences of immigrant men. The
reason is historical: in the 1950s, 1960s and to some extent 1970s, men were
predominantly seen as the main risk takers when it comes to the act of immigration, and
women were more often than not perceived as tied movers, accompanying the male
migrant (either their father or husband), and their experiences were usually downplayed if
not unrecorded (Pessar 1999, Mahler & Pessar 2006). During this period, there were even
prestigious researches on immigration that collected data only from immigrant men, but
still made generalizations for the entire immigrant group (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003). This
tendency started to change from 1970s onwards, as second wave feminism’s demands for
gender equality had echoes in public and academic realms.
Hondagneu-Sotelo (2003) traces the emergence of feminist scholarship on gender
and migration, and divides the academic literature into three stages. The first stage begins
in the 1970s, when studies, mostly designed as quantitative research, follow the “add and
stir” approach, which means adding another variable, sex, into their analysis (Curran et.
al. 2006, Mahler & Pessar 2006). The inclusion of women in these studies was for
comparative purposes only, with a focus on education or labor market participation levels
or amount of earnings by immigrant women and men (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003).
Moreover, these studies equated the notion of gender only with women (Pessar 1999),
and perceived gender categories as fixed and unitary, rather than fluid, relational and
performative (Donato et. al. 2006, Mahler & Pessar 2006).
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The second stage of feminist scholarship on immigration starts in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, focusing on the nature of gender relations both as source and outcome of
immigration processes. The ethnographic method, first introduced by anthropologists,
later picked up by qualitative sociologists, has been instrumental in this new research
agenda (Donato et. al. 2006, Mahler & Pessar 2006). Influenced by third-wave
feminism’s arguments underlining diversity in women’s experiences based on their
ethnicity, race, class, sexual orientation, “by the observation that men possess, display,
and enact a variety of masculinities, and by the recognition of the fluidity of gender
relations, this research focused on two aspects: the gendering of migration patterns and
how migration reconfigures new systems of gender inequality for women and men”
(Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003:7). The defining feature of the third and final stage of feminist
work on immigration is that researchers take “gender as a constitutive element of
migration,” where they examine how gender penetrates into daily practices and
institutional structures such as “patterns of labor incorporation, ethnic enclave businesses,
citizenship, sexuality, and ethnic identity” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2000:117). Moreover,
these research projects do not limit their attention to family, household and domestic
realms, which was the case with the second-stage feminist research (Hondagneu-Sotelo
2003). They rather expand their horizon and focus on several –yet, most of the times
intersecting- issues including family (Hoang & Yeong 2011), race (Lopez 2003),
sexuality (Espiritu 2001, Brennan 2004), class (Bettie 2014), employment (Min 2001),
and citizenship (Cantu 2009).
In a similar vein, a great part of the literature on the history of Turkish emigration
predominantly focuses on the experiences of Turkish men in Europe. It is true that in the
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initial phases of migration from Turkey to western European countries through bilateral
agreements, the majority of workers who went abroad were men. However, the share of
women migrants has increased overtime. For instance, while the share of Turkish women
in Federal Germany was only 6.8 percent in 1960, the number rose up to 25.9 percent in
1974 (Abadan-Unat 1977). Many of these women came to Germany in the form of family
reunification whereas there were others who arrived alone for employment purposes, with
the hope of later bringing their spouses/families in Turkey through family reunification
(Ibid). The majority of existing research on Turkish immigrant women focuses on those
in European countries, and most frequently cover issues including Muslim hijab/veil
(Mandel 1989, Klinkhammer 2003), practice and dynamics of migration marriage
(Timmerman 2006, Akyol 2008), employment (Essers and Benschop 2007, Strüder 2003)
and empowerment (Winkler 2013, Liversage 2012).
Gender and sexual boundaries constitute a highly fruitful research ground
regarding the issues of boundary crossing and boundary shifting (Lamont and Molnar
2002). “Among the most pervasive of distinctions mark the boundaries between men and
women, and these distinctions mark the boundaries of conceptual and actual sex
segregation and enunciation,” says Epstein (1992:232). This project situates itself within
the feminist literature on immigration, as well as gender and sexual boundaries, which
affect the life experiences and prospects of women and men tremendously depending on
where they stand vis-à-vis the boundary.

Research Questions
This project has four sets of broad research questions. The first set deals with the
ethno-national identity formation processes of Turkish immigrants in the New York
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Metropolitan Area. What sort of symbols and markers, as well as narratives do
immigrants use in order to construct boundaries regarding American society? How do
they portray and make presentations of the “self” in their daily life? How do stories from
Turkey help them define who they are? What kind of variation exists among Turkish
immigrants?
The second one focuses on the structure of ethno-national boundaries of immigrants
regarding non-Turkish Muslim groups in the U.S. Do immigrants interact with
individuals from non-Turkish Muslim communities? Do they attend the same mosques
for prayers? Do they get together at community events? Do they celebrate religious feasts
together? How do Turkish immigrants situate themselves vis-à-vis other Muslims? Do
they claim sister/brotherhood on the basis of shared religion, especially after the 9/11
attacks where Muslim identity became unwelcomed?
The third set is on the nature of the religious boundary Turkish immigrants
experience in their every day life in the U.S. What do immigrants think about 9/11? How
did they experience its aftermath? What do they think about the responses by the
American government? Do they feel they were discriminated against, or had their
freedoms being curtailed by the government, by other people? To what extent do
experiences of secular vs. pious immigrants differ in American society? Do immigrants
experience a bright religious boundary? How does Turkish Islam gets organized in the
U.S.? What kind of new functions do mosques develop? How does participation in the
mosque life affect immigrants’ experiences in the United States?
The fourth and final set of questions focuses on the issue of gender relations. Do
answers given by Turkish immigrants to the abovementioned research questions vary
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based on their gender? How do Turkish immigrants define femininity and masculinity?
What do they think about gender roles? How do they perceive gender equality? What do
immigrants think about women’s employment outside home? How do they deal with new
norms on female sexuality in the U.S.? Do they mention any significant change in their or
their spouses’ roles after immigration to the United States?

Methods
For this research project, I used the two major data collection methods of the
qualitative research: in-depth interviews and participant observation. As opposed to
survey questionnaires, in-depth interviews help researchers go beyond “yes or no”
questions and help them understand meanings attached to certain issues by the groups
that are being examined. In-depth interviews act as a gateway for researchers into the
world of interviewees. Through the use of in-depth interviews we can comprehend how
certain events have affected the population under study, and how they interpret the world
around them (Weiss 1994). Using in-depth interviews, we can learn about interviewees’
past experiences, their present attitudes and future expectations.
Unlike survey questionnaires, while doing in-depth interviews the researcher may
not know all the right questions to ask but rather follow the flow of the interview and
may come up with interesting findings that are not anticipated (Bloemraad 2012).
Although there is always the danger of drifting away from the main issues and losing
focus, a good researcher usually finds a way to direct the interviewees to the research
questions of the study. In-depth interviews also help developing new research questions,
finding new territories to explore, and opening up new ways of thinking. For this study, I
used semi-structured interviews that includes a list of questions but also left room for
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improvising and allowing the interviewee to influence the direction of the interview
(Sanchez-Ayala 2012).
The major goal of this study is to understand the experiences of Turkish
immigrants in a society that has been deeply traumatized by September 11 attacks. Since
I need to understand the meanings they attach to their life and relations in the United
States. as well as their perception of certain events (such as 9/11 backlash), a simple
questionnaire format would not be sufficient. Therefore, I conducted what Rubin and
Rubin (1995:6) refer as cultural interviews whereby the researcher examines “shared
understandings, taken-for-granted rules of behavior and standards of value, and mutual
expectations.” I complemented the interviews with participant observations. To this end, I
attended regular Friday gatherings of three Diyanet (the Directorate of Religious Affairs)
run Turkish mosques, two in New York City, and one in New Jersey. I also participated
in community events organized by local groups including April 23rd celebrations, the
Turkish-American Day parade in Manhattan (NY) and Clifton (NJ), celebrations of the
holy birth week of Prophet Mohammed.
I conducted 52 in-depth interviews with first or 1.5 generation Turkish
immigrants. Thirty-two (62%) of these respondents were females whereas twenty (38%)
of them were males. I recruited respondents from the New York Metropolitan Area,
mainly from the five boroughs of the New York City (Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, the
Bronx, and the Staten Island), and three counties of New Jersey (Bergen, Hudson and
Passaic). In order to recruit respondents to this study, I used a mixture of purposive and
snowball sampling methods. Since this research project examines Turkish immigrants’
ethno-national, religious and gender boundary-making processes as well as their
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experience in the U.S. before and after September-11, I had to use purposive sampling to
make sure that I ended up with enough number of subjects with different levels of
religiosity, education and socio-economic status.
Interviews consisted of four question blocks. The first one dealt with life stories
of immigrants including their families, life in Turkey, and reasons to migrate. The second
block was about the characteristics and definitions of Turkish-ness, and meanings
attributed to the notion of American. The third block included issues of religious practice
in the U.S., including their experiences in the aftermath of September-11, and
immigrants’ perceptions of and relations with non-Turkish Muslim communities. The
fourth and final block dealt with gender relations, the issue of sexual norms, the
definitions of femininity, the understandings of gender equality, division of labor and
women’s employment outside home. These four related aspects in the interviews
established connections between immigrants’ life stories in the home country,
experiences in the U.S. and their perceptions of boundaries regarding mainstream
Americans and non-Turkish Muslims. All interviews are conducted in Turkish and in
2013 (April-June) and 2014 (August). They are recorded, transcribed and coded on the
qualitative software program ATLAS.TI.

Chapter Overview
This dissertation has four empirical chapters. The first chapter deals with the
ethno-national identification processes of Turkish immigrants in the United States. It
opens with a discussion of the notion of personal space, which is celebrated by several
immigrants with varying levels of religiosity. It then moves on to examining the way
immigrants define the concept of American based on their experiences, and the positive
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and negative attributions they use while referring to their friends, co-workers, neighbors
or random people they met on the street. It discusses the symbols and markers as well as
the nature of the symbolic boundary defined by Turkish immigrants. The chapter ends
with a discussion of immigrants’ perception of themselves as American, and what it
entails for future generations born in the U.S.
The second chapter focuses on the organization of religious life and religious
boundary for Turkish immigrants in the U.S. It first discusses the organization of
religious life in the U.S. for religious faiths in general and Islam in particular. Drawing on
examples from the field work, it moves on to explain how the organization of Turkish
mosques have taken after the Protestant model in the U.S. and what kind of differences
this development has produced in comparison to the case in Turkey. Then, it discusses
the experiences of Turkish immigrants in the aftermath of 9-11 backlash, and examines
how they differ from the experiences of Muslim Arabs explored in the literature. Finally,
the chapter investigates the experiences of immigrants regarding their practice of Islam in
the U.S. and their understanding of the religious boundary stemming from the negative
portrayals of Islam in the media and political discourse.
Third chapter discusses the symbolic boundary Turkish immigrants construct visà-vis non-Turkish Muslims, especially Arabs. It begins with a short discussion of the
modernization project of Turkey, and how it constructed Turkish ethno-nationalist
identity as modern, civilized, Muslim, and a complete opposite of the Arab Muslim. It
explores how Turkish immigrants, within this backdrop; perceive non-Turkish Muslims,
and what kind of markers and symbols they use in order to differentiate and put a social
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distance from them. It also examines under what conditions this bright boundary is
challenged, and what type of revisions is made as a result.
The fourth and final empirical chapter centers on the issue of gender boundary. It
first looks at how the notion of the Turkish woman emerges as the marker of two distinct
but related boundaries in immigrant narratives. It then explores how the notion of namus
(honor) regime immigrants socialized in Turkey is challenged and what that means
regarding immigrant women’s sexuality in the U.S. The chapter moves on to examining
the way immigrants’ define notions of femininity and masculinity and gender equality
and what kind of differences they perceive in terms of gender roles/equality in the U.S.
and Turkey. It later explores immigrant’s understanding of division of labor in the
household and its resemblance to the American context. Finally, the chapter looks at how
women’s employment outside is perceived, and what sort of challenges they face in U.S.
Finally, the conclusion chapter revisits the entire research. It starts with
mentioning the main motivations of this research project. Then it moves on to briefly
discussing the findings and conclusions of each empirical chapter. Finally it discusses the
contributions of this research to academic literature on immigration, boundary-work,
religious identity and gender relations.
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Chapter 2: The History of Turkish Immigration to the United States
Modern Turkey has long been known as a country of emigration due to a large
population movement to Western Europe in the 1960s. In order to provide the manpower
needed for the economic boom during the European rebuilding period following World
War II and also to solve the unemployment problem in Turkey, the Turkish government
had signed bilateral agreements with countries including Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Holland and Sweden. Among these European countries, Germany is the one
that recruited the highest number of Turkish workers, which is reflected in the current
size of its Turkish population. While the initial desire on both sides of the agreements
was the return of the workers back to Turkey eventually, things did not work out as
planned and majority of Turkish workers settled down in their new countries.
The oil crisis of 1973 put an end to labor recruitment programs across Western
Europe, but did not stop population movements from Turkey, as they continued in the
form of family reunification, asylum seeking, and irregular migration. Given that
migration to Europe became much more difficult especially for the unskilled and semiskilled, new destinations including the Middle East, ex-Soviet countries, and North
America gained popularity over time. According to De Bel-Air (2016), the total number
of first-generation Turkish immigrants abroad is estimated around 2.9 million in 20142015. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects that over six million people of
Turkish descent (including those born abroad and naturalized immigrants) are living
outside of Turkey (MFA 2017). Of this number, 5.5 million is claimed to live in Europe,
and the rest is dispersed across North America, Asia, the Middle East and Oceania.
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The past two decades have also witnessed Turkey gradually emerging as a country
of immigration (Kirisci 2007). One of the major reasons for this new development is the
further tightening of borders across the European Union from 1990s onwards. For many
immigrants coming from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa, Turkey has come to
serve as a waiting room until they make their final move to Europe (Icduygu 2005, Danis
2006). Turkey has also become a magnet for people coming from the Balkans and exSoviet countries seeking employment opportunities in the form of circular migration
(Kaska 2006, Akalin 2007, Kirisci 2008). Moreover, the Mediterranean coast of Turkey
has become a famous destination for elderly Europeans to settle down after their
retirement (Balkir and Kirkulak 2009, Balkir and Sudas 2014). Finally, the Syrian civil
war has produced the highest number of refugees from a single nation ever arriving in
Turkey. As of December 2015, a modest estimate of the foreign-born population in
Turkey amounts to 5.6 percent of the total Turkish population, which is around 80 million
(De Bel-Air 2016).
Although migration to Western European countries where the majority of Turkish
migrants is currently located was initiated through bilateral agreements to supply
workers, the movement of people from Turkey to the United States follows a quite
dissimilar trajectory. As a migration route first traveled long before the establishment of
the modern Republic, the history of Turkish movement to the United States is usually
discussed under three distinct waves: the turn of the 20th century, the post-second world
war, and lastly, the post-1980 migration.
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First Wave: Late 19th and Early 20th Century Migration
The first wave of migration from the Ottoman Empire began in the mid-19th
century where the Ottoman subjects of various ethnic backgrounds crossed the Atlantic
and landed in the New World. The number of immigrants arriving in the U.S. from the
Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century is highly contested. The U.S. Department of
Justice statistics indicate that during the period between 1820 and 1900, approximately
35,000 Ottomans came to the United States (US Department of Justice 2002). During the
first three decades after the turn of the century, a total of 325,259 immigrants arrived in
the U.S. from different regions of the Ottoman Empire (ibid). The data compiled by
Karpat (1995) from various American sources puts the number of Ottoman immigrants
coming to America between 1820 and 1931 as 415,793 (244). The majority of the
immigrants were non-Muslim Ottoman subjects including Sephardic Jews, Armenians,
Greeks, Serbs, Bosnians, Assyrians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, other groups from the
Balkans, and Arab Christians (Karpat 2008b, Akcapar 2009). Karpat challenges the
accuracy of these numbers due to the problems in systematic data collection at the time
both in the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire (Karpat 1985). He also asserts that the share of
Turkish Muslim immigrants is higher than what is usually claimed for two major reasons
(Karpat 1995). First, the U.S. officials collected data based on country of origin (i.e.
Turkey in Europe, Turkey in Asia), which would not classify immigrants according to
their religious belief. Second, he claims that many Turkish Muslims had registered under
Christian names due to a fear of facing discrimination in a Christian society (Ibid).
Based on Ottoman as well as other statistics, Karpat estimates that during the
period between 1820 and 1920, over 1.2 million had immigrated to North and South
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America from the Ottoman Empire where the majority headed North, and nearly fifteen
percent of these immigrants were Muslims, of whom 50,000 were Turks (Ibid 233). For
the same period Bali (2013), sticking to official sources, puts the number of Ottomans
between 200,000 and 300,000, where Turks consist of only 5 percent of the total
population (53). Ahmed (1993), whose father was among the early comers to the U.S.,
claims that while non-Muslim subjects were the majority among those who arrived, some
45,000-65,000 Turks came to the United States until the outbreak of the World War 1 (x).
Grabowski (2005) asserts that 25,000-50,000 Muslim Turks arrived in the U.S. during the
period between 1890 and 1924 (85-86).
The majority of the Ottomans who arrived during this period came without proper
travel documents. There was a travel ban in place for Ottoman subjects, and those who
wanted to leave had to receive a governmental permission (Ahmed 1993). Since getting it
through the hurdles of bureaucracy was beyond the means of many peasants from
Anatolia, they found alternative ways to get out of the country. The most commonly used
route was traveling with the help of French shipping companies. At the time, these
companies were carrying hazelnuts and various agricultural products between the Black
Sea ports in Anatolia and Marseilles, France. Having seen a business opportunity and
potential rise in profits, the agents of these companies would not only sell tickets but also
dreams of making money to Ottomans willing to go to America (Ibid). Boarding the ship
from a Black Sea port, these immigrants would stay on board when the ship makes a
short layover in Istanbul or Izmir. Undetected travelers would then be able to reach
Marseilles, France where they would board another ship, which would be sailing to the
East coast ports of the United States. Ahmed (1993:87) shares an interview by journalist
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Mete Akyol conducted in 1970 with a Turkish immigrant who chose this route to come to
the United States:

“Just before dawn, Ali Haydar Ibrahim made his way, mostly by foot,
to the Black Sea port of Trabzon. It was a port where mostly French
ships called to pick up hazelnuts for the French port of Marseilles. The
shipping agents were all French. These agents knew what we Turkish
peasants wanted to do, and they advised us on how we could
circumvent the Turkish laws which prohibited its citizens from
deporting the country without permission of the government. All the
Turks were told to tell the Turkish authorities that they were going to
Istanbul to look for work. The French shipping agents would then sell
us two tickets: one would read “destination Istanbul” and the other
would read “destination to Marseilles.” We hid that ticket until we
cleared Turkish waters. Of course, the French also gave small bribes to
the Turkish officials who had heard of and understood what these
Anatolians were really up to. The only ticket paid for was the one to
Marseilles. I was instructed not to leave the ship in Istanbul or Izmir.
Once well out into the Mediterranean Sea our tickets would be
collected. We followed our instructions and had no problems.”

The population movement from the Ottoman Empire to North America at the turn
of the 20th century was motivated by several factors (Bali 2013). First, the technological
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advancements such as the invention of steam engine had shortened the duration of travel
by steamships by half, thus making it possible to reach America in 1-2 weeks. Second,
the pay for unskilled work in America was five or ten times higher than the amounts any
farmer or shepherd in the Ottoman Empire could possibly earn. Third, for the nonMuslim population, the obligation to serve in the military, from which they were exempt
until 1909, was an additional reason to leave the country. Moreover, the image of
America as a country with streets paved in gold made an impact among the subjects of
the Ottoman Empire. According to Bali (2013), letters and/or money sent by co-villagers
abroad, travel guides, advertisements, shipping agents, middlemen trying to recruit
workers for American companies all contributed in the marketing of this dream-like
image. American missionary schools, especially the one in Harput, played a significant
role as well (Ahmed 1993).
Immigrants arrived during the first wave were mostly composed of illiterate,
unskilled young people with no command of English and coming from rural
villages/towns of cities such as Harput, Dersim, Rize, Samsun, Giresun, and Elazig
(Grabowski 2005, Ahmed 1993). Over 90 percent of the immigrants were males between
the age of 14 and 44 (Bali 2013). Clustered in cities such as New York, Detroit, Chicago,
Pittsburg, and Philadelphia, these immigrants were predominantly employed in the
industrial sector (Ahmed 1993, Bali 2013). In several towns of Massachusetts including
Salem and Peabody, they were working in factories specialized in leather products such
as shoes and purses. In Detroit, they were employed in automobile factories (Ahmed
1993). There were also immigrants who established their own businesses. A Tatar (Turk)
had a silk factory in New York, and in Worchester, a Turkish immigrant named Hafiz
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Efendi was running his soap factory (Sertel quoted in Bali 2013:311-12). The majority of
the self-employed were in the business of running laundries, barbershops, restaurants,
small stores, shoe shops, and coffeehouses (Ahmed 1993, Sertel quoted in Bali 2013:31112). Although their wages were higher than those paid in Western Europe, many of the
immigrants employed in factories were working under unhealthy and dire conditions. In
many cases, immigrants’ poor English skills were limiting their employment
opportunities, making only these types of jobs available (Ahmed 1993, Sertel quoted in
Bali 2013:311-12).
Turkish immigrants soon established their own communities. In neighborhoods
with high concentrations of Turks such as Peabody, MA, the immigrants were socializing
with their co-ethnics in coffeehouses. According to Ahmed (1993:66), “The highest
concentration of coffeehouses in New England was clearly along Walnut Street in
Peabody, MA from the early turn of the century until two decades after WWII, when the
last one closed. At the peak of the Turkish presence, when over three thousand Turks
lived in Peabody one could find several Turks, an equal number of Greeks, and one or
two Armenian coffeehouses all doing a flourishing and noisy business.” Dr. Fuad Bey,
the secretary general of the Society for the Protection of Children, during his visits to
Turkish communities in the United States in 1923, makes a similar observation. He
asserts that Turkish immigrants were gathering together, socializing and discussing
developments regarding their home country in these coffeehouses. These were also the
places where the unemployed were spending their spare time. Fuad Bey mentions that
there were four coffeehouses in New York in the early 1920s (quoted in Bali 2013:309).
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Many of the Turkish immigrants, having arrived in the United States without their
families, were subletting beds in houses occupied by their co-ethnics in order to pay a
much-reduced rent. These houses were usually referred to as ‘rooming’ or ‘boarding’
houses, where 30-40 single men would be staying together, while sharing household
chores such as cooking meals and cleaning the house (Ahmed 1993). Bali (2013:340-2)
shares the interview journalist Hikmet Feridun Es made with Hasan, a Turkish immigrant
who worked and lived in such a house for a long time:

“In our village we had Armenian neighbors. They went to America
first. We saw how Artin, who had gone to America a little bit – maybe
a year and a half – earlier sent his father six [gold] Napoleons. Kirkor
went after him. He sent his mother the price of a field. Then the sons of
our paternal uncle went. No money came from him, but he sent good
letters. And a little later, he sent money too. We said, “What are we
waiting for?” We saw America as a golden land. (…) I went out into
New York, and oh, my God! It was nothing like Erzincan. It was really
crowded! Where would I go? In what direction? What would I do? I
didn’t know a single word of English. The people around me were
staring at my fez. In those days, they hadn’t yet heard the name Turk.
They were practically backing away from me. I saw that this wasn’t
going to work out, and I slowly removed my fez. As I stuck it in my
pocket, a man came up to me.
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Didn’t he ask me in Turkish, “Are you coming from Turkey?” I
wanted to kiss him… I threw myself on the man’s neck. He asked
where I was from. I told him I was from Erzincan. “There is no home
here for people from Erzincan, but there is a home for those from
Erzurum. Shall I take you there?” Such homes still exist now. But back
then there were lots of them. Thirty or forty people from a particular
province – or sometimes fifty or sixty – would get together and live in a
home. There were homes for people from Bitlis, Mush, Diyarbakir, and
Erzurum. Those who lived in those homes pooled their money to pay
the rent. All the homes were organized in the same way. A president
called the “Ross” would supervise all the chores. Additionally, the
houses had a servant who was also in charge of cooking. They paid the
cook, that is, the servant, a dollar and a quarter. The cost of the cook’s
food was deducted from that, and on the weekend the cost was shared.
They usually chose these cooks/servants from those who had just set
foot in America. Because, since they were totally ignorant of the
language, they couldn’t find another job. They would work for their
countrymen who had come earlier, and while on the job, as they cooked
for them, they would learn a little bit of the language, get to know their
surroundings a bit, and when they were ready to look for another job, a
new servant would come. So I became the “servant-cook” in a house
where sixty-two people slept. (…) Every Turkish immigrant went
through that servant-cook phase as soon as he came to America. That’s
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why all the Turks in America are very good cooks. And what they
cooked best and most often was bulgur pilaf.”

The First World War and the developments followed in its aftermath had slowed
down the rate of migration from the Ottoman Empire for several reasons. To begin with,
during the war, the Ottoman government was in alliance with the Germans, the enemy of
the United States, which as a result dissolved the diplomatic relations between the two
countries (Karpat 1995, Akgün 2000). Second, the adoption of the Immigration Act of
1924 (a.k.a. the Johnson-Reed Quota Act) introduced an annual quota for immigrants to
be admitted to the United States. The Act limited the number of new immigrants to a 2
percent of the immigrant population from that country already living in the U.S. during
the1890 census. Ending mass migration to the U.S., the Act also reduced the number of
new arrivals from Turkey, as the quota was limited to 100 individuals per year (Halman
1980). Third, on July 1st 1924, the American government introduced the obligation of
obtaining a visa before embarking upon a journey to the United States (Bali 2013). And
finally, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 served as an important factor
in the reduction of potential migrants to America. Moreover, the need for manpower in
the war-torn young republic not only slowed down out-migration but also resulted in
return migration. Halman (1980:993) says, “Turks living abroad were encouraged to
return home; in many cases the Turkish government made loans or outright grants to
those who wanted to go back to Turkey but did not have money for the passage. In
particular the well-educated Turks abroad were offered attractive incentives and job
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opportunities in the new republic, which was in dire need of professionals and
technicians.”
Gordon (1932) claims that almost 70,000 Ottomans who became American
citizens returned to Turkey until 1925 (quoted in Bali 2013:41). According to Halman
(1980), 86 percent of approximately 22,000 Turks that arrived in the U.S. between 1899
and 1924 went back to Turkey (993). Ahmed indicates that the return migration from the
United States to Turkey started in the 1920s and continued until the Great Depression,
leaving less than twenty percent of the initial Turkish population behind (Ahmed 1993).
Karpat (1995) asserts that more than half of the Turkish Muslims in the U.S. decided to
return to their home country. This high rate of return migration may not come as a
surprise as the main aim of the first wave Turkish immigrants was to earn enough money
that would sustain them for the rest of their lives in Turkey. Several accounts have
mentioned this motivation among the immigrants. Ahmed (1993) indicates that
immigrants had little or no interest in adapting to the daily life in the American society
(12). Yalman makes a similar observation during his visits to Peabody in 1911. He asserts
that their only motivation was not to get sick and to be able to return Turkey after making
some money. With great disdain, he indicates that whenever a Turkish immigrant was
interested in learning English or getting to know American society, the others would be
making fun of him in order to talk him out of this idea (quoted in Bali 2013:327). He
narrates one of his encounters with these Turks as the following:

“[The immigrant says] ‘We don’t bother to learn this country’s
language, just because we’re not thinking of settling here. We don’t
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approve of those who learn it; we try to stop them.’ (…) Ahmet Şükrü
and I were appalled at the spectacle of their ignorance. Because they
didn’t learn the language and avoided participating in the life around
them, they didn’t progress; having come to a distant land with so much
sacrifice and struggle, laboring in menial jobs they couldn’t get out of,
they were learning nothing in the New World, they were really out of
luck.” (quoted in Bali 2013:329)

Karpat (1995) makes the observation that while non-Muslim immigrants from the
Ottoman Empire such as Armenians and Greeks managed to establish their own
communities in the U.S., Turkish immigrants were not successful at that. He thinks the
main reason is the fact that these groups were already living organized in the form of
communities in the Ottoman Empire, so they knew how to establish a life around
religious institutions. Turks, part of the Muslim majority of the Empire, on the other
hand, had no such practice. Karpat (1995) also adds that the lack of an enlightened
leadership that would guide immigrants regarding their cultural and religious needs and
help them adapt to life in the U.S. also contributed to this problem. He says, “Most
Muslims looked upon America as a culturally alien land where they had been driven by
sheer necessity and where they wanted to stay as little as possible. So they refused to
strike permanent roots, build mosques, and establish their own communities as Muslims”
(Ibid: 236). And the Turkish immigrants who stayed behind married native-born
Americans and eventually assimilated linguistically, religiously, and ethnically into the
American society (Akçapar 2009).
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Second Wave: Post-Second World War Migration
The second wave of Turkish immigration marks the period between 1950 and
1980. Although the number of Turkish entries to the U.S. plummeted in the wake of the
Immigration Act of 1924 which allocated an annual quota of approximately 100 people to
be admitted from Turkey, the number started to increase after the removal of the quota
system by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Therefore, while the total
number of newcomers was at a low of 1,065 during the period between 1931-1940, 758
between 1941-1950, 3,519 between 1951-1960, the number jumps to 10,142 in the 1960s
and 13,399 in the 1970s (U.S. Department of Justice 2002).
In addition to the removal of the immigrant quota, developments in international
arena and the strengthening of bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States
have contributed to this sudden increase. The establishment of political ties between
Turkey and the United States with the Truman Doctrine of 1947, and Turkey’s NATO
membership in 1952 opened up new opportunities for Turkish professionals (Karpat
1995). While the first wave was mostly composed of unskilled, illiterate, and rural
migrants, the immigrants who came to the U.S. during the second period predominantly
included high-skilled, highly educated young men and women who were students,
professionals, medical doctors, engineers with good command of English (Halman 1980,
Karpat 1995, Akgun 2000, Akçapar 2009).
During the 1950s and 1960s, a significant number of Turkish students started to
arrive in the United States for educational purposes. While the first comers usually paid
for their own education, over time more scholarships became available for Turkish
students willing to pursue post-graduate studies in the U.S. (Ahmed 1993). In the 1950s,
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graduates of Robert College, an American school for boys opened in 1863 in Istanbul,
started to arrive in the U.S. (Ibid). Referring to this new trend in Turkish emigration
history as “brain drain,” Halman (1980) indicates that at least 2,000 engineers and 1,500
medical doctors came to America beginning from the late 1940s. He also makes the claim
that the number would be much higher if there were no immigrant quota. Having
received exciting job offers, a great number of these students decided to stay in the U.S.
after receiving their diploma (Ahmed 1993). For example, the parents of Dr. Mehmet Oz,
a famous American TV persona and a medical doctor, also arrived in the U.S. during this
period. His father Mustafa came to Cleveland, OH as a medical resident in 1955 with his
wife Suna (PBS 2010).
The immigrants who arrived during this period identified themselves as secular,
modern Turks and pushed their Muslim identity to the background (Karpat 2008a)
Although their dispersion across the country prevented them from establishing “Turkish
communities,” they managed to form professional or cultural organizations that would
enable immigrants to perpetuate their Turkish-ness in a foreign land across the Atlantic
(Karpat 2008a, 1995). While the immigrants arriving during the previous wave
assimilated into the lower socio-economic layers of society, those who arrived in the first
two decades of the second wave had higher income levels, and therefore managed to
enter the middle to higher strata of the American society (Halman 1980: 993, Karpat
1995:238-9). The second wave was also marked by the presence of women migrants, not
only as dependents but also as students (Ahmed 1993). The final characteristic that sets
these two waves apart is the fact that the rate of return migration was negligible (Halman
1980: 994).
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In the last two decades of the second wave, newcomers from Turkey became
diversified in terms of their education level, socio-economic background, and skill set
(Ahmed 1993). In late 1960s, a group of tailors came to the United States from Turkey,
and settled in Rochester, NY. An executive from the Bond Stores of New York City, Mr.
Muscovite, while planning on inviting Italian tailors to come and work in the U.S.,
followed a lead from a Turkish associate and invited Turkish tailors instead (Ahmed
1993: 92). In 1967, there were over 600 Turks living in Rochester, as a majority of the
tailors came with their families (Ibid).1 Soon they establish a Turkish community by
building a school and a mosque (Karpat 1995, Erman 2013). So when the Bond Clothing
Company went out of business in early 1970s, many Turkish tailors supported each other
and established their tailoring shops in Rochester while some others moved to places
such as Washington D.C. and Lawrence, MA (Ahmed 1993).
In a similar vein, Turkish immigrants from the village of Yağlıdere (Giresun)
started to arrive in large numbers from 1968 onwards. The chain migration of Turks from
this region has an interesting connection to the forced migration of Pontic Greeks from
the Black Sea region during the tumultuous years of early 1920s (DiCarlo 2008).
Referred to as the Greek Genocide by the Pontus Greek refugees in the U.S., this
traumatic event led to the creation of a Pontus Greek community in and around New
York. Lefter Çember, a Pontus Greek from Yağlıdere, who had lost his family members
during these tragic events and escaped to the U.S. decided to visit his motherland years
later (Pusat 2004 quoted in Bali 2013:362). During his visit, he established relations with
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Karpat (1995) contradicts Ahmed (1993) and asserts that an initial group of 13 Turkish tailors arrived in
the U.S. in 1969. Soon the number of tailors rises up to 300, and with their families combined, a
community of 2,000 Turkish people was established in the city of Rochester.
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the then residents of the town, and brought one of them, Ihsan Ardin2, with him
(2008:111) to America. Over time, thousands of other members of the town started to
arrive in the U.S. settling in places such as New York and New Jersey. Purchasing
businesses sold by retiring Pontic Greeks, these Turks began to run shops such as gas
stations and diners.

“Whenever Lefter heard that friends of his were selling their businesses,
he would tell Ihsan and Ihsan would pass the word along the covillagers. This worked well for Ihsan, who had started charging people
for this information and for assistance getting to America. Within a 15year period, Ihsan had assisted thousands of his regional compatriots in
getting to New Yuva3. (DiCarlo 2008:112)”

There was also a Turkish community composed of villagers from Yağlıdere in
Connecticut. Referred to as Kennedy Kent4 in the daily conversations among Turks from
the region, immigration to this state followed a similar trajectory. The chain started with
some retiring Pontus Greek entrepreneurs selling their property such as pizzerias, gas
stations, mechanic’s shops or diners to Turkish immigrants intermediated by Lefter
Cember. After securing their workplace, these immigrants started bringing their own
family members, including the immediate ones as well as distant cousins (DiCarlo 2008).
A news article claims that over 20,000 people from Yağlıdere are residing in several
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It’s a pseudonym.
New Yuva is a pseudonym used by the author when she refers to the neighborhoods these Turkish
immigrants settled down.
4 This is actually a word play and is based on how the pronunciation of Connecticut sounds in Turkish.
3

	
  

43	
  

cities across the U.S. whereas only 7,400 remain in the village in Turkey (Milliyet 2015).
The diversification of the migrant stock in terms of educational and socio-economic
background, skill-sets, command of English, etc. towards the end of the second wave sets
the stage for the characteristics of the third and final migration wave from Turkey.
Third Wave: Post-1980 Migration
The third and final wave of Turkish immigration to the United States covers the
period between late 1970s and today. The rapid population growth in Turkey, the
increase in the unemployment rate, globalization and growing interest in the outside
world as well as the termination of labor recruitment programs in Europe motivated
people to consider new migration routes (Karpat 1995, Kaya 2003, Guler 2004). The
diversification of the Turkish immigrant population in the United States beginning from
1970s intensified during this period, creating an immigrant group coming from all walks
of life. Therefore, the third wave includes not only high skilled professionals but also
semi- and unskilled immigrants.
From 1980s onwards, arriving in the U.S. in the form of irregular migration also
became popular among Turks, as many of them chose entering the country from the
Canadian border, overstaying their tourist visas, or escaping from their ships (Guler
2004). The establishment of the Diversity Visa Program by the Immigration Act of 1990
intensified the heterogeneity among Turkish immigrants in the U.S. in terms of their
education level, religious orientation, and socio-economic background (Akcapar 2009).
The semi- and unskilled newcomers became rivals to immigrants from other ethnic/racial
groups for low-level service sector jobs (Guler 2008). Turkish immigrants found
employment in a wide range of areas including gas stations, construction sites, grocery
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stores, factories, or they started working as hairdressers, cab drivers, restaurant, diner or
shop owners (Karpat 1995, Guler 2008, Ferris 2010). For instance Kaya (2003:61),
during his fieldwork in 2002, was told that over 60 percent of the gas stations run in Long
Island had Turkish owners.
According to the 2016 Census Bureau statistics, the total number of people
claiming Turkish descent in the U.S. amounts to 230,342. This is a relatively small
immigrant group compared to Turkish population in many European countries. For
instance, as of January 2016 there are 1,352,200 Turkish citizens in Germany (excluding
those who were naturalized or born in Germany) (Eurostat 2016). This number increases
to 2.8 million when all Turks with migration background are combined, corresponding to
3.5 percent of the total population (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016). By contrast, Turkish
immigrants in the U.S. only correspond to 0.07 percent of the total population. The data
provided by the Eurostat of the European Commission indicates that there are
approximately 98,300 first generation Turkish immigrants in Belgium; 32,300 in
Denmark; 191,000 in the Netherlands and 160,300 in Austria. Since all these countries
have populations under or around 10 million (except the Netherlands) Turkish
immigrants have more visibility there than they have in the U.S (Eurostat 2016).
While it is a rather invisible group in a nation of 323 million people, the size of
the Turkish community in the U.S. is growing quite rapidly. To begin with, more than
half of the current Turkish population was born outside of the United States. Moreover,
of the foreign born immigrants (122,079), 35 percent arrived between 2000 and 2009, and
30 percent came after the year 2010 (ACS 2016). In other words, while 65 percent of the
foreign born arrived after 2000, only 35 percent came before that year. Two years ago,
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those who arrived before 2000 formed 40 percent of the foreign born population (ACS
2014). This is indicative of the fact that more Turks are coming to the U.S. annually than
it was the case before the year 2000. Although their numbers are increasing, their socalled invisibility brings certain benefits to Turkish immigrants in the U.S. First of all,
they enjoy the absence of stigma associated with their ethno-national identity, which is an
omnipresent factor in the lives of many Turkish immigrants in Western Europe.
Moreover, the socially constructed racial hierarchy in the U.S. categorizes Turkish
immigrants as Caucasian. A New York Times essay from 1909 titled “Is the Turk a white
man?” while reporting on the U.S. Circuit Court in Cincinnati regarding a naturalization
request by a Turkish citizen,5 argues that although Turks are “cruel and massacring
people” they are “also Europeans, as much “white” people as the Huns, Finns and
Cossacks” (NYT 1909).6 Unlike Europe where Turkish identification is tainted with
negative stereotypes and inferiority, being Turkish in the U.S. means belonging to the
superior racial category, except possibly for some people under certain circumstances that
compromise their whiteness, i.e. hijabi Turkish women.
Turkish immigrants are dispersed across thirty-five out of fifty states in the U.S.
The highest concentration is in New York with 32,316 immigrants, followed by
California (24,754), New Jersey (20,111), Florida (17,127) and Texas (12,924). In eight
other states, the population of Turkish immigrants is higher than 5,000. These states
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One interesting finding is that these immigrants referred to as “the Turks” in the press were
predominantly of Syrian Lebanese origin (Christian Arabs). Neither the press nor the government was
paying attention to ethnic differences in the Empire at the time, and were conflating all immigrants under
the name of Turk.
6 This was one of the many cases tried in court in 1909 after the decision by the Naturalization Bureau that
Turks are not white. Despite some negative rulings, the courts usually decided in favor of the applicants
who were predominantly Christian Arabs. Muslim immigrants, who were a small number at the time, were
denied citizenship on the grounds of being polygamist until the McCarran Walter Act of 1952, which lifted
the race category as a condition for naturalization right before the start of the second wave migration from
Turkey (Kayyali 2006:54).
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include Virginia (8,074), Illinois (7,984), Pennsylvania (7,610), Massachusetts (6,631),
Maryland (5,944), Washington (5,569), Ohio (5,452) and North Carolina (5,310) (US
Census Bureau, 2016). Numbers from previous community surveys are also indicative of
rapid growth of Turkish immigrants in the U.S. In 2011, the Turkish population in New
York was 16,562, almost half of the current number. In a similar vein, the number of
Turkish immigrants in California was 14,991, followed by New Jersey with 12,000
people, both states witnessing an increase around 40 percent. During the same period, the
number of immigrants in Illinois doubled, and in Massachusetts it increased by 25
percent.
In New York, the most densely populated areas by Turkish immigrants are
Brooklyn (5,513) and Suffolk County (5,523) followed by Manhattan (4,333), Nassau
County (3,703) and Queens (3,630). There is also a sizeable Turkish community in
Rochester (2,322) and Westchester (1,677). In New Jersey, slightly more than half of the
Turkish population is concentrated in three major counties, Bergen (6,192), Passaic
(2,827) and Hudson (1,560), which are in close distance to Manhattan. Kaya indicates
that Turkish immigrants are concentrated “in Brighton Beach and Coney Island in
Brooklyn, around Rivington and Forsythe Streets in Manhattan, and in Sunnyside and
Richmond Hills on Queens. Paterson, Clifton and Cliffside Park in New Jersey’s New
York suburbs have significant Turkish-American communities, while Long Island also
has a Turkish-American population” (Kaya, 2003).
As for the gender distribution among Turkish immigrants in the U.S., it is rather
equal with 53 percent being male and 47 percent female. With a median age of 33, the
most densely occupied age groups among the Turkish population include 25-34 (18.4

	
  

47	
  

percent), 35-44 (17.5 percent), and 5-17 (15.8 percent). According to the 2016 American
Community Survey, of all the Turkish immigrants in the labor force, 4.2 percent works in
occupations such as maintenance, construction and natural resources, 11.6 percent is
employed in production and transportation, 12.5 percent works in the service sector, and
18.8 percent is in the sales and office occupations. Akıncı provocatively refers to this
trend, the diversification of Turkish immigrants in terms of their skills and socioeconomic status in the U.S., as the “Germanification” of immigrants (Akıncı 2002).
However, current data indicate that more than half of the immigrants in the labor force
are employed in occupations such as management, business, science and arts (ACS
2016). Moreover, of the Turkish population aged 25 years and over, 55.5 percent holds at
least a BA degree and 92.6 percent holds at least a high school diploma (Ibid). Compared
to the situation in Germany, where 20 percent of the immigrants do not hold any school
degrees and 52 percent hold some degrees7 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016) and the
remaining 28% is still at school, Turkish immigrants in the U.S. are doing fairly a great
job in terms of their education levels and occupation.

Conclusion
Today, the majority of Turkish migrants reside in Western Europe. Initiated in the
form of labor migration through bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and
receiving countries, this population movement had mostly brought immigrants with rural
backgrounds to Europe. Migration from Turkey to the United States, which has consisted
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Moreover, of Turkish immigrants holding some school degree in Germany, only 16% holds Abitur, 7%
holds vocational school degree, 27% holds secondary school degree (Realschule) and 50% holds only
elementary school degree.
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of three waves, is different in terms of its trajectory and the characteristics of the migrant
stock that ended up in the new land. The first wave of migration started in the mid-19th
century, long before the establishment of the Turkish Republic. While the majority of the
carriers of Ottoman passport were non-Muslims, there was a sizeable Muslim Turkish
community as well. Mostly coming from peasant backgrounds, the majority of these
immigrants returned to Turkey after the establishment of the Republic in 1923. The
second wave of migration started in the 1950s, and brought highly educated Turkish
immigrants, mostly students, to the U.S. Having good command of English, and middle
to upper class backgrounds, these immigrants mostly relied on their secular ethnic
identity rather than religious one. The third and final wave, started in the 1980s, brought
immigrants from all walks of life, establishing diversity in terms of social class,
education level and religious orientation among immigrants.
Turkish immigrants in the U.S. are widely dispersed across the country. While the
majority of them are settled in New York, California and New Jersey, there are
immigrants in various other states too. The emigration from Turkey to the United States
peaked after the year 2000, pushing the percentage of foreign born in the migrant
population to 65 percent in 2016. Compared to their counterparts in Europe, Turkish
immigrants in the U.S. are doing fairly well in terms of their education and occupation
levels. Moreover, they do not carry the ethnic stigma, which has become an omnipresent
factor for many Turkish immigrants in Western Europe.
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Chapter 3: Drawing the Boundaries of an Ethno-National Identity in the U.S.
It is a warm, sunny afternoon in New York City and parents and their children
start to fill my view as I approach the Manhattan Bridges High School in Midtown
Manhattan. I hurry into the building, with the hope of securing a seat near the stage but
half of the large auditorium has already been filled with anxious parents and children.
This is an event organized by a weekend school frequented by children of Turkish
descent, namely the Atatürk School in Manhattan. The kids are going to celebrate the
April 23rd National Sovereignty and Children’s Day in Turkish style. I look around and
take a note of the crowd. Since it is a national holiday, the children are aptly wearing red
t-shirts and white pants/skirts, commemorating the colors of the Turkish flag. The red tshirts have the hand signature of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of the
Turkish republic, printed on their backs. I also see that the schoolteachers are dressed in
harmony with their students, wearing blazers in red and dresses in white, and standing
near the bottom of the stage. A lady wearing a headscarf with the print of a crescent and
star (Turkish flag) sits several rows away from me. I am seated next to two ladies, whose
children speak in English among each other but in Turkish with their mothers, with the
hope of engaging in a conversation during the show.
Soon the school principal takes the floor and starts delivering her speech in
English. Naming Mustafa Kemal as the revolutionary leader of Turkey, the principal tells
the audience that the main goal of the school is to teach Turkish language and culture
while preserving traditions to Turkish children growing up in the United States. Then, the
presenter starts explaining the importance of this day to the audience: “National
Sovereignty and Children’s Day is a unique national holiday celebrated each year on
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April 23rd. In 1920, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic,
dedicated April 23 as a gift to the children of the country to emphasize that they are the
future of the nation. (…) With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk
transformed Turkish society (…) from a Muslim part of an empire, into a modern,
democratic, secular nation state. Even after his death, Atatürk is commemorated by many
memorials through Turkey. As a nation connecting Europe to Asia, we are proud to be
here today to share and tell his fortune, to establish friendships, and empower our
children.” Then she announces that it’s time to take a moment of silence in remembrance
of Atatürk before moving onto the national anthems of Turkey and the other nations
represented by children who are invited for a performance. People stand up and sing the
Turkish national anthem, then the American national anthem with visibly less
participation from the audience, and they listen to remaining anthems.
Representing the bureaucratic tradition of Turkey, Mr. Levent Bilgen, the then
Consul General of Turkey in New York, takes the stage. Bilgen says, “Today is a very
meaningful day, for us Turks, our nation, our families and this gathering today is more
meaningful for our community and for us. (…) Our founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has
guided us on many fronts, and he also stated that we have to invest in our future. That’s
what we are doing today, because we learned from our children how easy for them to
embrace one another, as we should do so.” Speeches from diplomats of Albania,
Bulgaria, Japan, Kosovo, Macedonia and Uzbekistan follow suit. Once they are done, the
then Turkish American Federation President Mr. Ali Çınar takes the stage, followed by
guest speakers from the Bulgarian-American, and Crimean Turkish communities in New
York City. Almost all of the speeches are done in English, no Turkish translation is
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offered, and most of the parents in the audience lost interest by the time the diplomats
took the stage, explaining the white noise in the school auditorium during the speeches.
Once they are over, it is time for children’s performances. We watch children of Turkish
descent do tango, modern and folk dances, sing songs and cite poems that aim to kindle
nationalist feelings. Guest children representing several “friendly” nations also take the
stage for their dances. These groups include children from Albania, Bulgaria, Crimea,
Japan, Macedonia, Uzbekistan and United States (countries and regions that Turkey has
friendly relations with). In the closing act, the diplomatic guests, as well as all teachers
take the stage with the children. Then someone takes the microphone and says in Turkish
“Atatürk, rest in peace. Your trust (emanet) is in good hands,” followed by a round of
crazy applause coming from the audience. The program ends with everybody on the
stage, waving Turkish flags while singing the song “Imagine.”
The next day, I walk into another high school for an event organized by the
Attaché for Religious Affairs at the Turkish Consulate in New York. This time, I’m in
Brooklyn at Abraham Lincoln School, participating at the celebration of Prophet
Mohammed’s sacred birth. A small welcoming team at the entrance of the auditorium
hands out candies, roses, rose water, and English Qur’an. They give me additional copies
of the holy book, asking me to distribute them among my friends. Bewildered, wondering
why I received such a request, I accept the gifts and walk into the big room. I walk
towards a row of empty chairs, take a seat towards the back of the room and look around.
What a change of scenery from yesterday’s crowd! There is no overabundance of the
colors red and white, nor excessive display of Turkish flags, which were filling the scene
yesterday. The large auditorium is packed and from what I can see, there is a clear
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dominance of hijabi women in the audience. The program starts with Qur’an recitations
then moves onto speeches by Mr. Süleyman Duman, the then attaché for Religious
Affairs, Mr. Levent Bilgen, the then New York Consul General, followed by a short
video screening on the sacred week prepared by the Religious Affairs in Turkey. Later, a
young boy takes the stage to read Prophet Mohammed’s final sermon in Turkish,
followed by a young girl who reads the English translation. A choir composed of young
girls wearing red hijabs, white shirts and long, red skirts sing several hymns and the
English song “Insha Allah” by Maher Zain, a Swedish singer of Lebanese origin. After
the choir show, the guest speaker of the event, Professor Bünyamin Erul from the Head
of Religious Affairs in Turkey takes the stage for his speech on human dignity, making
several references to Prophet Mohammed and his teachings. The final act of the show is a
musical concert of Turkish Sufi music by an inter-ethnic band led by Ahmet Erdoğdular.
When the program was over, we all went out to the schoolyard, and enjoyed the food
prepared and offered by the women of a nearby Turkish mosque.
Although they took place on the same weekend, these two Turkish community
events were quite different from each other on several grounds. First, the embodiment of
Turkish identity took two distinct forms in these events. The school celebrations of the
national holiday were specifically marked by the sheer display of nationalist symbols
such as flags, red and white outfits of teachers and costumes of students, nationalist
poems, and frequent references to Ataturk, the founding father of Turkey. Moreover,
neither the performances nor speeches made any references to religion.8 The celebration
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  Moreover,	
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of the Prophet’s sacred birthday, on the other hand, was a different story. Contrary to the
secular, nationalist discourses from the day before, the performances and speeches were
heavily based on religious teachings. However, one cannot claim that the program was
free of nationalist symbols. Although downplayed to a great extent, Turkish nationalism
was present in the red and white outfit of the choirgirls. Still, there was no reference to
Ataturk whose name had repeatedly echoed in the auditorium the day before.
Another difference would be the choice of language in these events. As a show
targeting the parents, and other relatives of the school children, the entire program was
designed in English in the first case. Aside from a couple of poems and songs included in
the program, all the announcements and speeches were made in English.9 The program of
the sacred birth celebrations, on the other hand, was predominantly in Turkish. Although
all of the speeches done were in Turkish, the English language was not entirely absent.
These exceptions include an English reading of the Prophet’s final sermon, and the
English song sang by the choirgirls dressed in red and white. While the organizers of the
first event were interested in the making of a Turkish-American identity with secular,
nationalist, and symbolic enactments of Turkish identity, those of the latter event were
mainly focused on the religious aspect of Turkish-ness with a minor inclusion of national
symbols, and without any clear reference to Turkish-American-ness.
This chapter explores the ethno-national identity formation processes of Turkish
immigrants in the U.S. with the theoretical framework of boundary-making paradigm. In
other words, it is investigating the nature of symbolic boundaries immigrants harbor visà-vis mainstream American society, and the conditions under which they are constructed.
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By examining the extent and character of these boundaries, the final section of the
chapter discusses the possibility of talking about a Turkish-American identity emerging
within the immigrant community in the United States.

America: Land of Opportunities, Land of Personal Space
Before moving on to explore the nature and content of symbolic boundaries the
immigrants employ, the chapter will first discuss their impressions of living in the United
States. When asked about the positive aspects of their experiences in the U.S., many
respondents mentioned the concept of “personal space” which is perceived as an
American value. Although they do not openly refer to this term in their answers, they
dance around the concept when discussing their experiences in the United States. The
notion of personal space was introduced by Edward Hall (1969) who defines four
dimensions of distance: intimate (including touching), personal (some level of intimacy),
social (arm’s length distance, impersonal relations) and public (space given to public
speakers). Imagined as expanding bubbles around a person, these different levels of
personal distance guides individuals, from very early on, about how to behave and
interact with other people in varying contexts. Research has shown that there are cultural
differences in the understanding of personal space distances across the world. While
Anglo-Saxons keep the largest personal space followed by Asians, people from Latin
America and the Mediterranean keep the shortest distance from others (Beaulieu 2004).
In this study, the notion of personal space is conceptualized not only as physical
distance among individuals, but also as lack of social pressure on and uncalled-for
involvement in a person’s life choices. For many Turkish immigrants, personal space
designates the sphere of privacy and/or personal matters. It might include all aspects of
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an individual that make up their personality. Respect for personal space is an
understanding that immigrants of Turkish origin learned in the U.S. and are highly
appreciative of. Non-violation of boundaries of personal space gives immigrants an
opportunity to explore their personal traits and interests, and allows them, in Goffman’s
terms, to present a self that they would like to project without limitations. In immigrants’
accounts, Turkey constitutes a cultural opposite where personal space is constantly
violated by parents, friends, neighbors and even strangers.
For instance Bilge10, a young mother whose eldest daughter covers her hair and
attends school without any problems in the U.S., could not walk down the streets in a
popular, upper class neighborhood with predominantly secular residents during a short
summer visit to Istanbul without receiving negative looks and even nasty comments from
strangers about her daughter’s veil.

“My daughter decided to wear a headscarf. We talked about it. She was
nine. It was her own decision. (…) We didn’t encounter any problems on
our way to Turkey. But I kept wondering because she was short. Not too
short, but still she was a nine year-old child. [In Istanbul], we were
walking down the Bağdat Caddesi (Avenue) and people were staring at us.
One day we were at a restaurant on the Cadde. The place had a garden,
where they were serving food. But it was not right on the avenue; it was
on a side street, next to an apartment building. My daughter was walking
around in the garden, and I was waiting for the food. An old lady
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accompanied by a younger one, carrying shopping bags, approached my
daughter and told her something. My daughter turned and looked at me. I
got up, and said, “What is the matter?” She asked, “Is she a nun?” I
replied, “What do you mean? She is wearing it [her headscarf] for her
religion, at her own will.” She, again asked, “Is she a nun?” She was still
going on with it, and it turned into an ugly fight because I lost my
temper.”

She adds that she can perform prayer (namaz) anywhere she wants in public place
without anyone giving her a hard time. For her, the United States provides a cultural
environment where her personal space is respected and where she can fulfill her religious
requirements without any outside interference. Several respondents back up her
arguments, stating that there are no obstacles in the U.S. preventing them from wearing
hijab to or performing prayer at work or school. In a similar vein, Metin who considers
himself religious despite the fact that he cannot perform prayers during the day tells me
that the reason is not because he is not allowed to. He asserts that, to the contrary,
Muslims can perform prayer wherever they want.

“If you’d like to practice your religion, nobody would interfere. For
instance, I have this friend. We sometimes travel to construction sites due
to work, and he always carries his prayer rug (seccade) in the trunk of his
car. He would take it out [for namaz] at construction sites, among others,
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not caring what they would think about him. And nobody would say a
word. That’s still the way it is.”

While a significant number of respondents with a stronger religious orientation
mention the culture of respect for their religious belief and practice, secular respondents
discuss other forms of respect for their personal space. Esin, a cyclist in her mid-fifties
talks about the disapproving and discouraging comments coming from her friends when
she used to live in Ankara and cycle to her work. Her family, friends and colleagues
believed that a woman in her age should not go on bicycles as a leisure time activity, let
alone as a means of commuting. Yet, in the United States, she has managed to pursue her
interest in cycling where she has become a member of a biking community and now is
entering tournaments and taking long distance trips. While violations of her personal
space in Turkey did not deter her from cycling, the lack of boundary violations she
experienced in the U.S. helped her further her interest by exploring new opportunities.

“ I used to ride a bicycle back in Turkey. I have a ten year-old grandchild.
I used to live in one of the best neighborhoods in Ankara. (…) I had a
decent social environment. But still their attitude was like “You are a
granny, aren’t you ashamed?” They used to say I looked like a pizza
delivery boy when wearing a bike helmet. They were trying to impose
neighborhood pressure on me. I like doing sports. I’m happy [when doing
it]. My friends usually play cards. I don’t go along but these are my best
friends. There were these types of pressures.”
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The lack of social or peer pressure that respondents claim to be exposed in
Turkey echoes in Leman’s take on her experiences of living in the United States.

“One of the reasons why I like living in the U.S. is the lack of street
pressure, the psychological pressure on the streets. (…) In Turkey there is
pressure from the society, family, and religion. Even if no one makes any
comments, you know what they think, or would think, how they would
perceive. You know what they would ask even before they pop the
question. You know what they would say behind your back. (…) When I
was living in Istanbul, the moment I would open my apartment door, my
neighbor’s door would get open, too. You’re taking out the garbage, and
their door opens up. People are peeping because they have nothing else to
do. They are not channeling their energy, or wisdom into something else.
You don’t have that here. That’s what I like about here.”

When asked about the positive aspects of living in the United States, Bahri
mentions the possibility of performing an identity that one would like to present. Noninterference in his personal space by outsiders is one of the characteristics that set his
experiences in America apart from those in Turkey.

“I’d say freedoms. Not in the political sense of the term. What I mean is
this: they let you be who you’d like to be. (…) Nobody interferes in other
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people’s business. That’s not the case in Turkey. [People would say things
such as] ‘Don’t do that’ [or] ‘don’t say that but do this, it’s better’ etc.
That suffocates me. (…) From peer pressure to neighborhood pressure, yes
there is too much interference. There is less tolerance for [the breaching
of] social norms and taboos.”

A similar response comes from Abbas, who establishes a relationship
between the invasive nature of Turkish culture and lack of people’s personal
space.

“Positive aspects of living in the U.S…. independence (serbestlik) and the
fact that people are not nested. You don’t feel other people’s spaces.
Turkey is very much invasive in that regard. Other’s music, TV,
arguments, aggression in daily traffic… They all reflect on your life. Here
you can isolate yourself. Here, you get the opportunity of not to deal, to
ignore, and to stay away from things you don’t like. That’s what’s
important to me.”

Ekin describes how personal freedoms are actually tied to the teaching of
respect for other’s personal space since childhood as she experienced first hand in
her job in the United States.
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“Positive aspects… [It’s different] from our country in terms of freedoms
and respect because you realize… I worked in a kindergarten. They start
teaching children from there on. Maybe it’s the same in pre-care as well.
For instance you put the kids in a line, if they get even one step closer to
the other person than they should have, you stop the student and tell them
to give some space to the other. They have to learn how to give that space.
They don’t let them approach each other too much.”

This newfound respect for boundaries of personal space that immigrants enjoy
functions in two different but related ways. First, the lack of any violations of the
boundaries of personal space inspires immigrants act to the fulfillment of their wills and
desires. It motivates them to behave or perform however they are pleased. It helps them
pursue their dreams, without having to stand up to negative comments or discouraging
remarks. In other words, this extended sphere of freedom gives immigrants the
opportunity to construct an identity that they would like to present and be content with
their inner selves. Second, respect for personal sphere, a value that they attribute to
American culture, creates an instance or a moment where they situate themselves vis-àvis Turkish culture, and feel closer to American-ness. However, many believe that
respect for personal space comes at a price: social isolation. This freedom that they
cherish also means the absence of intimate relations established with friends, coworkers,
neighbors and even family members. Since respecting people’s privacy requires one to
keep a certain distance from them, many Turkish immigrants interpret this looseness of
relationships as isolation and loneliness. Respondents complain about lack of close
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relations with their American friends and neighbors, and about not having anyone to take
care of them especially when they get sick. Immigrants who had moved from Turkey
alone feel this more strongly, as the ones who came with a family have immediate family
members to fall back onto whenever they need physical and moral support.

Defining Who and What Is American
This section discusses how Turkish immigrants perceive the notion of
“American” and what kind of characteristics these constructions include. It is safe to say
that it is not a black (“Americans are bad”) and white (“Americans are good”) picture but
rather a grey and complicated one. Turkish immigrants project whatever they think they
(or Turkish people in general) are not on to this imagined American-ness. None of these
attributions indicate the emergence of a bright boundary but still showcase what they
think about the society they are living in. A number of immigrants think that Americans
are ignorant and aloof individuals who are disconnected from the outside world. Serra,
who has been living in the U.S. for over twenty years, voices this argument.

“Americans are people who do not read or have much information [about
the world]. The thing is they have their own bubbles. They own a car, a
house, and have payments to make. They have established their own
world, busy with their kids. Busy working. They have to pay their bills.
That’s why they are not receptive. (…) When I first came here, I met a
high school student. I told him that I was from Turkey. He replied, “Where
is that? Around Texas?” Therefore you don’t expect much. Their thoughts
are shaped based on what they see in the media, [or] read in the papers.”
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Echoing Serra, Aras and Umut, who have been living in the U.S. for the last six
and seventeen years respectively, believe that Americans cannot show where Turkey is
located on a map. Moreover, they also get Turks and Arabs all mixed up as they had
experienced. Umut says:

“They can’t show where Turkey is on the map. When they hear [the word]
Turk, it’s the Arab identity that comes up to their mind. Maybe the image
of a bearded terrorist, maybe some other images… There were people who
asked me if I were speaking Arabic and I said I didn’t. So they asked what
I was speaking, and I said Turkish. The questions they asked showed me
that people think Turks speak Arabic, and they are Muslim. This is the
image some people have in their minds.”

Aras believes the reason is that the media, including the news and movies, does
not introduce the rest of the world accurately to average Americans.

“I think they grow up with movies. And all those American movies
portray… Well, first of, they make the following assumption: Iraq, Iran,
Syria, Egypt, Turkey are all the same. I don’t know if you’ve met with one
but when you call an Ecuadorian a Mexican, it is seen as offensive. Or, if
you call a Mexican an Argentinian… Isn’t it the same for us when we’re
called Arabs? [For Americans] Turks are equal to Arabs. ‘Can you speak
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any Arabic?’ They wouldn’t know that a language called Turkish does
exist.”

Bahri, who interprets his loss of interest in following the Turkish news after living
in the U.S. for a certain time period as becoming American, argues that the American
ignorance does not stop at Turkey or Islam. It’s more than that.

“[Americans’ perception of Islam] has to do with their general ignorance
or with the position they occupy in the mainstream media. This is true for
Islam, but also true for, how shall I put it, to Russians or to Chinese. For
instance, the Boston marathon showed that they don’t know where
Chechnya is. They mixed it with Czech Republic or Slovakia. I mean they
don’t know what’s going on. They don’t know the history. From another
angle, their prejudices come from their ignorance. Not all prejudices come
from that. Hitler’s didn’t.”

Yet, some immigrants make a symbolic distinction among Americans, claiming
that talking to “European-Americans,” whom they deem as more sophisticated, is
different from speaking with those Mid-Westerners. Yekta believes that aside from the
highly educated, curious ones, the Americans live in their own universe, distanced from
and with less outside connections. He thinks, since they had little to no knowledge
regarding Islam, they believed the narratives of post-9/11 period, and equated it with
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terrorism. In a similar vein, Cemre thinks it is of no use to try explaining what “true”
Islam is to certain Americans. She claims:

“People [whose worldview] stays in the 1970s, who mostly live in the
mid parts of the U.S., rednecks, they are Americans. They believe there is
no country other than the U.S., or when they hear [the word] Islam, it’s
only terror that comes up to their minds. They are ignorant really. But
when you talk to a European American, you may enjoy a different
conversation. You can’t talk to others, they are illiterate.”

Aside from being ignorant of the outside world, Americans are also perceived as
being unfriendly, lacking courtesy and sincerity. Aras recounts a memory he had at work.
They were working on a project with Americans, and he befriended one of them.
Together they spent hours day and night, trying to finish the same project on time.
Whenever his new friend got up to get something from the vending machine, he did not
asked Aras if he needed anything, nor offered what he got from the machine. Aras thinks
if it were Turks, they would offer the food to their friends before eating it. Aras calls this
kind of behavior as the most defining American characteristic and believes it has to do
with their upbringing. He states, “Maybe it has to do with learning how to stand on their
feet at an early age. In Turkey, even when you’re 25, your parents would tell you what to
do and what not to do. But here, once they turn 18, they are thrown out. They leave their
homes for college anyway and they never return to their home. They stand on their own
feet. Nobody has to offer them anything. They would get up and get it.”
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A similar comment comes from Sabri, who argues that when Turkish people have
guests over they would do anything to please them. He claims that even strangers would
get welcomed, fed and invited to spend the night. However, that’s not how America
functions. He gives an example to make his point clear: “Let’s say this American friend
of mine… I wanted to offer him hotdogs, and he asked me four times if I was sure. Didn’t
believe that someone else would buy [hotdogs] for him. Do I make sense? This is who we
are.” Rauf makes a similar remark, stating that Turkish people like having guests over but
U.S. is different. He says, “You know we [Turks] like guests. We like to host people.
They don’t have it here in the U.S. They are not like that. In New York for instance, you
can’t stay at people’s place more than one day. Their space is small. They don’t have
time like we do. Here they are very time oriented you know.”
Some immigrants believe that the relations with Americans are superficial. Canan,
a hospital worker, argues that Americans are too selfish and their self-interest always
comes first. She also finds them insincere whenever they say “hi” or “how are you?” In
Turkish culture, she claims, when people call someone their friend they mean it. She
says, “It means we’d be friends till grave. We would never stab them in the back or never
sell them out. It’s not like that here. You could lose your friendship in an instant.
Americans always come first.” Metin also believes that in the U.S. friendships end when
there is a conflict of interest. He tells a story of their neighbor. Their upstairs neighbor is
a single mother living with her boyfriend. She has kids who are same age as his and they
go to the same school. So, his wife offers the neighbor to drive all the kids to school and
back together. Metin tells that the neighbor happily accepts the offer and things go
smoothly until the day when his wife couldn’t make it to school on time. So she asks for
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a friend to pick up all the children from school, and bring to her own apartment. Metin
says that the neighbor got upset because her children were picked up and brought to the
apartment of someone she did not know. So she stops talking to them, and Metin’s wife
sends her a text, telling that she won’t be carrying her kids to school anymore. Metin
finds the neighbor’s attitude exaggerated and disloyal. He argues that his wife drove the
kids to and from school for over a year, and just because she asked a friend to pick them
up for one day, the neighbor stopped talking to them as if that one-year of taking care of
her children did not mean anything. He thinks people end relationships too easily in the
U.S. and that they don’t feel any loyalty.
Fuat thinks in the U.S. people are nice to you as long as you don’t push their
buttons, or cross them somehow. He also thinks Americans do not have the feeling of
mercy. He remembers a memory: “I was riding the train one day. An elderly woman got
on so I gave up my seat to her. She cursed at me. She told me that I didn’t know her, so
why was I offering my seat to her. She cursed at me. But in Turkey people would curse
when you don’t give up your seat, right? Here, people don’t have the feeling of mercy.
They don’t have it.” He also remembers the day when he took his pregnant wife to the
hospital. She was in terrible pain and the doctors decided to give her a specific type of
shot due to the pregnancy. The shot didn’t arrive for several hours. He got into a fight
with a nurse. She complained about him to the security. So the security arrived to the
scene to throw him out. Since his English was poor, he couldn’t explain himself to
anyone. Then another nurse who had seen the entire situation saved him, telling the
security that it was the nurse who was being rude, not him. After the change of shifts,
new nurses arrived. These were of Russian descent and they treated his wife differently.
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While he and his wife had been in the hospital waiting for the shot for 5 hours, nurses
from the new shift gave her the shot in 15 minutes. Fuat says: “We call these [Russians]
communists but the communists are actually the locals here. These [Americans] have no
mercy. That’s how they grew up.”
Despite all these negative perceptions, Turkish immigrants also harbor positive
feelings and opinions regarding Americans. Many respondents define Americans as selfconfident, naïve, honest, respectful, conformist and hard working people. Serra asserts
that the most defining characteristics of Americans are their carefreeness (rahatlık) and
self-confidence. She makes the following claim:

“They would know nothing about the world, and yet they assume they are
the center of it. (…) Let’s say you’re watching CNN. It’s CNN and they
announce ‘now news from the world’ and the first story is from California.
This is very interesting. See how they use the media? They are telling the
American society that they are the world. That’s why Americans are
naively self-confident. That’s it [they are] naively self-confident. They are
also very carefree. A man may wear red pants with a green jacket. Not a
big deal. Or he might have just left his work and he changes his shoes with
a pair of sneakers. For them, comfort is of top priority.”

Metin indicates that he is observing his children, and how they are building selfconfidence through the education system in the U.S. He asserts that teaching kids to be
self-confident starts at a very early age.
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“They ask them write essays, and have them present those essays. For
instance, at this age, when I have to talk in front of a public I still mumble.
Because I don’t think I was raised with self-confidence in Turkey. We
were always afraid of our teachers, our family too. But that’s not how it
works here. People can easily make a speech at weddings for example.
They don’t have to say important things. I mean they tell a story, and the
audience laughs, etc.”

The Turkish word “rahat,” which has several meanings in different contexts
mainly including “lighthearted, relaxed, comfortable,” shows up quite often during the
interviews. Buse, a pious mother of two, uses it when discussing the most defining
American characteristics. She says, “They are very relaxed (rahat) about dressing up,
very relaxed about their behaviors. They act as they pleased. They don’t care if others
would find [their behavior] odd. What other people think is quite important for Turks.
But for them, it is their comfort (rahatlık) that is more important.” Ekin makes a similar
observation and argues that in Turkey, people are judged by their outfits and the way they
look whereas that’s not the case in the U.S. She states, “We Turks go to shopping dolling
ourselves up. For example, when I go to a shopping center with my sister, I would go out
dolling myself up. But people here [are not like that]. Trust me I even saw someone
wearing PJs [outside]. Nobody would turn around and look at them. Nobody would find
it odd. Nobody would say a thing. I mean people are extremely relaxed (rahat) here.”
Abbas also observes that people in the U.S. mind their own business and do not get
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involved in what others are doing. He indicates, “There is carefreeness (rahatlık) that
comes from your environment. I mean nobody cares what others are doing. I’m using it
positively. Nobody cares what you are wearing, doing, listening to, reading, as long as
you are not disturbing anyone. That kind of carefreeness (rahatlık) is inherent to the life
in the U.S.” Asude also compares the case in the U.S. with that of Turkey and says,
““People are more carefree (rahat) here. What I mean is, they can talk about everything
out in the open. It’s not like that in Turkey. Some things are considered shameful.”
While some Turkish immigrants find Americans unfriendly, insincere and selfish,
others think quite the opposite. There is a widespread belief that Americans are nice,
naïve and respectful people. While some immigrants I previously mentioned find
Americans insincere in their attitudes towards them, Serra thinks otherwise.

“[Americans] would not lie. Of course I’m not talking about all of them,
but in general. They don’t lie; they are honest people. They would show
respect to everyone. They are warm-hearted. In Turkey, people would say
“Well, I haven’t seen you in a while, you look a bit pale,” or “have you
put on some weight?” Here, it doesn’t matter, even if you look unattractive
they would say ‘you look wonderful, you look beautiful, I miss you, etc.’
That’s the difference.”
While Samet, a pious young man living in the U.S. for over two years, finds some
aspects of the American culture at odds with his own, he thinks the word that defines
Americans is naiveté. Trying not to romanticize Americans, he argues that they may have
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several faults that he does not know, but still, he believes that Americans are not cunning,
that they are never after small gains.

“The term American brings the notion of naiveté to my mind. Very naïve.
(…) What I mean by naiveté is that they don’t think of anything cunning
or bad. Maybe it’s because I only saw that aspect of them. I’m sure there
are other examples. Maybe it depends on where you stay.”

Moreover, he thinks Americans are very respectful of others and are not against
their life styles. Yekta also finds Americans open and naïve. He says they are
straightforward people, telling what they think easily, never taking any detours. He also
thinks it’s hard to say the same for Turks. Demir finds Americans amiable despite his
belief that some are not genuine. He thinks, Turks pretend to be friendlier but they don’t
behave too sympathetically to others. He claims that Turks are more prejudiced to people
they don’t know. While Kuvvet does not approve some American behaviors and claims
that they are at odds with the Turkish culture, when he considers their other
characteristics, he asserts that Americans look like they inherited some of the good
qualities of Islam without following the religion.

“As far as I can see, people here keep their promises. Such as [when]
doing their job, or being punctual. You know in Turkey people talk about
Islam ethics, here people are like as if they have inherited its very fine
characteristics without leading an Islamic life. Maybe they don’t pray, or
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fast, and they have some [behaviors] that are bad from our point of view,
but [when you look at] some other things [it is] like as if they inherited
those morals. I mean our people can sometimes be more immoral.”

Semanur, a pious young woman from Queens makes the observation that
Americans spare little time for their families because they work too much. She finds them
hardworking and very disciplined as they follow the rules religiously. But she gets a bit
confused about the term “American” as these are people with several different
backgrounds and she says everyone has unique characteristics. Since Semanur only lived
in New York, she can’t help but wonders if things would be any different had she lived
elsewhere.

“I have a friend who moved to Connecticut, and she says that it is different
over there. She is living with Americans and she is the only one with a
different accent. She says that they are very friendly and helpful, that they
are good people. Here, I can’t tell the Americans apart because everyone is
from a different country. (…) I wonder how real Americans are like.
When I take my kid to school I look around to see how the Americans are
treating their children. Well, I don’t see much difference maybe because
we are a large group. But I have an image of them as hard-workers.”
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Drawing a Boundary Right Across “Americans”
Semanur’s remarks bring us to the issue of boundaries Turkish immigrants tend to
draw between Americans. One form of this boundary is imagined between what they call
“real” Americans and others. For them, the immigrant character of New York and New
Jersey makes it difficult to get into contact with “real” Americans. During the interviews,
when I asked the respondents about the defining characteristics of Americans, most often
than not, they replied me asking which Americans I was referring to. Mete, a young man
from Queens, indicates, “We are living in New York. How many Americans are here? I
mean of course there are Americans, but we don’t get to see real Americans. Those in
New York are mixed.” Filiz, trying to correct my question, says, ““Well you keep saying
Americans, but I have not met any real Americans here. People around me are mostly
Chinese. They don’t know the language for instance.” These responses are a clear
indication that a differentiation is made between immigrants, regardless of their legal
status, and the image of “real” Americans pictured mostly as white, Southern or
Midwestern, and religious. Suna has been living in the U.S. nearly for twenty-years, and
Brooklyn and Jersey City are the only neighborhoods she has ever resided in. She makes
the following comment:

“If we think of New York and New Jersey, especially in Jersey City,
which is close to New York, I mostly interact with Asians, not Americans.
I don’t have much relation with Americans because there is not much
Americans around… Who are the Americans in New York? [Maybe] the
Jews. (…) There are different prototypes of Americans and I think I’m not
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in interaction with them. But I run into them during some of our travels.
Red necks, obese, etc.”

Canan, who has been living in New Jersey for over twenty years, makes a similar
observation. She tells me that as immigrants heavily populate the part of New Jersey
where she currently lives, it is not possible to find real Americans there. She claims that
anyone that she would come across would have an immigration background. Damla, who
has been living in New Jersey for twenty years, refrains from calling New Yorkers
Americans. When I probe further, she comments, “Because it’s New York! It’s a
different country. People are different. Metropolis and metropolitans… I call them
metropolitans, not Americans. I think Americans are people of small cities. (…) They
live in small cities, and they stay there. Like in Turkey.”
The immigrant nature of New York and New Jersey has been underlined as a
positive aspect of life in the U.S. during the interviews. Many immigrants believe that the
reason why they did not encounter any negative attitudes from Americans during the 9/11
backlash is because they live in New York and/or New Jersey, where “real” Americans
are too hard to find. Cahide, a hijabi mother of two, thinks her experiences would be
different if she had been living in another state with “real” Americans.

“This is a city of immigrants. I mean New York. If I happen to go outside
of it where real Americans are… There are so many immigrants here.
Russians, Hispanics who happen to be abundant. People with all
nationalities… New York is a city of immigrants. So I’m thinking if I
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happen to go other states it might be different. There is no such thing here.
Everybody is an immigrant. So, no I didn’t encounter such things.”

Abbas, a non-religious man who has been living in the U.S. for almost
twenty years indicates that immigrants have to figure out where they can live
more freely and easily in the United States. “In the end you have to find your own
accurate geography here in this country,” he says and adds, “That’s one of the
things you need to learn.” What he refers as finding accurate geography is
actually settling down in a city, or neighborhood where the person would blend in
and feel more comfortable He clearly has a preference for ethnically and
culturally diverse neighborhoods of New York and New Jersey over other parts of
the U.S. with “real” American majority.
Moreover, immigrants also tend to differentiate Americans based on their
social class, which is reflected in the neighborhoods they live in and the schools
they send their children to. Several respondents have mentioned their concerns
over the “quality” of parents of students attending the school same as their
children. Metin tells me that they moved to another neighborhood a month after
his son started attending primary school because they wanted to send him off to a
better school. In this new school, students’ parents mostly work in New York
City, and they tend to have higher cultural capital compared to the previous one.
Suna, whose son used to attend a charter school, registered him to a private one
because in his previous school, parents were not college graduates and were
working full hours and not taking care of their children. For Turkish immigrants
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especially with higher levels of social and cultural capital, choosing
neighborhoods with similar Americans is of utmost concern. They do not want
their children to socialize with just any Americans, but those who come from
families with higher socio-economic and education levels.

Making of Ethno-National Boundaries: Food, Family, and Socialization
Discussions and debates on the defining characteristics of ethnic groups have
always been an essential component of sociological thinking. According to Max Weber
similarities in physical type are not a sine qua non feature for the formation of an ethnic
identity (Weber 1968). Moreover, people claiming to have the same ethnicity do not
necessarily have to share same customs, or even same ancestry. It is the subjective belief
in a shared history and common descent that creates an ethnic group rather than cultural
similarities. Scholars have claimed that ethnic identity formation was a dialectical
process, involving both agency (the members of an ethnic group) and structure (the
society they are living in) (Barth 1969, Nagel 1994, Cornell and Hartmann 1998). In
other words, ethnic identity is constituted of both self-claims made by group members as
well as ascriptions made by larger society. So on the one hand, ethnic identity is optional
-the ethnic group may choose whatever label they would like to call themselves-; but on
the other hand, it is mandatory -same ethnic group is limited by some categories defined
by the society.
In this process, culture provides meaning for ethnicity and “animates and
authenticates ethnic boundaries by providing history, ideology, symbolic universe and
system of meaning” (Nagel 1994:162). In a similar vein, Barth (1969) indicates that an
ethnic common culture should not be taken for granted and rather be treated as an
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outcome, an end product of ethnic interaction, and not the starting point. Nagel
(1994:162) urges us to think of ethnic culture as the things we put in a shopping cart
including “art, music, dress, religion, norms, beliefs, symbols, myths, customs.” She
underlines the fact that these items do not come ready made, rather they are selected by
the members of the ethnic group and therefore they are made into ethnic culture and are
not given. Since culture provides an answer to the question “who are we?” it is not
surprising to see the boundary-making by Turkish immigrants vis-à-vis American
mainstream includes marking off perceived cultural differences.
Although Turkish immigrants harbor different understandings of the term
‘culture,’ it is still possible to group major and most recurring themes under certain
categories. While many immigrants define and attribute certain cultural characteristics to
Americans, there are respondents perceiving American society as devoid of a culture. For
them, the main reason is the multiethnic, -racial and -cultural composition of the cities
they settled in. Asude, who calls herself American as she has adapted into the American
culture at a very young age, makes the following observation when asked to discuss the
meaning of the term ‘American culture’:

“I think we can say that Americans don’t have a culture. People have been
migrating here for such a long time. It’s called a melting pot, have you
heard of that? I can refer to that concept because there are Turks, Irish,
Arabs, etc. here whose cultures are mixed. (…) Americans don’t have a
culture as I said before. They took bits and pieces from other cultures.”
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This argument reflects how she perceives the Turkish culture, which she assumes
is cultivated in the country and not imported from elsewhere. In other words, she finds
Turkish culture authentic. Abbas, who arrived in the U.S. in his mid-thirties, has been
living in the country for 18 years, and residing and working in Jersey City voices a
similar argument. For him, the term ‘American culture’ does not contain a singular
meaning but plural.

“What do you mean by American culture? If you walk ten blocks to east from
here, you’ll end up in Jersey City’s lowest income neighborhood. Almost all of it
is [composed of] black Americans. They are American and they have a culture,
too. Well, here it’s a mixture; there is a mixed culture here. You cross the river to
Manhattan, and everything changes in every 10 blocks there. Therefore, what is it
that we can call American culture?”

When asked to elaborate on the cultural differences mentioned as a boundary,
many immigrants’ immediate response is the issue of Turkish cuisine. This reveals itself
in two major forms. Immigrants either show pride in the assumed richness and quality of
food in/from Turkey or stress a positively held view of Turkish cooking and eating
habits. Cahide a housewife and a mother of two, agrees on the idea that Americans do not
have a culture. When I ask her if Turks have one, it’s food that immediately comes up to
her mind. “Just think of our cuisine for instance,” she says. “[American culture] is not
like our culture. Ours is very different. It doesn’t resemble to theirs.” She also underlines
the large range of food selection people could offer when they invite guests over their
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house. This is something peculiar to Turks, something that Americans do not do
according to her. She continues, “Maybe they do but I have never seen it. I research such
things.” In a similar vein, Berrin a 1.5 generation immigrant living in New York over
twenty years underlines the importance of Turkish food selection and manners when it
comes to hosting guests at home.

“Of course it [our culture] is different. (…) We have a large selection [of
dishes]. My husband went to a BBQ last week with his American friends.
They only served the meat he brought, some tomatoes, cucumbers, and
cookies. Maybe it was their style. But when the Americans invite you;
that’s how it goes. Everything is practical, ready-made, and easy. (…) But
Turkish people would clean the entire house a week before the guests
arrive. They would make several olive oil dishes (zeytinyağlılar), and
desserts. It’s very exhausting to have guests, mentally and physically. But
we do that grunting but at the same time with pleasure. When the
Americans invite you over for coffee, there is cookie or apple pie. That’s
it. Nothing else. But when we invite someone over for tea, we first ask if
they are coming hungry or not. Then we’d prepare accordingly. We make
desserts, salty things, pastry, salads, etc. That’s our difference.”

Sabri, a cab driver from Brooklyn, shares a similar view. He answers the question
regarding his feelings about being American or not by referring to cultural differences.
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And the first cultural reference he makes concerns food. He takes full pride in Turkish
cuisine, and also in the belief that it is highly appreciated by Americans.

“First of all, culture is very important. (…) [Americans] have nothing that
gives me pleasure. Nothing makes me say that I’m American. Why?
Because they neither have history nor culture. If you ask me to cite three
famous dishes from American culture, well, hamburger, pizza doesn’t
count because it’s Italian, hotdog, well, I couldn’t found the third one.
Culture my friend. I made çiğköfte for an American here, and she ate the
entire dish. An American lady ate the full dish, telling how good it was.
We have them eat mantı (dumplings) here and they jump up and down
with joy. All the Turkish restaurants in Brooklyn and Manhattan make
money from Americans. They are always full. See, it’s the culture.”

Sabri is not the only one with a clear sense of pride in Turkish food. Yahya, who
runs a restaurant in Brooklyn, tells me that when it comes to food, Turkish culture is far
advanced than its American counterpart. He asserts that American customers, once set
foot in a Turkish restaurant, would not think of going elsewhere again. He says, “They
are like, ‘where have we been until now? We were eating at diners, and what not. We
came here and learned what actual food is.’” On the discussion of ‘actual food’ other
respondents also have a point to share. The widespread practice of eating frozen food in
the U.S. is highly looked down upon by Turkish immigrants. It is true that the selection
of frozen food at any given supermarket outperforms those in Turkey. Although highly
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time consuming, especially for the woman of the household, there is a pride in the
presumed Turkish habit of cooking meals from scratch. “As you know, Americans don’t
dine, I mean not in the way we understand from [the word] dining,” Suna mentions.
“When I tell them that I cook they are like, ‘from scratch?’ They either buy pizza, or
cook pasta for their kids. They put a meatball on top of it at most. But since we live in a
mixed neighborhood, our dining practices resemble to those of Chinese or Indian
families. That’s why we get along well.”
Sending her son off to a summer camp for the first time was challenging for Suna,
especially regarding the issue of food. It was also challenging for her son. Growing up in
a household where his mother cooks several dishes (including meat, veggies, cold dishes,
etc.) for dinner every evening, he was served pasta and salad on his first night at the
camp. “Our child doesn’t know the American culture, if such a culture ever exists, the
one where they eat pasta and pizza, where kids spend time in front of the TV, where
parents live separate lives, he doesn’t know that,” says Suna. There is not only pride in
home cooked meals, but also in fruits and vegetables that grow in the homeland. Ayfer, a
tailor who moved to the U.S. with her husband and baby-girl fifteen years ago, told me of
her shock the first time she had grapes in New York.

“I can’t forget the taste of those grapes [she had on her first night in the
U.S.]. I’d always ask new comers ‘Have you eaten any grapes?’ and they
would always ask ‘why?’ because they taste different in Turkey. Mom
[referring to her mother-in-law] offered me some grapes when we first
came here. I was thinking we arrived in November so how come there are
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still grapes? You can’t find any grapes in November in Turkey. Mom said,
there are various different fruits here and she was going to help me taste
them all. Like, fruits that do not exist in Turkey such as mango. I didn’t
like mango. I felt like I had eaten plastic grapes (laughs). So I said I don’t
want to taste any more. Well, you don’t like it the first time you eat it but
you get used to it after a while. That’s how we stayed here. We got used to
the living conditions here.”

Celebrated mostly for its rich content, the issue of Turkish breakfast did not go
unmentioned. While discussing American culture, immigrants underlined the differences
between Turkish and American ways of having it. Ekin, who moved to the U.S. as a
result of family reunification in her late thirties, told me that having Turkish breakfast is
an irrevocable habit for her.

“When I first came here, [my husband] was like, ‘eat this, eat that.’ I put
on weight because of him. He was trying to introduce me lots of things.
For instance, I didn’t like breakfasts here. Not for me. It has to include
tomatoes, feta cheese, olives, etc. These are a must for my breakfast.
There has to be mint, parsley, paprika and different types of cheese. Here
breakfasts are too heavy. When we go on a vacation I carry some cheese
with me in small containers in order to be able to have breakfast.”
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Ekin is not the only one making a differentiation between American and Turkish
ways of having breakfast. Berrin shares a similar view. She passes on the impressions of
an American friend who had traveled to Turkey. “She says, ‘I liked Turkish breakfast. I
loved that culture of breakfast’” expresses Berrin, and then continues “They don’t have
one here. It’s composed of a donut and a cup of coffee. You know how our breakfasts
are. Especially on the weekends.” Asude also agrees to the idea that Americans do not do
breakfast.

“A typical American doesn’t have breakfast. I have a long-term friend.
Her family has been living here but they are of Irish origin. For example,
when she wakes up in the morning, she drinks coffee and that’s her
breakfast. At lunch, she eats a sandwich. At dinner, she has salad with a
small piece of meat and some rice or bread. (…) It’s not like our culture. If
you look at Turkish culture is quite rich.”

Rich food culture that immigrants see worth mentioning is not the only issue that
they use in order to differentiate themselves from Americans. Although not as salient as
the boundary that emerges vis-à-vis other Muslim groups,11 cleanliness forms another
symbolic boundary mentioned by Turkish immigrants. Cihan and Samet, a young couple
in their mid-twenties has been living in the U.S. for the last two years, have the following
conversation regarding the issue of cleanliness:
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-

[S] “There is the issue of entering the house with shoes on. We ask
everyone to take their shoes off. It’s a bit of a problem (laughing).

-

[C] “Or, we move the rugs away, and then ask them to pass.”

-

[S] “We purchased a bunch of galosh. We give those to anyone who
doesn’t want to take off their shoes.”

Suna also indicates that, unlike Americans, they still take off their shoes before
entering the house. Moreover, the cleanliness of the house is the most essential thing for
her family. She states, “My son sometimes says, ‘what a dirty house they had mom.’
Americans do not clean their house. I mean the majority. Our understanding of
cleanliness is very different. They keep their shoes on at home. Their houses smell. They
always own either a cat or dog. We also do have one but [in their houses] cat and dog hair
is everywhere.” Duration of stay does not change views of Berrin, who has been living in
New York City for over twenty years. Entering the house with shoes on is a clear sign of
cultural differentiation for her.
Family relations as a boundary
Another most recurring theme pertaining to culture is the perception of American
family and how it differs from imaginations of Turkish family. Mainly centering on the
relationship between children and their parents, the arguments voiced by immigrants can
be grouped under two main themes: the reciprocal care provided first by parents and then
by children, and the issue of respect. One of the most underlined differences is the
perception of American parents taking care of their children until they turn 18. Many
immigrant parents cannot relate to this understanding of child rearing. Deniz, a young
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mother of two who moved to the U.S. due to family reunification, argues that she doesn’t
like the way Americans raise their kids. She adds, “I don’t support the idea that children
leave home at certain age and start living on their own.” Berrin, a young mother of two
living in the U.S. since her early teens makes a similar observation.

“For Americans, once you turn 18, you’re done. [Parents are like] I took
care of you until now; you’re free to go. I even had a friend who was
charging her children for rent. They had to pay rent as long as they stayed
in her house. ‘I no longer do your laundry. You have to get a job, and
make money.’ But Turkish people would not do that. ‘You’re my child
until grave, and I will take care of you.’ It’s not shameful that they stay in
your house after turning 18. But it’s shameful in the U.S.”

Tomris, a stepmother of two and has been living in the U.S. for over 40 years,
criticizes what see defines American behavior, of letting kids go free as a bird once they
turn 18, and states that Turkish parents would not let go of their children until they die.
Semra, a college student majoring in human psychology, echoes this argument and takes
it one step further by arguing that the fact that Americans are living distant and lonely
lives have a huge impact on their emotional state of being. She says, “Here you are not
part of the family after 18. Everybody minds his or her own business. Because everybody
works: the mother works, the father works, the child works, and they don’t have a
common value. For us, the grandmother is in the same house with the grandchild. That’s
a wonderful thing for instance. It’s something these people yearn for because [here] love
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is like a prize you get to win in life. They never find that love and they are always
miserable. They always try to look for love. They are psychologically too messy;
therefore they always have problems. But you don’t get to see that in a Turkish family.
People always have someone to open up to; they never get lonely.”

Azade, a 28-year old mother of two, indicates that she has been observing the
situation in the U.S. and finds it quite sad. “Children become too independent after they
turn 18,” she claims. “They don’t show enough respect and love to their parents. We
[Turks] are people of compassion and love, and live with a moral compass. I don’t see
that happening here. People live disconnected lives. Everybody lives his or her own life
here,” she adds. This lack of compassion among family members that is attributed to
American culture is also repeated by Demir, a young man living in the U.S. for 14 years,
who claims that one of the things he finds different in America, is the lack of family
intimacy. “Relations between children, and parents get more distant as they all age,” he
argues. “That’s something really rare in our culture. Family members are closer
regardless of their fondness of each other. They may have issues but they are more
intimate. There is less formality. I find it too formal here. I wouldn’t like to have it that
way. I’d like to have warmer relations with family members and relatives.”
The issue of intimacy, or rather lack of it in the U.S. ties to another important
matter for Turkish immigrants, which is what happens to parents once they get older. The
idea that American elderly age lonely in their homes, or even worse in nursing homes, is
unbearable for many immigrants. Hazan, a young mother-to-be, makes the observation
that she is seeing elderly people around, and they are all lonely. “Asked, they would tell
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you they have several children but none of them show up at their door. But this is very
normal to them. You would ask, ‘how is this possible,’ but they would say, ‘well, that’s
normal, and people have their lives.’ This is not ordinary for us,” she argues. In a similar
vein, Begum, a mother of two living in the U.S. for almost ten years, asserts that while
elderly Americans are living in their big houses, they don’t have many visitors, including
their grandchildren. To her, the problem lies in their disconnected lives. She continues,
“The children’s task is to send a postcard on special days, get together on Christmas eve,
but other than that they don’t talk on the phone 3-5 times a day like we do. You know an
American wouldn’t call her daughter and ask ‘did you purchase that jacket?’ but we do.”
The lack of intimacy in American families that many immigrants mention is closely
related to the understanding of personal space they grew up socializing in Turkey. Since
the distance is much closer in their home country, as complained by some immigrants,
and not only close family but also friends, neighbors and even strangers can get involved
in what would be considered as private/personal matters in the U.S., the social distance
immigrants experience in the U.S. is translated as aloofness, lack of intimacy, etc.
According to many Turkish immigrants, the discrepancy between Turkish and
American cultures when it comes to familial relations does not stop here. The whole issue
of intimacy is also related to another matter: respecting the elderly. Mete, a young man
who moved to the U.S. when he was a teenager, finds Americans less respectful of their
parents when compared to their Turkish counterparts.

“In Turkish culture, you never call your parents or relatives by their first
names. We use titles like mom, dad, uncle, aunt, etc. (…) When your
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parents come into the room you try to tidy yourself up out of respect. Do
Americans do it? Some of them may be. We have to ring and talk to our
parents in every two-three days even if we’re living far from home. I don’t
know if many Americans do that. I think they are calling their parents only
when it’s their birthdays and stuff.”

Calling people by their first names, regardless of age difference, is highly
unconventional for many immigrants. When asked about cultural differences Pelin says,
“Respect for elderly. I don’t see that here. For example, calling someone older than me
by his or her first name at work is something I find strange. We don’t have such a thing.
You would call people abla, agbi or teyze even when the age differences are small. I
think this is respect.” Hazan makes a similar observation and underlines the importance
of respect in daily life. She says, “For example, listening to your parents, or referring
others by amca, agbi… In America, people call you by your first name even if you’re 80
years old.” While Filiz emphasizes the importance of respect in Turkey, regardless of
geographical regions, Vahap takes it one step further and complains about lack of respect
for elderly on public transport. The only exception among immigrants who discussed
similarities between Turkish and American families was a young couple that had spent a
year in the mid-West. Cihan, the wife, asserts that the notion of family is quite important
for Americans as well. She says, when their American friends found out that they were a
family, they started treating them respectfully. She also claims that American families are
troubled by the fact that their members get distanced from each other gradually. Samet,
her husband, agrees by stating that it is difficult for families when their kids leave the
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house at the age of eighteen, and start attending college and hence visit the parents less
often.
Socialization as a boundary: being Turkish by childhood
People might assume that being born in a country other than U.S. would be seen
as an obstacle towards integration to the American society. This is not true for many
Turkish immigrants. Rather, it is not growing up in the United States that forms one of
the reasons respondents give as to why they cannot perceive themselves as American. In
other words, they do not need to be born in the U.S. in order to feel American but
socialized into the mainstream culture at a young age. Mete, who moved to New York
with his family in his late teens indicates that since he was socialized into Turkish culture
as a kid before his move, it is not possible for him to feel American. However, he claims
that had he come at the age of 10 or earlier, he would have a shot in socializing and
adapting into the American culture. So, for him, the problem does not lay in being born
elsewhere, but having socialization done elsewhere.

“How can I feel American? Now, here is the thing. If I had come here
when I was 10 and lived here, let’s say, for 12 years (…) then I would feel
[American]. But I was socialized where I was born and grew up. I think an
individual’s personality is already established when he is 19. More or
less… The culture you are socialized into affects whether you feel
American or not. I mean, in the end you’re 19 years old. You grew up with
the Turkish culture until then. After that point you can neither speak their
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language like a native, adopt their religion nor become American. You just
cannot.”

There are respondents who mention how they feel like an outsider during
conversations with American friends especially when they start discussing or make jokes
about a television show from their childhood or teenage years. They feel an outsider
when they don’t get the jokes because they can’t relate to the sense of humor. Any
cultural reference to a past that is not shared by immigrants of Turkish origin acts as a
boundary telling them that they do not belong. For instance Serra, a fitness instructor who
came to the U.S. in her late twenties and has been living there for the last 24 years
indicates that,

“I don’t see myself American. Because, for instance, I don’t get some of
their jokes as I don’t know them. There are some expressions, idioms that
I don’t know of. I don’t know the history of the last fifty years. What I
mean by that is this: They talk about a TV show that was on years back.
They make jokes about that and I don’t get the reference because I haven’t
seen the show. (…) Am I being clear? I mean I’m more Turkish. But
whenever I go back to Turkey, I start missing here. When I’m here, I miss
it there.”

In a similar vain, Umut, who moved to the U.S. at the age of sixteen with his
single mother, tells me that when he decides to go out, in eight out of ten cases, he prefers
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going out with his Turkish friends. When asked why he says, “You shouldn’t feel like an
alien [to others] when you go to any social gatherings. However, I do… sometimes…
during my first years here. You enter a crowded group, everybody is talking, laughing,
having fun, then someone makes a joke and you don’t get it. You unavoidably feel maybe
not excluded but uncomfortable. Someone says something and you don’t get it, or you
don’t feel at ease [like they do]. Or you feel lacking, ‘why do I not get this joke?’ I feel
that way. They create uneasiness on my behalf.”
Bahri, who moved to the U.S. at the age of 36, and has been living in New York
for the last 13 years, refers to ‘a lack of history’ setting him apart from the experiences of
Americans. This lack of history includes having left all his friends (from school,
neighborhood, etc.) back in Turkey. Friends that he has known of since childhood, grown
up together and created memories with are no longer with him. In other words, he feels
like he not only left his home country, but also his past behind, including some of the
forces of socialization that contributed to the formation of his self. Echoing Serra, he adds
that, when his peers start talking about a TV show from their childhood, he cannot
become part of the conversation because his past does not include those pop culture
references. While he does not see it a huge obstacle to socialize with people in New
York, he believes that it definitely creates a difference. The differences in social interests
culturally shaped in the home country may form another type of boundary. Metin, who
came to the U.S. in his mid twenties, indicates that his interest in watching soccer games,
was not shared by many Americans, as they are into watching football and baseball
games. He also adds, “Their jokes are different. I mean their sense of humor is different.
Their culture is different. Things people chat about are different. I mean even though I’ve
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been living here for the last 15 years, our culture is absolutely different. The clash of
cultures is unavoidable.”
The boundary of socialization and culture takes an interesting turn, once I start
speaking to Asude, a 23 year-old college student who moved to the U.S. with her family
when she was only nine. She says,

“I see myself American. Had I come here in the 6th or 7th grade I wouldn’t.
But since I came at a younger age, I adapted to American culture. I got
used to it. I mean when I travel to Turkey, some of the cultural references
I make are seen weird by Turks. When I first came here, I used to knock
on door before entering the class. The teacher would warn me, ‘why are
you knocking, you can enter directly, this is not my bedroom.’ It’s
different. I lived here so many years. I came at a young age. I spent only a
short period of my life in Turkey, therefore I can I say I’m first Muslim,
American and then Turkish. But I find Turkish closer to myself. In terms
of culture I find it closer.”

Asude is not a naturalized citizen but she is a green card holder, although she
spent years without papers stuck in the system waiting, as her relatives in New York
sponsored their immigration. But for her neither not holding a U.S. passport nor being
born in Turkey constitute a problem in terms of feeling American. Besides, she is not the
only one who thinks having socialized in Turkey makes a difference in terms of adapting
to culture and growing up American. Semra, a 25 year-old college student who came to
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America for higher education, has left her family behind in Turkey. As she is an active
member of a Turkish organization in New York, she has several friends of Turkish origin
working at the institution with her. Before the interview starts, she introduces me to some
of her friends. She makes a reference to one of them during the interview.

“The girl that you saw talking on the phone, I wouldn’t call her Turkish.
She was born in the U.S. and adapted into the American culture. She
wouldn’t be comfortable if she had gone to Turkey. For me, if I have to
decide between American and Turkish [identities], I would definitely say
Turkish. I grew up in Turkish culture, so you cannot get detached from it
after you came here. That’s my place. I belong there. Here, you feel like
you are a guest, but since life is more comfortable here, it’s highly likely
that I’ll choose here [to stay]. Here, I hear the phrase of Turkish American.
[Meaning] they are both Turkish and American. Because they live here,
people try to fit themselves into a form. But I have never used that phrase
and I don’t think that I will. But it convinces me if this friend calls herself
American before Turkish. Because she lives just like them.”

Although the friend she refers to was born in the U.S., her following remarks
about why she does not feel American point to the argument that it’s not the place of
birth but place of socialization that lead to different self identification processes.
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“I don’t feel American, and don’t think I’ll ever do because I spent my
childhood in Turkey. My family is there also. It has a huge effect as well.
That girl’s family is here for instance. But I don’t think I’d call myself
American ever. Even if I get a Green Card or citizenship.”

For immigrants who arrived in the U.S. in their late teens or older, socialization in
Turkey emerges as a significant boundary. Not being able to understand certain cultural
references or jokes during conversations with Americans is linked to this notion, which
Bahri refers to as lack of a history in the U.S. Asude, born in Turkey but came to the U.S.
at the age of nine, lived paperless for several years, and has a green card but not
citizenship, claims that she is American, whereas Semra, who is of same age but who
came in her late teens does not feel American. Moreover, she claims that holding a green
card or even citizenship would never make her feel American, because she is Turkish by
childhood, by the forces of socialization.
An Identity of One’s Own: Feeling American or Not
Turkish immigrants can be grouped under three categories regarding their answers
to the question “Do you feel American?” including the “no” camp, the “neither” camp,
and the “both” camp. Respondents who indicate that they do not feel American also
mention several different reasons why. A few immigrants base their claim on the
argument that since they were born in Turkey that is where their essence comes from.
Yahya, a highly nationalist man who arrived in the U.S. when he was 25 and has been
living in NYC for almost 30 years, says the place where he was born was the only thing
that matters. He continues, “I’m Turkish. I’m Turkish to death. That’s why I don’t feel
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American at all.” Deniz, who has been living in New Jersey for 13 years, states that she
does not call herself American because she never wants to lose her “Turkishness.” “I
always want my essence,” she says. While Hazan does not feel American, she also
mentions a dislike for the extensive use of the term American. She thinks people whose
ancestors can go back several generations should be using the term. But to her dismay,
anyone born or naturalized in the U.S. is called American. Her belief in Turkish ethnoracial purity and homogeneity makes it impossible for her to feel American. She adds, “I
don’t see myself American. Because I’m not, I’m Turkish. I have an origin; I have a
family; I have a place that I came from. (…) Why should I call myself American?”
A large group of immigrants who reject an American identity indicate that they do
so because of the Turkish culture they were socialized into before they moved to the U.S.
Semra, a 25 year-old college student who has been in the U.S. for five years, indicates
that if she has to choose between Turkish and American identities, she would go with
Turkish because she grew up with Turkish culture and it’s difficult to break away from
that. Azade, who is only three years older than Semra and has been living in the U.S. for
almost ten years, states that she sees herself Turkish. She adds, “Because that’s my
culture, that’s how I grew up, my parents are Turkish. I can adapt to anywhere I live, but
Turkey is where I came from, and that’s how I live, and I can’t change.” Metin, who has
been in the U.S. for 15 years make the following observation when asked if he feels
American:

“No I don’t. I couldn’t. Why, first of all my culture is different. I don’t
live like the ones here do. And I can’t. Now you’re going to ask me what
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is American culture. They have various characteristics. I mean, I don’t
know, maybe we came from a small social environment. There was the
patriarchal family. There was an environment of respect. Many here don’t
have such an environment of respect. There are so many divorced families
around for instance.”

There are immigrants who do not consider themselves American, but want their
children born in the U.S. grow up with at least certain aspects of the American culture.
Umut says he has never thought of America as his own country. He has formed his own
Turkish community in the U.S. He indicates that he reads Turkish papers, listens to
Turkish music and watches Turkish TV. He has been living in the U.S. since he was
sixteen, and he cannot hide his yearning for living in Turkey. He says, “Here, I
sometimes think it must be a great feeling to be able to live in one’s own country.
Because I sometimes feel that this is not my country. Maybe it’s such an idea and it
would be different once I’m over there.” Although he does not feel American, he wants
his daughter to grow up knowing both American and Turkish cultures. When asked why,
he says he doesn’t want her to feel alienated and isolated like he was at school. In a
similar vein, Aliye, who has been living in the country for ten years, wishes her sons will
get to know the American culture, as they will continue to live in the U.S. Berrin, a
young pious Muslim woman who arrived in the U.S. in her teens asserts that she wants
her children to get both Turkish and American cultures. While protecting their
Turkishness, she still wants them to adopt certain practices. She says, “We still have to
think kindly, if it’s someone’s birthday we have to call them, or send a postcard or bring
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a cake. Or like bringing soup to someone who is sick. We have to do such things. I have
to teach them. That’s why I could choose the best of each side and try to present it to
them. And then hopefully those will stick too.”
There are also immigrants who underline their willingness to protect their
children from socializing into the American culture. As a pious Muslim woman, Semanur
wants to raise her son according to Turkish traditions. She speaks Turkish at home. She
socializes with Turkish friends. She takes her son not to the nearest playground but to the
one that is mostly populated by other Turkish children. She says she doesn’t feel
American, and she doesn’t want to make any concessions about either her outfit (she
wears hijab) or anything else. “Hence I don’t think I’m American,” she argues. She
continues, “I’m more inclined to Turkish culture. I can even say I’m more attached to it
here because I miss it (laughs). I’m trying to protect it, trying to hold on to that culture.”
Kuvvet thinks his pious Muslim identity will prevent him from ever feeling American. As
a New Jersey resident of 8 years, he implies that the attitudes of Americans will never
make him feel that he belongs to America. When asked if he feels American he replies,

“Absolutely not. I think I can never do. I’ll be honest with you, I think the
reason is, my wife is hijabi therefore we can never be American. I’m a bit
conservative regarding religion. That’s why I don’t feel I’ll ever feel
American. Becoming an American citizen doesn’t mean becoming
American. Being American means celebrating 4th of July with other
Americans. Will we be able to do that? I’ll be very crude. We cannot go
and do something like that as a family. Because -maybe you’re not aware
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of it- we feel people’s gazes. The way they look I mean. The way they
look when they see a hijabi woman. Maybe we can go and celebrate it
here [meaning New Jersey] because these places are mostly Mexican,
Arab, and Turkish. But if we go further into Pennsylvania for example, it
will be different. That’s why we can never be American.”

While many immigrants reject American identification right away with a clear
stance, it presents a more complicated issue for some others. When asked if he feels
Turkish or American, Yekta says, “Neither. Let me say Turkish-American, the middle
ground,” and then he laughs. He asserts that people are obliged to change when they
move to another country. Therefore, when they go back to their home country, their
behaviors, expectations get to differ from those of locals. “Had you asked Alamancılar12,
I’m sure they would tell you the same thing,” he claims. Canan, on the other hand,
accepts a Turkish American identity rather very reluctantly. She starts by saying that she
does not feel American, and only uses the legal rights granted to her as a citizen. She
underlines the fact that she is Turkish, she feels Turkish everywhere. She only accepts a
Turkish American identity after being reminded and questioned about having one. She is
resigned, “I think I have to accept that because I’m now living here. I can say that I feel
Turkish American.” Turgut, who came to the U.S. in his mid-twenties, argues that he
considers himself Turkish-American, and thinks he is Americanized. When asked to
elaborate on that he states, “What I mean by Americanization is this: I always saw myself
in a separate category, I mean I felt more closer to the world. I never contained myself in
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a national ID. Let me not call it Americanization but... um… adaptation to the living
standards. When people ask me if I could go back and live in Turkey, there is only one
reply I give. I say, “I cannot live in a country without baseball, let alone Turkey.”
Finding the question very complicated, Demir thinks for a while. He then claims
that he feels he doesn’t belong to either one. He thinks the feeling of belonging
somewhere gets lost after spending sometime in a new country, and it is hard to find. But
for the moment, he feels he is closer to the U.S. He states, “Because I’ve been living here
for the last 14 years. I spent maybe 6 months in Turkey during that period. That’s why I
feel closer to here. I find this is highly important because it happened [to me] after the
age of 20. But I don’t think I’ll ever feel belonging here hundred percent. But I don’t feel
I belong there [Turkey] any more. And I will never ever feel I belong there hundred
percent. It’s a different line right in between.” Asya, who has been living in the U.S. for
almost 30 years, also thinks she is torn in between. Like Demir, she has a hard time
deciding where she belongs because she thinks she is neither American nor Turkish. She
says she can neither move back to Turkey, nor totally settle down in the U.S., therefore
she feels she is left in between. When asked why she thinks she doesn’t feel American
despite spending all those years in the country, she says, “Although we live in America
our hearts, even our dreams are in Turkey. We never dream in America. If that heart has
the urge to go back to Turkey, everything becomes all about Turkey. Otherwise, we’re
living a daily American life here. Just like the Americans. But that heart, it never gets
Americanized.”
Leman, who moved to the U.S. as a single mom thinks she feels American in
some places, from time to time. She thinks she is more likely to feel like a global citizen.
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And when I ask her why she does not feel American, she replies that she doesn’t want to
be a wannabe, a pretender. Besides, she adds, “I lived in Turkey till I was 30 so it is never
possible for me to feel and think like a proper American.” She also doesn’t like the idea
of people changing their names to English ones. She is proud that she hasn’t changed hers
despite the fact that Americans cannot pronounce it correctly. “Making concessions starts
with changing a single character in your name,” she says. In a similar vain, Merve, a
pious hijabi woman who has been living in New Jersey for ten years, indicates that she
does not want to feel American. She says that she is at ease (rahat) living in the U.S. and
it’s not where you’re born but where you earn a living that counts in the end. However,
echoing Leman in a way, she says she is not a wannabe. She likes life in the U.S. but she
can never imagine herself American.
Abbas tells me that calling himself American is a question he keeps asking
himself as well. As a U.S. citizen, he thinks he is legally entitled to the term. But at the
same time, he finds the term highly complicated. He asserts that people have several
different definitions of it, and if he starts calling himself American it would create a lot of
confusion. He says, “You get to wear a cultural dress when you call yourself American.
It’s like calling yourself Turkish. That’s why I don’t like calling myself Turkish. That’s
the most attractive part of living here. Yes, legally we’re citizens, and we’re working,
paying taxes and trying to establish a life here. But other than that perception is quite
important regarding belonging. I mean rather than belonging to this country, belonging
here to this environment. Thinking locally is more dominant.”
There is also a group of respondents who claim that they can adapt and live in the
U.S. without difficulty because for them, life in the U.S. is not too different from their
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life in Turkey. But claiming an American identity does not mean letting go of a Turkish
one, in other words, these identifications are not mutually exclusive. Alp claims that he
does not see much difference between the Turkish and American cultures. He says, “I
studied at French schools in Turkey. I feel like I can live anywhere.” Esin, who decided
to move to the U.S. in her early 50s after wining the diversity lottery, says, “I think it’s
easy [to adapt to life in America.] If you are used to living by the rules, by a system in
your [home] country, you could live, not just in the U.S., but anywhere in the world.”
Turkish immigrants also find the narrative of America as a country of
immigration helpful as they make references to it while justifying their relevance to the
American identity. When I ask Ridvan who are Americans, he says it’s a funny question
because anyone who lives in America is American. He absolutely feels American. “Why
wouldn’t I?” he asks. “I’ve been living here for 20 years. My two kids were born here.
Why wouldn’t I? Also the first 24 years of my life was spent in Turkey, and let’s say 8-9
of those years I was conscious (referring the fact that he was a child unaware of things
before that) and the rest, remaining 20 years I spent here consciously. In four years, I’ll
have spent half of my life here and the other half in Turkey. How else will I see myself?”
However, he does not reject the fact that he also feels belonging to Turkey. “I absolutely
see myself Turkish,” he indicates. He also explains the moments he feels he’s Turkish the
most. “Here is the thing, and it’s quite interesting. How can I explain this to you? Turkish
people usually get angry very quickly, and start shouting, fighting and cursing right? I
don’t fight any more. Never. But I curse a lot. It’s a huge problem when you fight here.
Hit someone and you get into trouble. But you can curse comfortably but I can never find
the pleasure in cursing English. That’s when I realize I’m Turkish. There is a huge
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difference cursing an American in English, and cursing a Turkish in Turkish. That’s
when I realize I’m Turkish, that I belong to Turkey. I still have some feelings inside me.
This is one of them.”
Asya, who previously mentioned that she feels she got stuck between two
cultures, also finds some refuge in the notion of immigrant America. She tells me that she
also keeps questioning who is American and what the term entails. She says, “I think
Native Americans are the first Americans we know of.” And she refers to the immigrant
nature of the American society by claiming that the first comers and settlers in America
were the Irish and Italians who at the time had their 8th-9th generations. Looked from this
perspective, Asya says, “[W]e’re Americans too, we became citizens. If you look at it
that way, everyone is American.” So for Asya it is possible to count oneself American.
You only have to change your perspective and remind yourself that America is made of
immigrants and immigration.
Alp, who believes he is capable of living anywhere due to his French education,
indicates that he feels American. According to him, nurturing a feeling of belongingness
is the most crucial thing when you move to a new country. He says, “I said it the first day
I came here. I said I was American. You can’t do it otherwise. If you say ‘I’ll live here,
I’ll earn a living here,’ when you move but don’t say that you’ll belong there, then you
can’t make it.” The narrative of immigrant America makes it easier for Alp to embrace an
American identity. When I ask him how he defines an American he asserts, “What do
you mean by American? We are the Americans. Are there any Americans here? They
were all driven out. They were massacred and killed. Native Americans are the real
owners of this continent. The ones who came after were Italians, Irish, etc. and they still
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pursue their own culture and religious belief. But it’s a mosaic. Nobody intervenes others.
No fingers are pointed such as ‘you are Catholic, you’re Jewish’ etc. They set up such a
system. A Chinese too says s/he is American. A black from Africa says s/he is American.
They all say they’re American.”
Finally, two female respondents indicate that while they didn’t feel American in
the U.S., they immediately felt that way once they were in Turkey. It’s more of an
imposed identity for Berrin, because she asserts that people in Turkey keep calling her
American whenever she doesn’t get a joke or a reference. It sometimes happens with
Turkish friends in the U.S. too. Damla’s story is slightly different from Berrin’s since in
her case the American identity it’s not externally imposed but internally developed.
Damla moves to the U.S. at the age of 14 with her family, and decides to move back to
Turkey when she turns 30. She had considered herself Turkish all the time. “I was a very
nationalist Turk, and I was against foreign culture. I had friends from Turkey, who
moved here after college, and they were putting up a Christmas tree at home, etc. I used
to find it odd. Why would you celebrate another culture’s holiday? You’re not Christian,
and this is not your holiday. Why would you celebrate it then? I didn’t like the idea and
never emulated it. And they used to tell me that I was too much Turkish.” Then she
moves back, gets a job and makes new friends. But soon afterwards, she realizes that she
won’t be able to make it there. She says, “[I] realized that either I’m Turkish and they
[the locals] are not, or they are Turkish and I’m not. I don’t know but we are not the
same. I think it’s probably because I grew up here. I was expecting more from them I
mean from those in Turkey. I was expecting them not to throw their garbage out on the
street for instance.” While Berrin and Damla, both arrived in the U.S. in their early teens
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accompanying their families, did not develop a sense of being American and considered
themselves as only Turkish, they have started to contemplate their American-ness once
their context had changed.

Conclusion
The notion of personal space was a recurring theme, underlined by several
respondents during the interviews while discussing the positive aspects of life in
the U.S. The level of personal freedoms and the lack of involvement in their lives
they came to experience in the U.S. is highly different from the one they were
accustomed to in Turkey. Reflected not only in the physical space people keep
between themselves while interacting, but also in the distance they keep from
each other’s personal matters unless asked otherwise was welcomed by many
respondents. While immigrants with lower levels of religious orientation defined
this newfound distance as “freedom” experienced in the form of lack of peer or
social pressure and involvement in life choices, pious immigrants underlined
respect for their religious belief and practices and lack of judgmental views
passed on from non-pious segments of the society. However, expanded personal
space comes at a cost for many immigrants: isolation, which is more keenly felt
by those who moved to the U.S. alone or those who do not have
family/community support in the U.S. The experience and feeling of isolation is
also reflected in their definitions of Americans as distant, unfriendly and insincere
individuals.
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Heavily tied to perceptions of Turkish national interests, anti-American
feelings in Turkey started to soar from 1960s onwards, after the U.S. decided to
not get involved in the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece (Uslu et. al
2005). However, the Turkish public opinion on the United States took a
significant downturn beginning from 2003, in the aftermath of the Iraq War
(Poushter 2014). While the rate of those harboring negative opinions peaked at
83% in 2003 (and later in 2007), it dropped to 70% in 2013 only to rise again to
73% a year later. Turkish immigrants in the U.S., on the other hand, have highly
complicated feelings toward Americans, since their opinions are based not on
political or media discourses but their personal encounters and experiences in
their daily lives. A number of immigrants define Americans as distant, ignorant,
unfriendly and insincere people. Some of these perceptions are based on
experienced cultural differences such as the notion of personal space. Yet, many
immigrants hold positive views regarding Americans, calling them naïve (in a
good sense), respectful and self-confident people. It is true that many immigrants
experience difficulty in explaining the term “American” as they find the idea
highly complicated and are inclined to make differentiation between what they
call “real Americans,” who are usually imagined as white xenophobes from the
Midwest or the South, and immigrants from New York and New Jersey.
As this chapter has demonstrated, Turkish immigrants make references to
several markers of the symbolic boundary that they think differentiate them from
the American mainstream. One of the major markers of this boundary is the
Turkish food culture, often mentioned with a sense of national pride. It is not only
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the richness of the Turkish cuisine and breakfast but also the quality of the
vegetables and fruits that grow in Turkey that indicate a significant difference
from the case in the U.S. for immigrants. The notion of Turkish family, which
emerges as another signifier of the boundary, is usually viewed positively and
perceived as a kin-based group of individuals who have close lifelong relations
with each other. Even immigrants who happened to struggle in their marriages
and family relations defined the concept in positive, idealistic terms. Parentchildren relations are often portrayed as close, intimate and reciprocal. The
narrative of American parents not taking care of their children once they turn
eighteen is widespread, and constitutes a stark contrast to their understanding of
Turkish parenting which does not give much personal space to children and
continues until both parents die.
Finally, the issue of socialization rises as the third major symbol of the
boundary imagined vis-à-vis Americans. Not being able to understand cultural or
historical references, and jokes while having conversations with Americans is
underlined as a factor that contributes to their feeling of otherness. Defined as
“lack of history” by some, this feeling of not blending in becomes powerful
especially during their interactions with Americans friends, coworkers, etc. who
grew up in the U.S. accustomed to all cultural and historical references. In other
words, immigrants argue that the issue is not being born but being socialized
elsewhere as it becomes difficult for many to feel comfortable embracing an
American identity after having immigrated past a certain age.
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The claim of cultural difference from Americans is also underlined during
the discussions over feeling American or not. While few respondents make
essentialist claims as to why they do not feel American, the majority of the
respondents who say “no” make reference to differences in culture and
socialization. The identification as American is highly complicated for many
immigrants who feel either stuck in-between Turkish and American, or claim that
they feel neither Turkish nor American. While some immigrants do not want to be
labeled as “wannabes” by calling themselves American, others are more likely to
claim a hyphenated Turkish-American identity by finding refuge in the narrative
of America as a country of immigration. Immigrants, with higher levels of social,
economic and cultural capital, are more likely to identify as American or TurkishAmerican. However, since the symbols majority use to differentiate themselves
from the American mainstream do not constitute a bright boundary, and are likely
to become markers of symbolic ethnicity for future generations to be born and
grow up in the U.S., it is possible to expect it will be easier for second and third
generation Turkish immigrants to make the claim for either American or TurkishAmerican identity.
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Chapter 4: Praying God Abroad: Islam, Mosques and the Religious Boundary
I push the heavy door open and enter the building. There is no one in the small
hallway. Searching for a spot to leave my sandals, I take a glance across the area. Some
shoes are hastily taken off and left lying on the carpet whereas many others are neatly
placed on the shelves. Based on a quick count, I can tell that many members of the
community have already arrived. Placing the sandals in a small spot left on one of the
shelves, I take the headscarf from my bag, and wrap it around my hair in a hurry. Making
sure that my outfit and scarf are in order, I open the second door and walk inside the
mosque. First thing that catches my attention are the balloons in different sizes and colors
hanging from the ceiling on the main floor. Some of them have ‘Happy Birthday’ printed
on the surface. There are also several colorful ornaments and decorations hanging on the
walls, reminding me of Christmas. Children, some of them are familiar faces, are running
around, screaming and all noisy. Relaxation washes over me as I realize the ceremony
has not started yet. I was anxious that I would be late. I take a quick look at the men
sitting on the floor and chatting at the far back of the room. Quietly, I turn left to take the
stairs to the basement, to the women’s quarter. This is the last evening of the three-day
long Ramadan (in Arabic it is called Eid al-Fitr), and the local Turkish mosque is about
to celebrate the holiday with the Turkish community that predominantly lives nearby.
A large dining table welcomes me at the entrance of the basement, occupied mostly
by small children and teens. Several folding chairs are lined up against the walls. On the
other side of the long room is the crowded kitchen, and I see few women praying on their
rugs in the middle of the room. There are many women sitting in the chairs, chatting in
low voices. I cannot decide where to sit down. The women all seem to be very
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preoccupied with each other and the only available seats across the walls are in front of
the women who are praying. So I approach the dining table, noticing few remaining seats.
I pull the chair next to a woman and smile at her. She returns my smile and says “happy
bayram (religious holiday).” I do the same. We sit there quietly for a while, as I try to
drink in the view. There is a large, framed Turkish flag on the wall. I see some printouts
of verses from the Qur’an hanging right next to the flag. A large white board, used for
Qur’an courses offered by the mosque I presume, is standing at the corner. A large flatscreen TV, a tall bookcase full of books, and a basket of prayer beads are the remaining
items of the sitting area that leads up to the kitchen.
The lady sitting next to me starts a conversation. She is in her late fifties, and she
has been living in New York City since mid-1980s. After having married and divorced
twice, she now lives with her two adult children. As I’m listening to her, my eyes fall on
a small group of women sitting on the floor in a circle and talking in a language other
than Turkish. She follows my gaze and starts explaining that they are Arab women who
have been attending the mosque often since the beginning of Ramadan. I watch them for
a while, noticing that although the women seem to be at ease in a mosque where
everybody else exclusively speaks in Turkish, they keep the conversation mostly to
themselves and their interaction with Turkish women in the room is next to nothing.
Soon, the women in the kitchen start serving food and drinks to everyone in the room
including the Arab women. Trays full of plates and drinks are taken upstairs to men. The
noise in the room quiets down once everybody starts eating. I see some women leaving
the basement when they are finished. The children’s program is about to start, and they
want to watch their kids perform upstairs in the men’s quarter.
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Soon we hear the imam’s voice on the speakers in the basement, asking everyone,
especially the children, to be quiet. He starts the speech by greeting everyone: “Welcome
to our traditional program of bayram celebrations and gift giving to children. May Allah
be pleased with you, all attendants. May Allah be pleased with our sisters who prepared
this food [for us]. May [Allah] accept their wellbeing.” Before moving on to the main
activity of the bayram program, which is the show put together by children who attended
mosque’s religious school during Ramadan, he feels the need to underline and remind
parents of the importance of sending their children to the mosque on a regular basis. He
explains, “You are bringing these kids to the mosque to have them participate in these
activities and these are highly useful [activities] for them, for their upbringing. [This
way], they don’t forget how to speak Turkish. They also learn, even if just a bit, sura(s) in
the Qur’an, and they get to expand their knowledge on Qur’an. They expand their
religious knowledge. Of course there will be differences between those kids who attend
the mosque and those who don’t. I’m sure you are all aware of that.”
The children who attended the mosque’s religious school over Ramadan were given
homework days ago. Now they are expected to take turns and make presentations one by
one. The imam warns the children that in order to get their presents in the end they not
only have to perform well but also have to keep quiet and listen each other’s
presentations. Then, right before the first child takes the stage, the imam decides to
address the wider audience briefly, reminding them of the upcoming presidential election
in Turkey and informing them about how and where to register their votes. He asserts,
“By the way dear friends, as you know the voting polls are opening tomorrow and will
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continue on the 31st (of July), 1st, 2nd and 3rd (of August). You can look up the polling
stations online through the website of the Supreme Election Council. But when you go
voting, you have to go on the exact date and time of your reservation. Otherwise you
cannot vote. I mean if you have a reservation on Thursday, Friday, Saturday or Sunday,
you have to go accordingly. You have to bring your passport and ID. I just wanted to
remind you of that. May Allah be pleased with you all.”
Having reminded the community of the upcoming elections in Turkey and their
duty to vote, the imam returns his focus to children and starts inviting them to make their
presentations one by one. The first child recites the worships that are peculiar to
Ramadan whereas the second mentions each and every phase that Muslims will go
through in the afterlife. The third one names different sections/parts of the mosque, and
the fourth one reads a poem about the importance of daily prayers. The following
children each read a sura from the Qur’an. Gradually, the white noise in the basement
increases, making it difficult to hear the voices of children coming out of the speakers.
Once the program ends, the children receive their bayram gifts from the imam. When the
families start to leave, I decide to leave as well. The bayram celebration at the mosque
comes to an end. In this chapter, I will discuss the organization of and services offered by
the Diyanet-owned mosques in the U.S., the way they differ from mosques in Turkey,
and the religious boundary Turkish immigrants came to perceive and experience in the
U.S.

Celebrating the Muslim Religious Holidays Abroad
The majority of my respondents report that they celebrate the Muslim religious
holidays Ramadan (Eid al-Fitr) and Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha). Turkish men usually go to
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the mosque for the bayram prayer, which takes place in the morning of the first day. After
the prayer, men join their families for a large breakfast to be enjoyed for several hours.
Especially for Ramadan holiday, this breakfast carries a special meaning, a get together
with the family and/or friends following a whole month of fasting. Mete shares how he
celebrates Muslim holidays with his close friends: “We don’t celebrate [Turkish] national
holidays, but we do celebrate Ramadan and Sacrifice. I don’t work on those days. We go
for [bayram] prayer to Brooklyn if we are not late. Since I have many Turkish friends
living there, I choose to go to Brooklyn. After the mosque, we gather together for
breakfast, which lasts quite long. This is the celebration.”
Most of the salary-earner respondents have mentioned that taking the first day off
from work is usually not a problem on Muslim religious holidays. However, unlike the
case in Turkey where Ramadan holiday lasts for three days and Sacrifice holiday for four
days,13 those in the United States cannot celebrate these religious holidays that long.
Even though they continue their bayram visits to relatives and friends in the evenings,
they have to go to work on the remaining days. While some immigrants make the claim
that Muslim holidays should become official like Jewish holidays and hence last for 3-4
days depending on the bayram, some others indicate that one day is enough to celebrate
bayram abroad as they have a small circle of friends and relatives living there. Parents
usually send a note to schoolteachers whom they perceive as understanding, and don’t
send their kids to school on the first day of both holidays. However, they end up sending
them on the remaining days because they do not want their children fall behind in their
classes more than one day. Beginning from 2015, children no longer had to miss their
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When religious holidays fall on weekdays, the Turkish government usually declares the remaining
workdays as official holidays, and thus creates a weeklong holiday. Many immigrants in the U.S. envy such
free holidays.
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classes on the first day of holy days, as New York City added first days of both Ramadan
and Sacrifice bayram to the New York Schools’ holiday schedule.14
While the majority of respondents celebrate Muslim religious holidays, there are
also those who do not. One of the reasons is the heavy workload of the immigrants who
run their own businesses. Since it is not recognized as an official holiday in the U.S.,
some of the immigrants who own businesses such as grocery stores, restaurants,
supermarkets or delivery companies, do not celebrate bayram holidays like others
because they have to keep their business open and running. They cannot find time to go
to a mosque for bayram prayer, attend a long breakfast with family members or make
visits to their relatives and friends because they are working even on the first day. Asya,
who works at the cash register in a family-run supermarket, discusses how she spends her
bayram holidays: “We try to celebrate like we used to do in Turkey but of course [we’re]
not that crowded. Also, our time is limited. For instance on bayram days, I work here
until 5 pm.” In a similar vein, Yekta, who runs a small business in New Jersey, refers to
the differences between Turkey and the U.S. when it comes to celebrating religious
holidays. He asserts, “Of course here it is not possible to celebrate them like [we used to
do] in Turkey. People are usually busy with work, and life goes on. We only have bayram
celebrations with our inner circle. That is all.” When asked if he continues working on
the first day of both bayrams he states, “Yes of course. I never stop working. I believe
that’s the main worship.”
Not living in close proximity to relatives/friends also shapes immigrants’
experiences of religious celebrations in the U.S. Aliye knows that many Turkish people
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Grynbaum, M. and S. Otterman, 2015, “New York City Adds 2 Muslim Holy Days to Public School
Calendar,” The New York Times, March 4; The Editorial Board, 2015, “Holidays That Reflect New York’s
Students,” The New York Times, March 6.	
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do celebrate religious holidays but she and her family do not take the day(s) off when
bayram falls on weekdays as they have to keep their grocery store open. Moreover, they
do not have any close kin living nearby to pay visit to. Therefore, the only bayram
celebration they have amounts to long-distance phone calls to their relatives and friends
in Turkey. While some cannot find people to celebrate bayram with, some others do not
partake in any kind of celebration because they are not religious. Suna thinks that
celebrating Muslim religious holidays in Turkey is more of a cultural habit, a habit that
also includes seculars but it takes on a purely religious meaning in the United States.
Although her family celebrates certain American holidays such as Halloween, they do not
do anything special when it comes to Muslim religious holidays. She argues, “[I]n
Turkey, you would celebrate them even if you are not religious. I mean you would go and
visit your relatives or meet up with your friends. But here they gain a totally religious
meaning. I mean who is to celebrate [Ramadan] holiday here? People are living in long
distances from each other. So, it is usually the pious people who have a motivation to
come together, and they get together at mosques. Therefore, it is difficult to celebrate
[religious holidays] among Turks. People are busy here.” She thinks secular Turks are
busy working during bayram, so they cannot meet up with their friends as they used to do
in Turkey. Moreover, she considers those who make the effort to celebrate bayram at
mosque as pious, and does not identify with them. Therefore, Muslim religious holidays
do not carry any special meaning to Suna. For those who are eager to celebrate, on the
other hand, the nature of their employment becomes an important criterion determining in
what way and for how long they manage to celebrate bayram. And for many immigrants,
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the Turkish mosque plays a significant role in these celebrations. I will elaborate this
point in more detail in the following section.

Turkish Mosque as the House of Worship and Beyond
The demographics regarding the Muslims in the U.S. are a highly contentious issue.
The Pew Research Center (2016) estimates the number around 3.3 million, whereas the
Council on American-Islamic Relations (Bagby, 2011) asserts that the total number could
be as high as 7 million. While the Muslim community in the U.S. is highly diverse in
terms of their ethno-national, linguistic, and sectarian backgrounds, Arabs (from twenty
two different countries) constitute 26 percent of all U.S. Muslims, and South Asians
(Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, and Afghanis) form 16 percent (Pew, 2011).15
A comprehensive report by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) on
mosques in the United States indicates that there are a total of 2016 mosques, displaying
a significant jump from the year 2000 where the number was 1209 (Bagby, 2011).
Although this large increase might partially result from a miscount of the mosques in the
2000 report, Bagby asserts that 26 percent of all the mosques they examined were
founded during the period between 2000-2011. While 33 percent of all mosques in the
U.S. belong to South Asians, 27 percent belong to Arabs and 24 percent belong to
African Americans (Bagby, 2011:13). The report also indicates that three-fourths of all
American mosques are dominated by one ethnic group, usually from one of the three
major Muslim communities. Yet, only 3 percent of all mosques are frequented by a single
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ethnic group, meaning that the mosque communities in general include worshippers from
diverse ethnic backgrounds.
According to Bagby’s 2011 report, only 1 percent of the total mosques in the U.S.
belong to Turks, corresponding to around 20 mosques nation-wide (Bagby, 2011:13). The
website of Diyanet Center of America, a religious branch of the Directorate of Religious
Affairs of Turkey (Diyanet) located in Maryland and opened in April 2016, lists 23
Turkish mosques affiliated with the center. Among these, five mosques are located in the
state of New York and six in New Jersey. The remaining mosques are distributed across
states including Ohio, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Georgia. However,
the total number of Turkish mosques across the U.S. is unclear as there are mosques
unaffiliated with the Center. For example, the Fatih mosque in Brooklyn is a case in
point, as the president Mr. Fatih Demirci in an interview underlines the fact that they do
not have a relationship with the Diyanet in Turkey (Toprak, 2012). All three mosques that
I attended in the New York Metropolitan Area during my research were affiliated with
the Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkey, and they continue to do so under the
rubric of Diyanet Center for America. Two of these mosques are located in New York
City, and the third one is in New Jersey.
In some of the interviews, immigrants become sentimental when they discuss what
it means to attend a Turkish mosque in the U.S. as they experience several different
feelings and emotions during their visits. It represents a holy place where they can shut
the door on their daily problems, let go of their troubles even for a little while and feel at
peace. Mukadder is an elderly lady who has been living in the United States for almost
thirty years. Her life story is full of bitter memories, which include escaping from a

	
  

116	
  

refugee camp in Europe, reaching Turkey under dire conditions and making her way into
America. Since she has been enduring a troublesome marriage for so many years, she
yearns for the time that she spends inside the mosque. She feels lonely in New York
except those times she attends the mosque. She continues; “I feel like I stepped into
another world when I come to the mosque. I feel like a burden is lifted off my shoulders.
I fill with joy. I feel at peace. Formerly, there was no mosque but its foundation. I used to
wait for its construction with longing.” When asked where she thinks the feeling of peace
comes from she replies, “From other people, from Allah. Allah gives me peace. I feel all
my stress is gone once I put foot inside the mosque. You come to peace. It’s as if your
load is lightened. You forget all your troubles. You meet with other people but this is a
peace-giving place. (…) When the hodja (imam) holds a prayer, I stop thinking about my
daily life. I see another one. When I go home, it’s another life. When I come here, it’s
another one. I [console] myself with these.”
She is not the only one who seeks and finds relief in the Muslim house of worship.
Semanur, a pious young woman, states that attending the mosque and listening to imam’s
preaching make her feel at ease. Moreover, they make her forget about the hardships of
living in the U.S. for a while. When she is in the mosque, she feels like she is in Turkey.
In a similar vein, Vahap calls mosque his second home, a home where he worships, meets
and befriends other Muslims, and gets to know new cultures. For some immigrants, the
Turkish mosque constitutes a source of pride and happiness. Pelin, who came to America
with her parents at a very young age and whose father was among the mosque board
members, indicates that they did not have a mosque to meet together for so many years.
Now they do, and coming and praying at the mosque gives her pride and happiness. For
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Azade, mosque is a place where she can hear ezan (the Muslim call for prayer). “I feel
happy,” she says and adds, “You go to a Turkish mosque and you embrace it. You call it
my place. I feel more independent, more peaceful there. It makes me happy.”
Americanization of the Turkish Mosque
While they serve as houses of worship, caring for attendants’ religious needs and
emotions, immigrant religious institutions in the United States also have an important
role in helping newcomers adapt to the mainstream society through participation (Gap
Min 1992, Kurien 1998, Hirschman 2004, Foner and Alba 2008, Alba and Foner 2015).
Immigrant religions in the United States tend to undergo a process of Americanization,
which basically means following in the footsteps of the Protestant congregational model
that includes characteristics like “the use of the English language, holding weekly
services, having a sermon as a focal point of the service, and an increasing role of the
laity in managing the affairs of the church” (Hirschman 2014:1215) Moreover, the
congregational model also foresees the expansion of services provided to members
beyond religious worship through non-religious classes, recreational activities, and
counseling in civic matters (Young and Ebaugh 2001). Once organized according to the
congregational model, immigrant religions serve several roles for their members. The
maintenance of a sense of continuity between immigrants’ past and present, and the
sharing information on issues such as housing, employment, and language education are
some of those important roles (Hirschman 2004).
For instance, in his research on Korean churches in New York, Gap Min discusses
four major services that are provided for newly arrived immigrants (Gap Min 1992).
First, by creating a social space for interactions, the churches help immigrants who had
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left their families and friends behind form new acquaintances and friendships that protect
them from isolation in their new country. Second, they operate as transmitters of the
Korean culture by holding bilingual sermons and classes on Korean language, history and
culture, and by celebrating homeland holidays and serving traditional food. Third, they
offer services that would ease immigrants’ way into their new lives by counseling them
on issues such as employment, housing, education, health care, social security,
naturalization, etc. Fourth, these churches help adult immigrants, who often experience
downward mobility after immigration, to maintain social status in the community through
occupying certain positions of authority in the church.
The migration waves that occurred following the Immigration Act in 1965 brought
multiple non-Christian religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam to the United
States. A growing body of literature on the institutionalization of these religions in the
U.S. suggests how the Protestant congregational model contributes to the acculturation of
the adherents of these religions (Yang and Ebaugh 2001) Kurien, in her research on
Hindu Indian religious groups in Los Angeles, found that by participating in these
religious gatherings immigrants learn how to reconcile their ethno-cultural roots with
American values (Kurien 1998). Having participated in two distinct forms of religious
meetings for almost a year, she asserts that these meetings help adult immigrants
establish and maintain new friendships, and teach younger generations how to take pride
in their Hindu Indian culture and establish a balance between their Hindu and American
identifications by reading religious texts, discussing daily problems and playing games.
In a similar vein, Islam in the United States has also been going through processes
of Americanization as Muslims have started raising funds in their communities for new
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mosque buildings and offering services that cater needs beyond religious worship (Alba
and Foner 2015). In his study on the Muslim communities in Dearborn-Michigan,
Abraham underlines the differences between mosques in the U.S. and the Middle East
(Abraham 2000). From the outside, he asserts, the major difference seems to be the
absence of call for prayer in the U.S. However, the actual differences stem from
Americanization processes as the mosques in the U.S. have boards of members in charge
of duties such as fund raising and serve as both religious and community centers. Bagby
(2009), in his analysis of 25 mosques and about 1,500 mosque participants, examines
these tendencies. He also indicates that women’s participation in mosques both as
attendants and board members in the U.S. is higher than in most Muslim countries.
Moreover, around 90 percent of mosque participants support the argument that Muslims
in the U.S. should be actively involved in American civic life (Ibid). Based on 1,400
surveys administered in 11 cities with Muslim Americans, Dana and his colleagues find a
positive correlation between high levels of mosque attendance and involvement in
American politics (Dana, Barreto and Oskooii 2011). Moreover, they also uncover a
positive correlation between higher levels of religiosity and perception of Islam as
compatible with American politics. Therefore, the authors conclude that mosques play a
similar role that churches and synagogues do in the U.S. in terms of motivating their
members towards not isolation from but integration into the American mainstream.
When examined closely, it becomes clear that the Turkish mosques in the U.S. are
undergoing a similar process of transformation as they are adopting certain characteristics
discussed by Hirschman (2004) and others. First of all, while the imams of the Diyanetowned mosques that I visited in New York and New Jersey were sent from Turkey and
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their wages were paid by the Turkish government, they were not the sole authority
responsible from mosque affairs as these mosques all had elected boards in charge of
administrative tasks regarding the mosque. This was quite a change of scene from their
counterparts in Turkey. Mosques in Turkey are governed under the auspices of the
Diyanet, which assigns imams, pays their salaries, and also provides funding for other
mosque expenses. However in the United States, under a strict separation between
religious and state affairs, immigrants had realized that if they wanted to establish their
own houses of worship, they had to do it through their own means. Therefore, raising
money from the immigrant community, while still seeking some contributions from the
Diyanet, has become a crucial factor for Turkish Muslims. The level of economic power
and political leverage of the Turkish community living in the area is also reflected in the
size of the mosque buildings they managed to buy, rent or build from scratch. For
instance, while one of the two mosques that I visited in New York City was constructed
with the help of community (and some Diyanet) funding as a mosque building, the other
one was a makeshift mosque, converted from a first floor apartment with a basement. In
the latter case, the board was willing to raise enough money to purchase a piece of land or
a building and move out eventually.
The mosques that I attended during my research were holding weekly sermons on
Friday evenings right after the sunset or night prayers, as prayer time changes depending
on the season. After the prayer, food cooked by volunteers, usually women from the
community, gets distributed inside the mosque, and the sermon starts shortly after. These
sermons are more often than not given in Turkish. Respondents who regularly attend the
mosque in New Jersey mentioned that the sermons are delivered in both Turkish and
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English in their mosque. Yet, they also indicated that the bi-lingual approach was the
personal effort of the imam who was appointed there, eager to learn English in order to
welcome non-Turkish Muslims into the mosque. The organization of this weekly service
is quite different from the case in Turkey where the imam’s sermon is usually delivered
right after the Friday prayer (around noon), which is only observed by men. Moreover, no
food is served in connection with the imam’s speech. Contrary to the case in the U.S.,
women’s presence in the organizational structure of the mosque in Turkey is highly
limited. However, in the U.S., they become much more involved, not only in taking care
of chores such as cooking but also in the administration of the mosque building. A young
woman that I interviewed was a board member, and she was discussing her plans to turn
the mosque into a more attractive site, especially for children but also for adults, in order
to create a tight-knit Turkish community.
Turkish mosques offer many services. For instance, they tend to organize Qur’an
courses for adult women from the community offered by a female instructor. In some
cases, this person is the wife of the imam, who was also trained in theology in Turkey.
Mosques also organize weekend schools for children, who are divided into age groups,
offering courses including Qur’an, Turkish language, crafts, and in some cases even
algebra. In summer, these schools are usually organized during the weekdays rather than
weekends, in a sense reflecting the practice of holding summer Qur’an courses by
mosques in Turkey. Some of these mosques offer art courses for adults, or sports courses
for children on the weekends. One of these mosques that I visited even has a karate team
composed of boys and girls entering tournaments in New York. Moreover, the women
who seem to be highly active in the two out of three mosques that I visited also organize
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women-only breakfasts (which sometimes include baby showers), and Qur’an readings
on special occasions (i.e. birth or death of a family/community member). In addition,
seminars on civic issues such as immigration law and health insurance are organized for
the community.
Aside from these services, the Turkish mosque in the U.S. plays a significant role in
the socialization of the Turkish community by regularly creating a social space where
immigrants from all age groups gather together. In addition to weekly sermons, which
make them meet, dine and listen to the imam together on a regular basis, bayram
celebrations and iftar (break of fasting) dinners offered during Ramadan also serve as
opportunities for group socialization. While some mosques organize a bayram breakfast,
some others, like the one I described in the beginning, hold evening celebrations. Despite
this variation, both activities serve the same end: to bring the Turkish community
together. This gives its members a chance to worship together, either by observing
bayram payer in the morning before the breakfast, or by observing the daily prayer before
or after the religious sermon. However, the function of these bayram events goes beyond
their religious aspect. They create a social space for people to meet, get acquainted, and
to hang out with friends. Moreover, the same applies to children who were born and grew
up in the United States. During these celebrations, the mosque is decorated with balloons
or Turkish flags, and sometimes clowns or illusionists are hired or a cotton candy
machine is brought to entertain children. The distance to which the mosque
administration goes in order to amuse children during the bayram so that they would not
want to celebrate Christmas is quite remarkable, not only because of the expenses but
also due to the fact that having balloons, or a clown, or a candy machine on the mosque
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premises is quite unheard of in Turkey. As Gap Min (1992) observes it for Korean
churches, the Turkish mosque also acts as the transmitter of culture, by offering Turkish
and religious classes to children or by organizing gift giving ceremonies as part of the
bayram celebrations orchestrated either by the imam of the mosque or some elderly in the
community.
The mosque also creates room for socialization during Ramadan by offering free
iftar dinners to the community for an entire month. As the main group responsible for
mosque affairs, board members usually begin searching several months before the start of
Ramadan for volunteers from the Turkish community who would take on the expenses of
the dinners each night, either solely or jointly with others. One of the regular attendants
of a mosque in New York tells me the number of women coming to the mosque increases
during Ramadan because of these dinners. While it was the women in the community
who used to prepare these meals, now the mosque hires a cook instead. She tells me the
details of how they organize the whole event: “Each day someone volunteers to do it. I
mean when I say volunteer I mean they donate a certain amount of money to the mosque.
It’s a contribution to the mosque. The mosque hires a cook and gets the iftar dinner ready.
(…) There is a [daily] fee. You can share it with a couple of others or you can pay the
entire [fee] yourself.” In order to showcase the willingness on the community to offer
these dinners, a participant from the New Jersey mosque indicates, “Last night we
gathered together to discuss who could offer these dinners [this coming Ramadan]. Last
year there were so many people who paid for the dinners, I couldn’t find a date to do it
myself.”
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Although these dinners are not exclusive to Turkish immigrants, the majority of
those who attend them are Turkish. While many regular attendees in these three mosques
are proud to tell me that non-Turkish Muslims also come to their mosque for prayers
and/or iftar dinners, there are cases where this welcoming attitude is not extended to all
non-Turkish Muslims. Over a discussion of why a Turkish mosque in New Jersey
stopped serving iftar dinners after the first 10 days last year, one board member of
another New Jersey mosque says, “People asked why they couldn’t find community
members who would fund the remaining nights. But, there is more to that issue as there
are several people who could offer the dinner. The mosque board decided to give a break
to these dinners. For the last 2-3 years [that] mosque was inundated by Arabs during iftar
dinners. Maybe I should not say Arabs, but sheepish looking people dressed like gypsies.
People lost their interest as a result. Well, I haven’t heard anything from anyone. This is
my guess.” When asked if he were not afraid the same people would start coming to his
mosque, he replied, “I don’t think so. (…) That mosque has become more public. Here it
is a bit away from [other Muslim communities]. So I don’t think they’ll ever come here.”
These socializing and instructional aspects of Turkish mosques in the New York
Metropolitan Area are also reflected in their official names, which usually include the
term “cultural center” in their title. Moreover, many of the mosque attendees were aware
that the Turkish mosque in the U.S. is not only a house of worship, but also a house for
socialization. A respondent who volunteers in the maintenance of a mosque in New York
points at this differentiation as he says; “This place is also a cultural center. It’s not just a
mosque. There are different activities [offered].” In a similar vein, another respondent
from New Jersey indicates that when he first mentioned the Turkish mosque to a friend
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from work, his friend thought it would be like the mosques in Turkey, meaning only
venues of worship, but when they paid a visit together, he got to see that this was not
true. He also adds, “In Turkey, people perceive mosques as a house of worship. When
you say there will be iftar dinner served at the mosque nobody would go because people
would think those dinners are for the poor only. But here it’s quite the opposite.”
Many of the mosque attendees that I interviewed underline the socializing aspect of
the Turkish mosque in the U.S. Cahide’s social circle is heavily based on her friends from
the local Turkish mosque, and when asked what she thinks about the mosque’s
significance, she replies, “I mean you get to see many people there, you see Turkish
people all gathered together. You worship. You have [the sermons]. You get to learn
things you didn’t know. I don’t know; it’s nice. I love it.” Filiz, whose main reason for
attending is to have her kids socialize with other Turkish children, states that at the
mosque she gets to meet other Turks -- people with whom she shares her nationality and
language. Therefore, the meaning of mosque for her is the gathering of Turkish
community together. Buse defines mosque as a place where she is relieved from stress
and gets the opportunity to worship, chat and have fun with her friends. She thinks living
in close proximity to the local mosque helped her entry into the community when she
first moved to the U.S. “Many people come to the U.S. and feel lonely,” she says and
adds, “But I never had that.”
Moreover, many parents who regularly attend Turkish mosques underline their role
as transmitters of Turkish culture and Muslim religion to their U.S.-born children. Having
grown up in a predominantly non-Muslim country, these children are seen to take an
interest in non-Muslim holidays such as Christmas. Often fueled by their interaction with
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other children in school, the children tend to ask to purchase a Christmas tree and
decorate it, or exchange gifts for Christmas. Although parents try to the best of their
abilities to explain that Christmas is not a Muslim holiday, they are afraid of pushing
their children further away from Islam with their persistent stance on the issue. Therefore,
they see the religious courses offered by mosques as an opportunity to have their children
learn the essence and requirements of Islam. One religious instructor at a Turkish mosque
also mentions this pressing demand coming from parents. She believes that Turkish
children find Islam boring because it’s devoid of all decorations and celebrations they
grow accustomed to in the U.S. Therefore, she advises parents to entertain their children
during bayram holidays by purchasing decorations and putting them up in their houses, or
purchasing ‘bayram’ gifts for their children. This mimicking of Christmas practices is
expected to counter-balance the need for engaging in the joyous activities kindled in
children by the way Christmas is celebrated in America.
Whenever Semanur comes to the mosque, she takes her four-year-old son with her.
She wants him to learn how to read Qur’an and how to pray. She thinks her son has so
much to learn from the mosque. Although she was not attending mosques regularly in
Turkey, she thinks it is more of a necessity in the U.S. This is understandable, as back in
Turkey she was part of the majority Muslim population, but after moving to the U.S. she
found herself in the minority status in a predominantly non-Muslim culture. Therefore,
she makes the extra effort to teach her son about her religion. Metin also believes in the
teaching power of mosques not only by lecturing about Islam but also by demonstrating
how it is practiced. He indicates, “We organize iftar dinners for 30 days during Ramadan.
Why? Is it because we don’t have food at home? Or is it because we cannot afford
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dinner? It has nothing to do with that. We get to come together with our friends due to
Ramadan. We get to chat; we break fast together. So I want my kids to see that
environment, to feel that environment. My kids will be able to tell stories about these
gatherings when they grow up.” In a similar vein, Azade thinks by bringing her children
to the mosque, she makes them hear ezan (the Muslim call for prayer), see people praying
and worshipping. She believes that’s how her children will learn about their culture.
Although the Turkish mosque serves several functions geared towards adapting
immigrants to the American society, there are some aspirations to instrumentalize it in
constructing an ethno-national community for adults but especially for children who were
born in the U.S. Hence, these children will be able to grow up embracing their ethnic
background and knowing each other as a community. A board member of a mosque in
New Jersey says while people who have less religious orientation do not send their kids
to mosque over summer breaks in Turkey, living in America creates a need for that,
which goes beyond learning the religious faith. She explains the reason why: “An atheist
father himself sends his kid to the [mosque] school so that [the kid] would have Turkish
friends, and feel that there is a Turkish community around. So that he could learn his
culture. (…) I mean these kids will grow up together maybe for two-three generations.
They want to have friends from their own culture even if they have American friends at
school. They would like to belong to something.” Growing up with Turkish friends and
encircled by a community, despite having American friends, are believed to provide a
sense of belonging, which would prevent children from melting into the American
mainstream. The same board member also gives an example from her own circle of
friends: “A Turkish friend of mine who grew up here once told me that she had felt so
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isolated when she had first started school because all the others [in school] had already
known each other. So she was isolated, feeling horrible. She thought if she had a
[Turkish] community that she could grow up with, she would have felt better.” In order to
attract more children to the mosque, the board member plans to organize several social
activities including music, art, and sports classes, which will be offered at reasonable
fees, and she dreams of having families, regardless of their religious orientation, perceive
the Turkish mosque as their second home.

Experiencing the Religious Boundary in the United States
One of the turning points for Muslims in American history was the September 11
attacks, which have critically affected the fate of many people in the country. Over 2,700
people were killed in the attacks, and even more were injured. The attacks have also
changed the life experiences of Muslim Americans, a group that was mostly invisible to
the mainstream society until that day (Cainkar 2002). Although the Muslims in the U.S.
had been subject of government and societal backlash in the past, especially during the
Arab-Israeli War in 1967 and Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, the scale of the September11 backlash was unprecedented. A few weeks after 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act16
passed in the Congress nearly in unanimity, and was signed into law by then President
Bush. The Act foresaw amendments to certain laws on immigration, intelligence, banking
and crime (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). According to Hing, the new legislation
provided “expanded authority to search, monitor and detain citizens and noncitizens
alike, but its implementation since passage preyed most heavily on noncitizen Arabs,
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  USA

Patriot Act stands for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001”.	
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Muslims, and Sikhs. Authority to detain, deport, or file criminal charges against
noncitizens specifically is broadened” (quoted in Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009:162).
Detention of Muslims has been one of the major consequences of the Patriot Act.
Midnight raids into houses occupied by Arab and Muslim residents by law enforcement
units became a mundane practice. Many people were arrested, interrogated, detained, and
eventually deported. People were held in detention centers for several months without
receiving any solid information regarding their legal situation and the length of their stay
(Bayoumi 2008). Moreover, people detained did not have easy access to communication
with the outside world. In many occasions it took several days before neighbors realized
that the Muslim family living next door was missing.
The developments that took place in the aftermath of September 11 attacks have
aroused one major intense feeling among Muslim immigrants: fear (Naber 2006,
Hendricks et al. 2007, Abu-Ras and Abu-Bader 2008, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). It
was not only the sudden shifts in government policies but also reactions from the public
ranging from physical violence and vandalism to verbal abuse that caused fear among
many Muslims. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has kept records of “hate
crimes,” a concept referring to criminal acts “motivated, at least in part, by the group
affiliation of the victim,” since 1992 and publishes them annually (Gerstenfeld 2004: 9).17
The data shows that among all hate crime victims of religious bias, victims of antiIslamic bias were around 2 percent throughout the second half of the 1990s including the
year 2000. In 2001, a sharp increase brought the figure to 26 percent, followed by a drop
to 10 percent the very next year (FBI 2000-2015). The data also shows that victims of
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there is no universally agreed upon system of measuring hate crimes, some reports may indicate
lower levels of hate crime incidents than others. For instance, FBI statistics tend to report lower levels of
hate crime incidents than those of Muslim/Arab civil society organizations. 	
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anti-Islamic bias declined to 8 percent (among all victims of religious-based hate crimes)
between 2002 and 2008 but started to increase after 2010, reaching 16 percent in 2014
and jumping to 22 percent in 2015. However, it is important to note that during all these
years, even in 2001, the percentage of anti-Jewish hate crime victims is higher than that
of anti-Islamic hate crime victims, albeit the number has been dropping significantly
since 2010.
Hate crimes are not the only reactions that immigrants of Muslim origin have
encountered in the public space--incidents of profiling, bias, and discrimination were
widespread against them (Cainkar 2002, Ghazal Read 2008. Bakalian and Bozorgmehr
2009, 2011, Widner and Chicoine 2011). Stereotyping and ethnic profiling resulted in
various unjust decisions and misconduct. Many people lost their jobs or faced
discrimination at their workplace because of their Muslim names. People were requested
to get off airplanes because they spoke in Arabic (or a language that sounded like
Arabic), which eventually led to the coining of the term “Flying while Muslim” (Khaleeli
2016). They were stopped and searched because their appearance revealed their Muslim
identity. Women wearing headscarves were insulted. Many Muslim shop owners faced
bankruptcy as people stopped shopping from their stores. The negative feelings towards
Muslims were at a peak in the aftermath of the attacks.
The September 11 backlash clearly displays the fact that Islam had become a
dubious, problematic, and threatening identity both at the government and society levels.
But why has it become the stigma of the early 21st century? According to Leary and
Schreindorfer, people may get stigmatized because “they are assumed to pose a threat to
others, contribute inadequately to the common good, violate social standards, and/or
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induce aversive emotions in other people” (cited in LeBel 2008: 411). Goffman (1963)
posits that “normal” people use stigma to justify the potential danger of the stigmatized
(12). In other words, the Muslim presence in the United States suddenly became not only
the “reason” for 9/11 but also the “source” of potential violence in the future.
Establishing guilt by association, Americans perceive the presence of Muslims in the
U.S. as a national security issue (Moore 2007). According to Alba and Foner, this is one
of the main factors that set the American case apart from European cases, since the latter
views Islam principally as the anti-thesis of western values rather than a security matter
(Alba and Foner 2015). Yet, despite the backlash and negative attitudes from the public,
Muslims in the United States choose to fight back and not isolate themselves from the
mainstream society. Moreover, they do that by organizing advocacy groups, and
engaging in civic and political activism, which is read by scholars as a clear sign of their
Americanization (Alba and Foner 2015, Moore 2007; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009).

Immigrants’ Perception of September 11
Turkish immigrants that I interviewed are, in general, aware of the presence of
negative feelings and attitudes toward Islam in the mainstream society. Unlike Arab
Muslims, they do not mention having a sense of collective discrimination because of their
religious belief and identification. However, when asked, the immigrants describe the
contours of how Islam is perceived in the U.S.--the general belief is that September 11
attacks have altered Americans’ perception of Islam and paved the way for the
establishment of associations between Muslims and terrorism in the mainstream. Yekta,
who moved to New Jersey a couple of years before the attacks, argues that Islam was
almost unheard of in the U.S. before September 11. He says, “Islam was not a big deal
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here. In fact, many people wouldn’t know who Muslims were. Since this is an introverted
country, except people who are curious or have higher levels of education, the
mainstream Americans are highly introverted, not having connections with the outer
world. They wouldn’t know who the Muslims were or what Islam was. They met Islam in
a horrific way at the time. Therefore, the association between Islam and terror has left an
imprint on their minds. Islam no longer gets associated with anything positive in the U.S.
anymore.” Alp, a middle-aged doctor who has been living in New York since early 1990s
makes a similar observation: “Muslims are now associated with terrorism. That’s the
general attitude. Although they keep saying things like… Obama gave a speech 2-3 days
ago; did you hear that? He said Muslims are the cornerstones of this country. It’s been 23 days. They keep saying that but…” Although the political discourse is inclusive at
times, Alp was not convinced that the equation between Muslim and terrorism had been
entirely erased.
There is also the belief that the negative image of Islam in the United States is
perpetuated following each new attack by Islamist fundamentalists in the western world.
Aras, a young engineer from New York who arrived years after September 11 is also
aware of this process. Remembering the Boston marathon bombings that took place few
days before the interview, he says, “Here is this thing, after the Boston bombing for
instance. [They would ask] ‘Is it the Muslims again?’ Somehow Americans equate
Muslims with terrorists.” Rauf, a white-collar worker who also came to New York many
years after September 11, shares his experiences in a public Facebook group right after
the Boston marathon bombings. He states, “I was thrown out of a group on Facebook. It
was right after the Boston marathon bombings and the group admin wrote a status saying,
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‘All Muslims are terrorist. Fuck Muslims’ and got so many likes from Americans. So I
posted a comment saying, ‘America is a country of diversity. Everybody comes from
different backgrounds. You cannot blame religion. The real problem here is ignorance
and lack of education, not religion. No religion orders [followers] to kill. Religion is for
people’s lives, to enrich their lives. Once the person is dead, there is no religion.’ So I
reported it to Facebook, and had it removed. It’s true that when you say you’re Muslim
here, they perceive you as terrorist.” This association is so deeply felt by Turkish
immigrants that whenever they hear the news of a new attack or bombing in the U.S.,
their first reaction is to pray that the perpetrators would not be identified as Muslims.
Some Turkish immigrants argue that the way Islam is perceived by the
mainstream Americans is changing albeit slowly. The decline in the intensity of the
backlash that they either experience in their daily lives or hear about from others is
interpreted as the sign of Americans changing their views. Yahya, a restaurant owner
who has been living in New York for over 20 years, thinks Americans have finally
understood that there was more to Islam than meets the eye. He claims that people’s
attitudes have changed a lot and have no resemblance to their thinking during the first
two years after the attacks. Asya, who has arrived in America in the 1980s, is more
cautious when talking about perceived change in Americans. She says, “I’ve met with so
many people here. Some people change their opinions after they read about or observe
[Muslims]. But some are idea-fixed. You can’t change them no matter what.”
Hazan, who has been living in New York for over five years, thinks there is a
generational difference among Americans when it comes to their attitudes regarding
Islam. “Informed new generations are good, but old generations, who had seen the
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[attacks] still hold the same views. They view [Muslims] negatively, as terrorists let me
say that. But the new generations are getting informed because Muslims have started to
introduce themselves well. Especially the Turks, they are far advanced in terms of
socializing in New York. They are introducing Islam really well to people,” she says and
adds, “People are slowly losing the association with terrorism but older generations still
hold on to those views because it’s still difficult to explain things to older people.” The
desire to show/teach Americans true Islam through interactions is expressed as a
responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by immigrants who perceive Turks as the model
Muslims. Serra mentions one of her friends, a member of a local Turkish organization
who told her after September 11 attacks that a huge responsibility fell on Muslims since
they were stigmatized as terrorists. As a result, he went on, [Turks] had to work towards
erasing that image. “That’s how he lives now, how he behaves,” Serra adds approvingly.
Interestingly, none of these respondents made any references to the efforts put forward by
several non-Turkish Muslim organizations to ameliorate the situation of Muslims in the
wake of September 11. So they thought it was either the role played by Turks as model
Muslims, or Americans’ own enlightenment that brought about change in their perception
of Islam.
September 11 was a traumatic incident not only for the wounded and families of
the deceased but also for the residents of New York City as PTSD levels and stress
among individuals increased after the incident (Abu-Ras and Abu-Bader 2008). For
Turkish immigrants, September 11 constitutes an important moment in their memory
regarding their life in New York, especially for those who had been living in the city at
the time of the attacks. Sabri, who had been living in New York for over a decade when
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the attacks happened, describes how the whole event affected New Yorkers and what
kind of memories and emotions it stirred up from his life in Turkey. He says, “We were
sad. Of course! First, so many people were killed and we witnessed the way they died. It
was a horrible thing because human lives were on the line. It was a huge atrocity. We
were sad, but we knew what terror was, what violence was about so we did not find it too
strange. I mean we were not that influenced but Americans were in shock. And people
started to act like zombies. [They were] unhappy, not smiling, economy also got upside
down. In short, it took people several years to recover from what had happened. The
signs are still visible even now.” When he says he is not foreign to violence and terror, he
makes a reference to the decades-long armed conflict in Turkey between the military and
the Kurdish armed group PKK, which has been deeply imprinted in the collective
memory of both Turks and Kurds.
In a similar vein, Demir, who was in New York for only three years at the time,
argues that while the attack and its aftermath were familiar to him, they were
unprecedented to New Yorkers. He states, “We haven’t been living here for long. So, we
don’t have enough previous experiences to compare. I had moved a little time ago.
Security… I mean the things that we were used to from Turkey. Soldiers walking around,
soldiers on the subway. Check points. The immediate changes happened here. But we
were used to [them]. Since Americans were not used to such things, it was more unusual
to them of course. The collapse of the buildings was of course horrible but the measures
taken afterwards were not unusual to me. You know the daily life in Turkey. Bombs
explode, people die, etc.” These respondents were claiming that despite the horrific
nature of the attacks, they were less traumatized than other New Yorkers because they
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had gotten used to violence and terror in the country where they came from. This
seemingly “relaxed” attitude constitutes a stark contrast to the experiences of Arab
Muslims who escaped from war zones and reported increased levels of stress and trauma
in the post-9-11 period (Abu-Ras and Abu-Bader 2008). The main reason lies in the
differences between the experiences of Turkish and Arab men in the post-9-11 period.
Turkish men, who were not targeted by the government security policies (unlike Arab
men), are only referring to their memory of terrorist attacks and witnessing increased
levels of security in Turkey. In this sense, they do not perceive themselves any different
from other New Yorkers, maybe only a little bit more experienced. But for Arab men,
who became the target of both societal and governmental backlash in the aftermath of the
attacks, post-September 11 era is experienced as an extension of the violence happened
back home.

The Narratives of the Backlash: “Nothing Bad Really Happened”
Since Turkish ethno-national identity is not stigmatized in the United States as it is
Europe, immigrants with lower levels of religious orientation and those whose religious
identifications are not evident from the outside are more likely to not report any incidents
of personal discrimination or hate crimes happening after September 11. Some
immigrants think the reason why they did not have any negative experiences is because
they are either not Muslim or a “different” kind of Muslim. Referring to the fact that he
does not practice religion or live a religious life, Mete asserts that the backlash had no
effect on him. “Because I’m one of the other Muslims,” he says and continues, “I mean I
do not do much. My social circle is also like that. That’s why it did not affect either my
life or theirs. But I think it must have affected others in those circles. I mean the religious
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ones who practice their religion, people who get dressed and live life according to
[Islam]. It must have affected them.”
Umut asserts that he did not have any problems after September 11 because he does
not fit into the Muslim stereotype circulating in the American mainstream. “I think it’s
because I don’t scream ‘Muslim’ on the outside,” he says. “I think it’s because I don’t
look like [a Muslim] or people do not notice [that I’m Muslim]. Probably ethnic Muslims
such as Pakistanis, I mean people with beards or those who make themselves noticeable
through certain physical characteristics have had problems. I’m sure there are those who
were insulted, or had problem at school.” In a similar vein, women who are not covering
their hair think the absence of hijab, which is perceived as a religious insignia, is the
reason why they did not experience any reactions. Pious non-hijabi woman Hazan says
since she is not hijabi nobody notices that she is Muslim. “But there are things that I have
witnessed [happening to hijabis],” she states, emphasizing the role of the religious signs
in inciting reactions by Americans to Muslims.
Some immigrants make the claim that they did not experience any negative
attitudes from mainstream society because Americans know that Turkey is different from
other Muslim countries. Rauf, a white-collar worker from New York, makes the
following observation regarding his American coworkers: “Nothing happened. I mean in
the company that we were working. It was an all-American company. There were no
other Turks. (…) But they were not like that. They tried to understand. I mean they
already knew that Turkey was different.” Turgut, who is in the IT sector, holds similar
views regarding Americans’ differentiation between Turks and other Muslims but he also
believes this outcome results from the efforts of Turks living in the U.S. He says, “It’s
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because of the way how we introduced Turkish people [in the U.S.] I said it a moment
ago, I believe I’m representing Turkey the best way I can. This has to do with your
behaviors, your personality, and your [good] nature. It means that Turkish people who
came here, has been living here had represented Turkey good enough that we did not
receive reactions.” As a secular, modern Turkish man, Turgut believes that he and people
like him are partially responsible for the positive image of Turkish people in the U.S.
helping Americans differentiate them from other Muslims, whom he does not view
positively either.
Some immigrants assert that living in multicultural, multi-ethnic cities with high
numbers of immigrants from a wide range of countries is the reason why they did not
have any negative experiences after September 11. Muslims in other parts of the United
States, especially those living in the South or Mid-west, are imagined as having multiple
problems due to the racial and religious homogeneity of the local society. Begum, who
arrived in the U.S. several years after the attacks, thinks she is lucky because New York
and New Jersey are ethnically and religiously mixed. She says, “There is a large group of
people including Hispanics, blacks, etc. coming from all races. In the aftermath of 9-11, I
believe people had different experiences in places such as Texas where there are
rednecks, and more white people. I don’t think those who live here are that extreme.”
Demir believes that the backlash, which he thinks did not last too long, was coming from
the ignorant segments of the American society. He indicates, “In the end this is New
York. It’s a democratic state and the society knows that people differ from each other. So
it did not last long. But my guess is that, people in the Mid-West or in the South had
more difficulty.” Samet tells me a story he read in the paper. A hijabi woman gets
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verbally attacked on a NYC bus and she immediately calls the police and they catch the
perpetrator. Samet believes this incident showcases the willingness of the NYPD and
authorities to deal with the attitudes adopted towards Muslims since 9/11. He attributes
NYPD’s positive behavior to the high number of Muslim residents in New York. In other
words, the multi-ethnic composition as well as the political stance of the residents,
deemed as blue, democratic states, set New York and New Jersey apart from the rest of
the country according to Turkish immigrants.
There is also a widespread belief that if immigrants mind their own business,
respect the law and do not get involved in shady organizations or activities, they will
remain unharmed. Sabri argues that there were no great reactions to Muslims, but there
were stories that some Arabs from Patterson who celebrated the attacks were taken into
custody by the police. Underlining the fact that things would have been different and far
worse if this had happened in Europe, Sabri says, “This is the positive side actually. It is
not like Europe. If it turns out the Muslims are the culprit, then no pressure is exerted
upon Muslims unlike Europe. But if you start saying ‘good job,’ then the police would
come and take you away. If you mind your own business, or do not get involved in such
kind of issues, nobody would bother you.” Halit, echoing Sabri’s comparison between
Europe and the U.S. indicates that Islam is perceived very positively, as long as Muslims
act in a measured way. Their trust in the American law enforcement and naïve belief in
the argument that nothing bad could happen unless you behaved wrong (unlike Europe)
showcases the fact that Turkish immigrants are oblivious to the governmental backlash
including unlawful detentions and deportations of many Arab and Muslim men in the
aftermath of September 11.
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Finally, many immigrants share the belief that 9-11 backlash was a reaction to
highly atrocious events and its scale and volume subsided over the years. Turgut justifies
the reactions on the grounds that the attacks got Americans highly mad, turning people
who committed the acts as their target. “Call it terrorism, call it religious [fanaticism] the
anger is directed at that,” he says and continues, “And you cannot prevent it. I mean
psychologically you cannot prevent it. How would you think about someone who slapped
you in the face? Same thing. At that moment it was like you were slapped in the face.”
Bahri says there was a general negative feeling in the mainstream society but it was such
a long time ago. When asked if he thinks the reactions died away he replies, “In New
York? Yes of course. Well, let me put it this way. Dying away is not the correct
expression. It was an instantaneous thing, which melted down.” In a similar vein, Begum
discusses how her husband, who was in the business of selling Turkish merchandise, and
who was already living in the U.S. at the time of the attacks, had to hide his name at a fair
he took part because of the backlash. But she argues that things have changed over time.
“Since I came later, it was a lot better,” she states. These immigrants perceive 9-11
backlash as a series of “natural” reactions that flamed up quickly but simmered down
eventually. They are not only apprehensive of the attitudes of Americans but also
ignorant of the prolonged injustices suffered by many Arabs and Muslims in the
aftermath of the attacks.

The Narratives of the Backlash: Hate Crimes and Bias Incidents
One of the major differences between the literature on Arab Muslims and my
research on Turkish immigrants is the fact that unlike what is experienced by Arab
Muslims, none of my respondents ever mentioned experiencing any sort of governmental
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backlash in the post-9-11 period. Moreover, many immigrants were even unacquainted
with the facts of Muslims being detained, or even deported, on unjust grounds under the
PATRIOT Act. Although none of them reported any incidents of physical violence that
they were subjected to, there were a few statements about violent acts immigrants have
either witnessed or heard of happening to someone they know. Yahya tells the story of
two customers getting attacked in front of his eyes while they were having dinner with
their 6-months-old baby few weeks after September 11. He says, “[H]is wife was hijabi.
They got attacked because they were Muslim. Police showed up later. They were having
dinner here. His wife was American who later became Muslim. She was not Arab; she
was American. He was Arab. Some people intervened. [The attackers] ran away. It was
one or two weeks after the incident. But they were fanatic Jews, not regular Jews. It was
the fanatics who attacked people.” Azade remembers what happened to a family member,
a hijabi woman, who was kicked and slapped while she was walking down the street in
New York. “People got concerned about their kids,” she describes the atmosphere,
“People who had hijabi daughters considered if they should take the hijab off because
they were scared while walking to school.”
While there are only few cases of reported physical violence, several immigrants
mentioned either experiencing verbal abuses or having witnessed or heard of someone
who did in the aftermath of September 11. Hazan, a young non-hijabi woman with a high
level of religious orientation, tells the story of a hijabi Arab girl from college who was
given the nickname “9-11” by her classmates and who had to drop out from school
eventually. Erkan, who was in the country for over twenty years at the time, asserts that
at the workplace he was treated nicely, but there were other Muslims (some Turks but
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mostly Arabs) who were not. He makes the following observation: “Americans gave a
hard time to people at work, or schools. For instance, [there were] negative words and
swearing. They were saying things like ‘We don’t want you; go back to your country.’
But then, because Americans like learning, they started reading books. They read Qur’an
and realized Islam is one thing and people are another.” Asude, a young hijabi woman
who was a non-hijabi high school student back then, indicates that since she is blond her
classmates thought she was a Russian Jew, which saved her from their mockery for a
while. However, after they had found out that she was also Muslim, their attitude toward
her had changed. “They mocked me, sniped me, I almost became the subject of ridicule,”
she says remembering those days.
Some Turkish immigrant women’s experiences, on the other hand, resemble those
of Arab Muslim women’s (Naber 2006, Haddad 2007, Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009,
Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009), as they mention becoming the target of verbal abuse
because of their hijabs, one of the visible markers of their faith, which had turned into a
stigma in the aftermath of September 11. Ayfer, a non-hijabi woman who only covers her
hair when visiting the mosque, was planning to attend a mawlid18 reading at her local
Turkish mosque few blocks from her house. It was three days after the September 11
attacks. Since she had her ritual ablution at home, she wrapped a white veil around her
hair and left her apartment. As she started walking down the street, someone started
yelling at her. “[It was] a regular cab. I didn’t want to take a look at his face but as his
voice got louder I turned and looked. It was a man, and he was yelling ‘terrorists.’ I did
not respond,” says Ayfer. Having traumatized by this experience, she is still afraid to
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Mawlid is a lyrical text on the birth of Prophet Mohammad. In the way Islam is practiced in Turkey,
people gather together in a ceremonial manner, and an imam recites it in Arabic as others are listening. It
could be done for a newborn baby or for someone who has recently passed away.
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leave her house with her veil on when she goes to the mosque. Pelin, who is not hijabi
and who moved to the U.S. in early 1980s with her family, remembers her hijabi mother
getting verbally attacked on the street in the aftermath of the attacks. She says, “Maybe
we are not recognizable; people do not realize we are Muslims from the outside but my
mother, because she is hijabi, she is highly noticeable. A lot of people were saying ‘Oh
you killed 5 thousand people in World Trade Center. We don’t want you here!’ We had
some experiences like that while walking down the street, or while doing laundry.
Therefore it was horrific times. It was truly a horrible experience for us.” Bias incidents
usually involve strangers and take place in the public space, and it is no surprise that the
reason why these women were picked up on street is because of their stigmatized
religious veil.
Another issue that came up often during the interviews regarding the effects of
September 11 attacks was the notion of ‘gazes.’ Immigrants, even if they have not
experienced any physical or verbal attacks, were aware of the change in Americans’
gazes, making them feel highly self-conscious and aware of the religious stigma. Cahide,
a hijabi woman who was living in New York at the time of the attacks, indicates that
Muslims were negatively affected once it turned out that the perpetrators were also
Muslim. “Was I affected?” she asks and replies her own question, “I didn’t experience
such things but you can get affected by people’s gazes. Gazes are very important. No one
said anything. Maybe they did behind my back. I don’t know. But there were differences
in their gazes.” Although she couldn’t elaborate on the differences in people’s gazes, she
was insistent that they were there. It was not only women respondents who were aware of
these altered gazes. Mete thinks the public perception of Islam is negative. “I could feel
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that,” he says. “Before it didn’t matter to Americans if the person was Muslim or not.
Now, you get it from gazes.” Vahap, who was working as a superintendent at an
apartment building mostly occupied by Jewish Americans, says people were looking at
him oddly. When asked to elaborate he says, “All the neighbors were Jewish. They knew
I was Muslim. I never had any confrontation but then my English was poor.” While it is
understandable for Cahide to report having received gazes because of her hijab, and for
Vahap because his employers had known of his religious orientation, Mete’s mentioning
of them is quite unexpected as he defines himself as a non-practicing Muslim who does
not showcase any religious identification to other people. So here, he is referring to the
gaze of Americans toward other Muslims rather than himself that he witnessed in the
public space.
Research indicates that Arabic names, shop signs and accent are among the major
triggers when it comes to hate and bias incidents toward Muslims (Hendricks et. al 2007).
Therefore, it is not surprising to hear that some Turkish immigrants experienced
discrimination because of their Arabic sounding names regardless of their religious
orientation. Among other public spaces, airports are the venues where this discrimination
is most keenly felt. Yekta, who used to have an Arabic sounding first name, remembers
being searched at the airport whenever he flew with Delta Airlines. “Whenever I traveled
with my wife and child, they would pick me on purpose. I don’t know why. I always
thought it was the name. Maybe it was my thinking.” Yet, he got rid of his first name
when he received his American citizenship, which also ended the problem. While Begum
reports that her friends with names such as Mohammed had to go through additional
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security checks at the airport, Fuat believes the reason why his son couldn’t get a job for
two years after college was his Muslim name.
A few Turkish immigrants report perceived discriminatory behavior that they still
experience in their daily lives. Deniz, who is not hijabi and never had any negative
experiences, thinks the reason why her neighbor of six years has never said ‘hi’ once
during all that time is because they are a Muslim family. Semanur, a hijabi young woman
who earned a graduate degree in New York, thinks sometimes when she goes into a shop
she gets the feeling that the person at the cashier desk helps her reluctantly. “While they
are smiley to other customers, their faces change when they see you and that conveys you
their feelings,” she says. “Nobody says a thing openly. They just make you feel through
their behaviors.” Contrary to some Turkish respondents who talked about the backlash as
a temporary situation, and the majority of immigrants who indicated that they did not feel
any negative attitudes coming from the mainstream, these two immigrant women
mentioned the perceived discrimination they experienced from Americans as ongoing.
Finally, the economic impact of September 11 has also been deeply felt by some
immigrants who were running their own businesses. Abbas, who was running a tourism
agency at the time, lost all his tourist groups on the day of September 11. “We lost
everything. We endured its effects for a year,” he says. Having lost all his savings, he
cancels the offer he made on a house he wanted to move in with his family. In a similar
vein, Mete and his family were about to launch the limousine company that they
purchased on the day before the attacks. Having worked on the business model for
several months, they were going to offer car service from all major airports in and around
New York. They had a full schedule for September 11. On the morning of the attacks his
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father tries to wake him up, saying that the towers got hit. “We woke up. It was real. But
you don’t immediately realize how great the effects would be. We started receiving calls.
All businesses got canceled. We did not get a single job for the next three months. All the
airports were closed. Nobody went anywhere. (…) We went bankrupt. It hit us really
hard. We tried to pull it together, but it was never the same.” However it is imperative to
underline one difference. While many Muslims experienced workplace discrimination,
lost their jobs, or had their businesses negatively affected due to the 9-11 backlash
(Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009), none of the immigrants I interviewed mentioned losing
jobs or revenues because they were of Muslim or Turkish origin. The reason why both
Abbas and Mete had revenue/business losses had less to do with the public backlash than
with the security measurements (such as closing down airports) taken by the U.S.
government afterwards.
Despite all the negative experiences and effects of September 11, many
immigrants remember the supportive remarks and acts of encouragement coming from
their American friends, colleagues or teachers despite the negative public discourse
regarding Muslims. They remember such behaviors with gratitude, as small moments
boosting their self-confidence and self-worth and also reminding them of their right to be
present at the American multicultural table as immigrants. Semanur, a young hijabi
woman, tells how she found such solace at college, when one of her professors made a
speech on the first day of school saying an entire nation could not be hold responsible and
labeled as terrorists just because they happen to carry the same passport as those who
committed the crime. “There was another hijabi in the class, a Muslim,” Semanur adds,
“and I really liked what the professor said and also the fact that s/he did it on the first day.
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Because I could feel the coldness of some Christian friends, especially the more religious
ones.” Serra, a non-hijabi woman shares an experience that happened right after the news
of September 11 attacks hit the media. Working in a service industry at the time, a coworker approaches her and asks, ‘You are one of them, aren’t you? You’re Muslim?’
followed by a comment that makes Serra upset. Her supervisor soon notices the change in
Serra’s mood, finds out what happened, and says, ‘Don’t worry, what she said is not
important. We are all united under the American flag. We are all American regardless of
skin color, or religion.’ These words give Serra relief and the courage to carry on that
day. Twelve years later, Serra does not remember the initial comment that made her so
upset, but the encouraging and supportive remarks of her supervisor.

Islam as a Religious Boundary for Turkish Immigrants: Bright or not quite?
Although the political discourse on Islam is heavily influenced by negative
portrayals, images and constructions of Muslims, unlike Europe, Islam does not emerge
as such a bright boundary for Muslims in the U.S. (Zolberg and Woon 1999, Casanova
2004, Alba 2005, 2010, Foner and Alba 2008, Alba and Foner 2015). The presence of a
solid marker, constantly reminding Turkish immigrants of their “otherness” due to their
ethno-religious identification, is an omnipresent factor in the lives of many Turkish
immigrants in Western Europe. However, the lack of a very bright boundary helps
Turkish immigrants, especially those with higher levels of religious orientation, perceive
their experiences in the U.S. in a positive light.
Despite the widespread belief that Americans view Muslims suspiciously and
harbor negative feelings towards Islam, majority of respondents hold positive views
about their overall experiences as immigrants in the United States. For respondents with
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lower levels of religious orientation, the United States represents freedom from any form
of interference in their personal space coming from relatives, friends, colleagues,
neighbors or an abstract notion of society. Respondents with higher levels of religious
orientation, on the other hand, describe U.S. as the land of religious freedoms.
Interestingly, when asked how they practice Islam in the United States, often they make
comparisons with Turkey and indicate they feel more comfortable practicing their
religion in the United States than they used to do in their home country. One of the most
recurrent issues that came up during the interviews is the freedom to wear the hijab. From
1980 to 2007, Turkey banned the hijab for women who wanted to study in high school
and college. Moreover, women who wanted to work as government employees in state
offices were also banned from wearing hijab after the military coup of 1980. Hijabi
women as policewomen, schoolteachers, government clerks, etc. were all unheard of until
the year 2013 when the current government (AKP) decided to lift the ban. However, the
legal aspect was only one side of the coin. Because of the stigma over a long period, the
notion of a hijabi woman in public space was not always welcomed by people with low
levels of religious orientation, which not only led to painful experiences but also created
a boundary between some segments of the society.
As I also mentioned in the previous chapter, Bilge, a young hijabi woman whose
daughter wears a hijab since she was nine, told me the story of two elderly women
approaching them in a posh and affluent neighborhood in Istanbul while they were in the
garden of a restaurant waiting for their lunch to be served. One of the women asks Bilge
if her daughter is a nun, and Bilge loses her temper and they get into an ugly fight. These
two elderly non-hijabi women not only had the audacity to approach a young girl they
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had not met before and invade her and her mother’s personal space when they were about
to enjoy their lunch, they also tried to humiliate them by likening the daughter’s hijab to
the religious veil from another religion. Bilge’s story exemplifies how the hijab as a
source of stigma affects experiences of some hijabi women in the public space that is
self-proclaimed by some seculars in Turkey. Bilge was happy to report that her daughter
had never faced with a problem because of her hijab throughout her education in the U.S.
In a similar vein, Buse, a young woman from Istanbul, also shares one of the
negative experiences she had when she was living in Turkey. While she was running
errands at a government office one day, a woman employee asks her why she was
wearing her hijab. “She tried to talk me out of it,” says Buse. “She was a non-hijabi
woman who was working there. She said, ‘Why are you wearing this? You get more
attractive.’ I replied, ‘I’m not wearing it to get more attractive, I’m wearing it because I
want to.’ That’s how she interpreted it,” Buse says and smiles shyly. The fact that there
are people from all sorts of background and cultures living in New York gives Buse selfconfidence about her hijab. She continues, “I mean if Jews are wearing their yarmulke,
then I can wear my headscarf. That’s why I don’t think people interfere much [into your
business] here. It’s more comfortable here when I come to think of it.”
Semanur also thinks the U.S. sets a better context than Turkey for living a
religious life. Here she can go to school with her hijab. When she did an internship in
New York with first graders and children at pre-care, the teachers welcomed her nicely.
“They were not prejudiced in anyway,” she argues. On the first day of school, she was
stressed out, worrying if she were going to experience anything because of her hijab since
she had such experiences back in Turkey. It was a relief to find out that her colleagues
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were fine with it. Wearing her hijab at school was not the only issue she had back in
Turkey. Observing daily prayers while at work was a huge problem, too. She remembers
those days in Turkey and says, “When I asked them if I could pray in an empty room
used as infirmary, they would say no. Here, I attended language school, and web design
program and when I asked them if there is space where I could pray, they have given me
the teachers’ room. Normally, students are forbidden to enter it. Those people, they were
Chinese, Buddhists, they don’t believe in [the same religion] but they gave me [their]
space. That’s why when I compare it to Turkey, it’s more respectful and I’m treated
better here.” The freedom to wear her hijab to work, but also to observe daily prayers
when she is at school sets the American experience apart from the Turkish one for
Semanur.
The possibility to observe daily prayers without any obstacles even at the work
place has been raised by many Turkish immigrants as the proof that one can follow
religion a lot more easily in the United States. Erkan, who thinks religious freedoms in
the U.S. are ‘marvelous,’ indicates that he prays whenever he wants. He can also attend
Friday prayers at a mosque. Yet, he also adds that there were some previous jobs where
he was not allowed to observe any prayers during his shift. Metin, a pious young man
finds American society more tolerant than Turkey despite his wife’s decision to take off
her hijab after September 11. Referring to the aftermath of September 11, he says, “But
still, people here were more tolerant. I mean they did not do anything. Had it happened in
Turkey, it would be completely different.” A similar remark comes from Samet, who
says, “To be frank, there are more difficult conditions in Turkey. I always use this
extreme example, but you can pray in an art gallery in Lexington or at the public library.
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I don’t mean right in the middle of people, but you can go to a corner and pray. You see
many Muslims doing it in New York. They base this act on the Qur’an verse that says
‘Earth is your mosque.” Therefore they pray comfortably on their prayer rug. In Turkey,
you cannot do it in Fatih (Istanbul), let alone in a park in Kecioren (Ankara).19 People
would stare at you strange. Here, people would at most stare at you, I mean the
Americans, they would ask you what you’re doing, and you would explain and that
would be it.”
Merve finds Americans respectful to people of other faiths and their religious
behavior. As a hijabi woman who came to the U.S. a few years after September 11, she
asserts that she has never experienced anything negative. “They are always respectful,”
she says. “I mean foreigners who know that you don’t shake hands or give a hug are so
respectful. (…) They respect your religion. I’ve never had any negative experiences until
now.” Asya thinks practicing Islam in the U.S. is easier than practicing it in Turkey ten
years ago since nobody interferes in their religion here. She also underlines how easy it
was to take religious days off while she was working in an American company. “They
never made any hassles,” she continues. “They said it was our religious holiday, so we
were meant to take the day off. What’s more, there were 6-7 Turks working at the same
company and we could all take the day off. Workplaces are very respectful of religion.”
A few of the respondents who had either lived in Western Europe, or have
relatives living over there, make similar U.S.-Europe comparisons regarding religious
freedoms. Asude, who defines herself as Muslim American, remembers the time she got
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Fatih is a highly conservative district in Istanbul, usually associated with women wearing chador on
streets in the public image. From the 2015 general election results, one can assert that Kecioren in Ankara
is also a conservative neighborhood with a sizeable secular population. In this case, the respondent is using
it as a counter-example to Fatih though, presuming it’s a heavily secular neighborhood.
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permission from her professor in order to break fast during Ramadan and left class early.
She compares her case in the U.S. with that of her hijabi cousin in France. “She is fifteen.
She cannot enter the school with her hijab so she takes it off,” says Asude and adds,
“Frankly, in the U.S., you are at more ease in terms of living according to your religion.
There is the First Amendment on freedom of religion and freedom of speech. That’s why
we are very comfortable when it comes to religion. I live the way I like. I can fast.
Nobody is judging me, asking ‘why are you doing such a thing?’ Thank god, here it is
more comfortable to live your religion.” In a similar vein, Halit who had spent over 20
years of his life in a Western European country as a worker, argues that Islam is
perceived very positively as long as Muslims are deliberate. The reason for that is
because Americans are open to all religions. “They are not against religion. But you have
to be positive. Then they would give a positive response,” he claims. “America is better
than Europe but you have to be careful, you have to adapt,” he adds cautiously.

Conclusion
This chapter explores the religious boundary Turkish immigrants experience in
the U.S. by setting its focus first on the organization of and services offered by Diyanetowned Turkish mosques, second on immigrant perceptions of September 11 and its
backlash, and third on their views and practice of following a religious life in America. A
majority of Turkish respondents indicate that they celebrate religious holidays in a
somewhat similar pattern in Turkey. In the morning of the first day, men usually go to
mosque to practice bayram prayer, and then they join their families and/or friends for a
large breakfast to be enjoyed for several hours, followed by visits paid to relatives,
friends and neighbors. Celebrating bayram is easier for those immigrants who earn a
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salary than for those who run their own business. Those in the first group usually manage
to take the first bayram day off, and parents do not send their children to school. Those
who are running their businesses, on the other hand, cannot enjoy bayram even for a day
as closing off even for a day means loss in revenues. Some immigrants do not celebrate
religious holidays because they do not have any family members or friends in close
proximity. For some others, bayram, which used to be a cultural practice back in Turkey,
starts carrying only a religious meaning in the U.S. so they do not celebrate. For
immigrants who do, Turkish mosques play important role in celebration and
socialization.
The Diyanet Center for America lists twenty-three mosques owned by the Diyanet
in Turkey. Almost half of these mosques are located in New York (five) and New Jersey
(six). However, the total number of Turkish mosques in the U.S. is unclear since there are
several mosques that are not affiliated with the Diyanet. For many immigrants, Turkish
mosques serve to fulfill their emotional and spiritual needs. Attending mosque gives
these immigrants the feeling of being at peace, at ease and at home. Some forget their
daily troubles or their yearning for relatives back in Turkey, whereas some others take
pride in attending a mosque in the U.S. perceived as extension of Turkey. These mosques
not only serve as houses of worship, fulfilling religious and emotional needs, but also
help immigrant adaptation into the receiving society. This is in part due to their adoption
of the congregational model found in other American religions. For instance, one of the
mosques I visited was offering both Turkish and English sermons after Friday prayer, all
three mosques were holding weekly sermons (usually on Fridays), and finally, they all
had elected boards to manage mosque affairs. Taking responsibility off imam’s
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shoulders, these boards were raising money for Iftar dinners, sports, arts and Qur’an
courses offered to children and adults, etc. Moreover, in one of the three mosques I
visited, women were taking up managerial positions and having a say in the running of
the mosque affairs.
Maintaining a sense of continuation between immigrants’ past and present lives,
and also contributing to their ethnic community formation efforts in the U.S., Turkish
mosques were also offering a space for socialization for Turkish immigrants through
organizing weekly dinners followed by sermons, bayram celebrations, and iftar dinners
during the holy month of Ramadan. Moreover, they were transmitting Turkish culture
through courses such as Turkish, Qur’an, or through teaching some cultural practices
such as kissing the hand of an elderly out of respect. They offer social networks to
newcomers where they could collect information on housing, employment opportunities,
schools in the neighborhood, etc. Moreover, they create a social space where people
could express their troubles and offer psychological support to each other. For many
immigrant parents, introducing Turkish culture to their U.S. born children such as fasting,
praying, Islamic call for prayer, etc. is a strong motivation for attending mosque events.
Moreover, many immigrants want their children to meet and play with other Turkish
children, so that they could build a network of Turkish friends during childhood.
The September 11 attacks marked an important turning point for many Muslims
in the U.S. For one, they came under public spotlight and became much more visible.
Following the signing of the PATRIOT Act, many Muslims, citizen or noncitizen, faced
governmental surveillance and control in the form of searches, monitoring, detentions
and even deportation. Moreover, public backlash such as hate crimes and bias incidents
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also increased in the aftermath of the attacks. Such developments have aroused fear and
anxiety among Muslims in the U.S. But for Turkish immigrants, while the majority was
aware of the negative attitudes toward Islam in the American mainstream, they do not
have a sense of collective discrimination, or a widespread perception of experiences due
to their religious belief and identification. In fact, many Turkish immigrants seem to be
oblivious to the experiences of Arab Muslims and their organizations dealing with cases
of discrimination and bias in society. However, immigrants believe that September 11
helped strengthen the association between Islam and terrorism in the mainstream, a
picture that gets stronger with each new attack (such as the Boston marathon bombing).
While some immigrants believe that attitudes are changing especially in new generations,
others think it’s due to either the enlightenment of Americans or Turks being such good
role models.
Immigrants who were living in New York at the time remember the day of the
attacks, describing how they learned about it, and what happened in the city after the
towers went down very vividly. They were all shocked to witness such an event, but
claim that they were less traumatized than other New Yorkers as they were coming from
Turkey, a region prone to terrorism and violence. Their rather “relaxed” attitude toward
the attacks constitutes a stark contrast to the experiences of Arab Muslims who escaped
from war zones and reported increased levels of PTSD. Unlike Arab Muslims who were
targeted by governmental scrutiny and control, Turkish immigrants who have no such
experiences identify with New Yorkers in general, rather than with Arab Muslims. While
Turkish immigrants did not experience much governmental intrusion, there were some
who either became subjects of hate crime and/or bias incidents or have witnessed
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someone become one. Immigrant women, who were subjected to verbal abuse on the
street, were targeted most often than not because of their hijab. A few immigrants, whose
Muslim identity was known to outsiders, mentioned the notion of change in the gaze of
Americans. Some immigrants experienced discrimination due to their Arabic sounding
names especially during airport screening.
Despite these negative experiences, majority of Turkish immigrants hold positive
views about their experiences in the United States. As discussed in the previous chapter,
for immigrants with lower levels of religiosity, these positive views encompass expanded
personal space, equated with freedom from intervention by family, friends, neighbors and
even strangers. For pious immigrants, the positive aspects of American life mean two
things. The first refers to an expanded personal space where immigrants would not be
questioned, judged or interrogated for their religious belief and practice, for example, not
having to explain themselves to their coworkers why it is imperative to wear the hijab
while working. The second makes reference to religious freedoms such as being able to
send their children to school while wearing hijab (which was not the case in Turkey until
recently), being able to observe daily prayers while at work, getting permission to leave
class early while fasting, taking the first day of religious holidays off without problems.
Pious Muslim immigrants find Americans respectful of religion in general, and Islam in
particular, during their day-to-day encounters and experiences. Moreover, as the previous
chapter has demonstrated, they do not find being Muslim and being American
incompatible. Moreover, the transformations in the organizational structures of Turkish
mosques demonstrate the role they play in facilitating immigrant adaptation into
mainstream society. As all these findings demonstrate, despite negative feelings and
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attitudes toward Islam in the mainstream media, Turkish immigrants are not confronted
with a bright religious boundary in the U.S.
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Chapter 5: They Give Islam A Bad Name: “Other” Muslims
The British reality show Pop Idol not only conquered the United States with an
American version of the show titled American Idol, but also spread out to other corners
of the world. The Turkish version was first organized in 2003 as Popstar. During the
show that started to air in August 2009, there was a young hijabi woman, for the first
time, among the contestants. In one of the programs, a discussion erupts after her
performance. One of the jury members states that she can never become a Turkish pop
star because she is hijabi. A woman from the audience opposes the jury member by
saying that “This program is also filmed in Arab countries. There are contestants with
beautiful voices and all of them are hijabi.” After her remarks, another jury member, a
well-known female pop singer in Turkey, intervenes and says, “I’d like to comment on
this. (…) Turkey is not Arabistan (the Arab-world) and it will never become one. This is
the Republic of Turkey founded by Ataturk.” Wild applause explodes in the studio, in
support of her comments. This one small incident clearly displays the immediate reaction
that any suggestion of resemblance to Arabs creates in many Turks.
This event is a tiny demonstration of the long-lasting identity crisis that Turkey has
experienced since the modernization processes started in the late Ottoman period. The
Turkish identity has long been a ground for battles that are continually refought over
daily practices in areas ranging from education to sports, cinema to literature, gastronomy
to tourism, and fashion to music. The claims to a Western Turkish identity that became
highly dominant in the early Republican period have been challenged by the emphasis in
recent years on a Muslim identity that envisages Turkey not in the West but in the
(Middle) East. Moreover, the European Union and its major members were of no help
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when it came to affirming Turkish claims to a European/Western identity. Although the
EU accession negotiations started in 2005, the most prominent narrative circulating in the
European Union was (and to some extent still is) that Turkey is not part of Europe and
therefore would never become a member of the EU. The extensive research on
immigrants of Turkish origin in Western Europe demonstrates that the ethno-national and
religious stigma has tremendously influenced the immigrants’ identification processes
and assimilation prospects in a negative way. However, the fact that Turkish immigrants
had not been assimilated in Western Europe has given the ‘no’ camp the motivation as
well as the excuse to deny Turkey European identity.
While the expressed or implied cultural superiority of Western Europe over Turkey
has created a bright boundary between Turkish immigrants and the Western European
mainstream, as well as between Turkey and the EU, another symbolic boundary emerges
between Turkish immigrants in the U.S. and non-Turkish Muslims in general, and Arab
Muslims in particular. This chapter focuses on the narratives regarding “other Muslims”
in order to explore the meanings and symbols attached to this persistent and bright
symbolic boundary.

Boundary in Motion: Turkish Immigrants and “Other” Muslims
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by a military elite following a
succession of wars usually referred to as the ‘War of Independence’. The project of
modernization, which had already started in the 19th century during the Ottoman Empire,
was continued by the founders of the republic with a significant difference: the founders
wanted to dissociate the new republic from the culture, history and legacy of the old,
defeated empire. Therefore, several political, economic, social and legal reforms were
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introduced to materialize this detachment. Some of these reforms include the abolishment
of the office of the Ottoman Caliphate (1924); the adoption of the Western calendar
(1925); the introduction of a new dress code (the ban of fez, men’s headgear, popular
during the Ottoman Empire) (1925); the adoption of the Latin alphabet (1926); and the
adoption of the metric system (1933). These reforms signal the nature of the Turkish
identity that the founders aspired to create: modern (meaning Westernized), Muslim yet
secular Turkish citizens who are “different from Arabs and keen to adopt Western life
practices and technologies” (Navaro-Yashin 2002:48).
These reforms were complemented by official narratives on Muslim nations
without secular governments in order to strengthen the new Turkish identity. Mankowski
and Rappaport (1995) argue that storytelling plays a significant role in creating and
maintaining individual and group identities. Hence, narratives are essential elements of
this important process. By producing knowledge about ourselves and the group that we
are part of, storytelling helps us understand who we are (both at the individual and group
levels) and where we stand vis-à-vis others. The attempts to develop a Turkish identity
that is Muslim yet at the same modern, progressive and Western resulted in the adoption
of a narrative where Arabs (and other non-secular Muslim communities) are portrayed as
the cultural, political and religious “other.” According to Jung (2005) “as the antithesis to
the rationalist project of Kemalist modernity, the Middle East was conceptualized by the
stereotypes of ‘Western Orientalism’, as a region full of superstition, inefficiency and of
dubious morals” (7). Moreover, a feeling of superiority accompanied by a lack of respect
describes the attitudes of Turkish elites toward Arabs and the Arab world (Robins 2003).
Yet the “stories” of the early Republican period are not the only narratives that have
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ever operated in Turkey. By the 1980s, Islam as a political movement gained significant
ground with its own claims regarding Turkish identity. As the Welfare Party developed a
considerable electoral base in the mid-1990s, Muslim intellectuals and political leaders
started to raise their voices to criticize the modernization project initiated by the founders
of the republic. Contradictions were claimed to exist between the modernization project
and the Muslim culture (Kasaba 1997). The modernization project was modeled after the
industrial and economic development of the Western world that, in the eyes of the
Muslim intelligentsia, wallowed in materialism and consumption. A true believer, they
claimed, never dedicated him/herself to material goods but to spiritual benefits of this
world (Gulalp 2003). Welfare Party politicians were against Turkey’s EU membership
bid and were seeking new ways to ameliorate Turkey’s relations with Muslim world.
From their perspective Turkey, as a Muslim nation, was part of this geography since the
Ottoman days.
However, the Welfare Party was also a product of Turkish nationalism. Therefore,
when Turkish truck drivers were beheaded in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the Welfare Party
could not stay indifferent to what had happened and criticized Saudi Arabia for being
uncivilized, barbarian and even not being a proper Muslim country (Navaro-Yashin
2002). While Islamist politicians were claiming a Muslim Turkish identity, they could not
refrain from using culture as a mechanism to differentiate themselves from Saudi Arabia.
This complicated attitude has become even more complex today. The current government
formed by the Justice and Development Party not only did not reject the West as their
predecessor the Welfare Party did, but also started the accession negotiations with the
European Union. Still, they do not deny Turkey’s Islamic identity and place in the
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Muslim world. But this place, according to the party elite, is more of a leadership position
since they perceive Turkey as the “self-confident successor to the Ottomans in a
rediscovered (and reinvented) past” (White 2012). This, primus inter pares attitude of the
ruling party clearly presents an imperialist nostalgia and ambition when it comes to
relations with the Muslim world. Although current ruling elites support a Muslim Turkey,
this projected identity carries Kemalist values of modernity and superiority vis-à-vis nonTurkish Muslim societies. The most interesting issue is that, while Kemalist claims were
based on denying Ottoman ancestry and asserting a place in Europe, current claims are
based on the Ottoman descent.
Although discussed with different markers by Turkish immigrants, the feeling of
superiority constitutes a highly complicated boundary when it comes to the way Turkish
immigrants perceive Arab Muslims both in the U.S. and in general. First of all, when
immigrants hear the word “other Muslims,” the first thing that pops up in their minds in
general is the image of an Arab from the Arabian peninsula rather than North Africa,
whom they immediately situate as the opposite of Turkey and Turks. While many
immigrants have a clear understanding regarding the nature of the boundary between
Turks and Arabs, some immigrants agree only that there are differences but do not
elaborate on them. These immigrants usually indicate that they are not able to give any
examples because they do not know other cultures too well, but they are sure differences
exist. One of the interview respondents regularly attending a Turkish mosque in New
Jersey shares his opinion based on his observations at the mosque. He states, “Turks
don’t like Arabs. I don’t know if it’s because of the classic story of Arabs backstabbing
Turks but we Turks don’t like Arabs in general.” Echoing his words, Alp blames the fall
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of the Ottoman Empire on Arabs and he says, “Today, the reason for Ottoman’s downfall
is the First World War. What did the Arabs do during WW1? They all backstabbed us.
All did. What had Turks done to them, had they colonized them like those Britons did?
Had they confiscated their properties? [It’s] quite the opposite. They had investments
there.” While Alp is not alone in his views regarding Arabs, as I will demonstrate in the
following section, the boundary perceived by Turks vis-à-vis other Muslims goes beyond
the historical official narrative taught as part of the school curriculum, which includes a
retelling of Ottoman history wherein Arabs backstabbed the Ottomans by siding with the
British during the World War I.
One of the repetitive markers of the boundary is the feeling of superiority
reflected in immigrants’ belief that Turkish Muslim-ness is better than that of others. This
perceived differentiation has less to do with the five obligations of Islam that Muslims
must perform in order to live according to their religion, but more to do with the
differences that are claimed to stem from the Islamicate20 culture of Turkey and other
nations. “A Muslim is a Muslim. There is no exception to that,” says Sabri a pious man
who is too careful not to say anything negative about non-Turkish Muslims, and adds,
“But there are cultural differences. [T]his is how I feel from what I see here. Thank God,
Turks are the ones who represent Islam the best here. I can tell you that for sure.” He then
moves on criticizing some of the behaviors of Arabs that he encounters in his daily life.
He asserts, “Here I see our Muslim brothers. I mean the Arabs. Hope God forgives me, I
pay attention to things I say, but they have coarse lives. Sometimes they display manners
and behaviors not suitable for Muslims. For instance, I was on the train the other day. A
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The term Islamicate was coined by Marshall G. S. Hodgson in order “to highlight a complex of attitudes
and practices that pertain to cultures and societies that live by various versions of the Islam (Babayan, K.
and A. Najmabadi, 2008: ix).	
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man was talking [to a friend] in a high voice, like he was yelling. And they were talking
this close [shows with hands] to each other. I turned and he was a cab driver from
Pakistan who lives nearby. Everyone got disturbed. I couldn’t stand anymore, so I went
up to him, I said ‘Peace be with you.’ Trying not to offend, I told him, ‘brother please,
people got disturbed. We’re Muslims. Muslims shouldn’t disturb others.’ He said he was
sorry.” His friend who was listening to the conversation interrupted, “He shouldn’t get
warned, he was supposed to realize it himself.” Then he went on giving his definition of a
proper Muslim, “A Muslim (…) would never disturb others [meaning non-Muslim
Americans]. He would rather [act in a way] to spark their interest in his religion, so that
they might decide to convert. However, I read an American actor who converted to Islam
saying, ‘Had I not learned Islam from Quran but from people, I would never become a
Muslim.’ That’s too terrible. I want to cut it short, I believe us Turks represent Islam and
Muslim-ness the best here.” Since they do not associate talking in high voices, in other
words yelling, in an American context with being modern and civilized, they were
categorizing these Muslims as culturally different from the Turkish mainstream.
This feeling of superiority toward non-Turkish Muslims in general, and Arabs in
particular, resonates in many other interviews regardless of respondent’s level of
religious orientation. Kuvvet, a pious man complains from the fact that the word Muslim
automatically brings up the image of Arabs in Americans’ mind. “In fact, when they see a
hijabi woman, my wife too, they ask if she’s Arab,” he states. He believes Turkish
understanding of Islam is different from Arabs or Iranians. “[It] seems like we are more
modern. People don’t get their hand cut off because they did robbery. So, when they
think of a Muslim country, they think of Syria for instance. If you didn’t know Turkey,
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what would you think? You’d think the same.” Alp, a secular middle-aged man, also
finds Turkey modern especially because of its democratic political system when
compared to the legal and political structures of Muslim nations. He says, “Turkey is
number one in terms of modernity, and in terms of democracy. Now, it’s a Muslim
country but ruled by democracy. They have a monarchy. Let’s say you killed someone,
under the Sharia law you get executed. I find it odd, capital punishment. Let him serve in
prison, why do you have his hand cut off?” Bahri thinks comparing Turkey to other
Muslim nations is like comparing apples and oranges. He thinks it’s meaningless because
these countries have different socio-political structures. He says, “Well we are different
but I cannot elaborate because I don’t know. But, aren’t these countries Islamic
theocracies? They don’t have laws but Muslim judges. They don’t have checks and
balances. It’s difficult to compare Turkey to Arab nations. It’s not like comparing Tunisia
to Egypt. It’s different.”
Moreover, Turkish investment in education is also underlined as a cause of
Turkish modernity and superiority to Arabs. Umay, a middle-aged woman who did not
have a chance to go to school in Turkey due to her family, interestingly points out this
distinction. She says, “Arabs don’t invest in education but we do. In Arab countries, they
only study religion, the Quran. They don’t go to school; they wear headscarf. Once a girl
turns 18, she has to get married. Arab people continue this old culture. But in Turkey,
girls get to study at college, at English schools. Turkey is changing. We cannot compare
Turkey to Arab countries. No.” Rauf repeats Umay’s views on education, as he argues
that it’s the Arabs who create the wrongful image in America that depicts Muslims as
uneducated masses. The reason why these immigrants find Turkey superior to Arab
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nations is the claimed modern appeal of the Turkish republic with its political system,
criminal justice system, investment in education, and Islamicate culture.
The idea of Turkey as a European country, which is automatically associated with
being civilized and modern, also emerges as a significant symbolic boundary
differentiating the Turkish case from those of Arabs. Serra, who finds Arabs’
interpretation of life primitive, argues that the reason why Turkish immigrants can adapt
to the life in the United States more easily than non-Turkish Muslims is because of the
European culture absorbed by Turks. Although Esin indicates having little knowledge
about non-Turkish Muslims, she is certain that there are differences between Turks and
them. “Should I say, we are more European? I mean we are more like European in terms
of our rules, etc.” In a similar vein, Umut indicates that he identifies with Europeans
rather than Arabs, believing that the main reason is growing up in a non-religious family
environment. He says, ““I’m not coming from a religious family so I don’t feel close to
them. There is a Greek neighborhood here in Astoria. There are lots of Greeks. I feel
closer to Greeks, or Mediterranean societies than I do to Arabs. That’s my thinking.”
Some Turkish immigrants assert that while western parts of Turkey are more Europeanlike the rest resembles Arab nations. This perception automatically associates people
from urban cities in the Western part (Marmara and Aegean regions to be exact) with a
European identification, while drawing an internal boundary denying European-ness to
the rest of the society and labeling them as inferior. For instance, Rauf who perceives
himself European makes the following observation: “Turkey is not like Arab countries.
We come from a country with a Muslim majority but in Turkey the understanding of
Islam is different. It’s not like Arab countries. It’s closer to Europe. It’s more of a
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Western country. Especially us coming from [cities such as] Istanbul, Bursa, and the
Aegean region. We are closer to Europe.” In all these accounts given by respondents with
lower levels of religious orientation, being European emerges as a fixed, given, superior
status, and the meanings attached to the term never get questioned.

For some immigrants, women symbolize Turkish modernity, and their advanced
situation becomes the living proof of Turkey’s superiority to other Muslim nations. Pelin,
a pious woman from New York, believes that Turks are more enlightened about certain
issues because other Muslim nations try to live in the past whereas Turks harmonize old
and modern. She thinks the major difference lies in the situation of women and says, “For
instance, they are more likely to limit everything. Think of Iran, a woman cannot go to a
supermarket alone today. But we don’t have that. We are more enlightened. We give that
opportunity. Many women are in the labor force. There are women in political parties, in
the parliament. They don’t have that.” Mete criticizes Arabs for marrying more than one
wife. He thinks there are special circumstances for that kind of act such as being in state
of war. And even so, he thinks, men can only marry a second or third woman if she is in
need. “Women are superior to men in Islam. But their interpretations are not correct. Not
only regarding this, but many other issues as well. (…) They pick parts [from the Qur’an]
that are to their benefit and lay rules accordingly. But we are not like that.” Drawing such
examples from Arabs’ cultural differences he says, “Well, everybody would claim that
they live Islam better than others. Every nation. But it’s really us, Turks, who live Islam
better. The major difference between Turkish Muslims and other Muslims is this: we live
according to current conditions, but they live according to the time the Qur’an was
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written.” In addition to celebrating Turkish women’s social status in society, these
respondents also share the view that Turkish interpretation of Islam and application of
Qur’an into daily life is modern and not old-fashioned like the Arab versions.

A few Turkish immigrants make a differentiation between Turks and other Muslims
based on perceived coercion in these Muslim countries. Ekin, a secular woman thinks
non-Turkish Muslims are more religious. “We are more light Muslims,” she says
laughing. “It seems like they live more religious lives, since they got used to it in
childhood because it was imposed.” In a similar vein, Dilara asserts that since in Turkey
there is no religious coercion, people can practice religion based on their choice. Asude, a
hijabi college student who has never been to any Arab countries, indicates that Arabs are
very strict and she knows that from her Arab friends at school. “Her family forced her to
cover her hair,” she says. “When people force you to do something, they run away from
it. This girl was covering her head before leaving the house, but taking the hijab off when
she gets to school.” This example stands in stark contrast for Asude, as she is the one
who wanted to wear hijab despite her hijabi mother’s suggestions to wait until she
graduated from college. In these accounts, the superiority of the Turkish Islam emerges
where the source of religion and religious practice is perceived not to be coercion but
love.
Bilge, who is one of the few respondents ever to have been to another Muslim
country, to Saudi Arabia, also underlines religious coercion especially in women’s lives.
She says, “I think there are differences. Religious practices are not imposed on people in
Turkey. I mean, I’ve never lived in Iran, but you have to wear a hijab when you are
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traveling to that country, regardless of your religious beliefs. But since the rules in Iran
are made as such, everybody has to comply. Since I’ve never lived there, I won’t be able
to say much, but Turkey could be more democratic when compared to others. Especially
when we consider the situation of women. In Saudi Arabia women are not allowed to
drive. I think they should have the right to drive regardless of whether they want to or
not.” This perception of coercion ruling especially women’s lives is contemplated by the
notion of Muslims living in isolation from the global society mentioned by Abbas, who
has been to several Muslim countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iran, etc. He argues, “Those
conservatives in Turkey, even them are more open to outside, and they have less
resistance. Maybe it’s changing I don’t know. In Iran, life is under strict control. People
who want to do stuff are doing that in secrecy at home. Such as watching TV shows. But
other than that, all aspects of life are under control. Saudi Arabia is unbelievable. That’s
totally closed [to the rest of the world]. Entry of knowledge, entry of books is all limited.
If you’re rich enough, and have your private jet, well you can bring whatever you’d like
in probably but for a regular guy, it’s not possible to read any history books because there
is censorship. As a result, educated ones were more open, more tolerant but the majority
of the population was living a traditional Muslim life.” Abbas, a secular man who usually
employs internal boundaries when referring to Turkish society especially regarding issues
such as people’s open-mindedness, includes all the Turks into the “open-minded” ingroup when it comes to the boundary marked by the image of Arabs living in isolation.
Some immigrants believe that it is the characteristics of Arabs that set them so apart
from Turks. Usually constructed as the moral opposite of Turkish-ness, Arabs are
imagined to harbor all the negative characteristics that Turks avoid. One of the most

	
  

170	
  

recurring themes is the issue of hygiene. There is a widespread belief among Turkish
immigrants that Arabs do not show enough care and attention to their hygiene. This
matter usually gets crystallized in two examples: ritual washing at the mosque and dining
habits. While discussing the matter, two pious respondents -one female and one malehave the following conversation:

F: “For instance, their culture of cleanliness gets criticized a lot. There is
the perception that Arabs are dirty. True, compared to Turks, they are. It’s
our culture that gives importance to cleanliness at home and in our clothes.
Regardless of being Muslim, when you’re Turkish you’re cleaner than
many others.”
M: “But Turks insists on that so much: ‘[Arabs are] dirty, dirty, dirty. Very
dirty.’ ‘What?’ ‘Dirty Arab.’ They cross off people based on a debate of
cleanliness and dirt.” (He laughs)
F:“I stayed in Syria for three-four months. Seriously though… (She is also
laughing)”
M: “They are really dirty. (Mocking)”
F:“I mean we couldn’t get clean plates and utensils even at good
restaurants. For instance, here we dine [outside] at ease. There, I had huge
problems. I lost weight. I couldn’t eat.”

Filiz also underlines the issue of hygiene when talking about other Muslim cultures.
She says, “Okay, we are Muslims, but we are different. We are different culturally. (…)
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In terms of hygiene, for instance. That’s what I see. Turks are more rigorous. Of course
there are those who aren’t but in general they are rigorous. Not true for them.” Erkan,
who defines himself as a highly rigorous man always paying attention to hygiene
complains about the images of unclean Arabs demonstrated on TV. “For instance, the
television shows an Afghani Al-Qaida member. He has to shave for 8 hours, shower for
10 hours. He needs to wash, or [better yet] burn his clothes. He is filthy. When
[Americans] see such Afghans or Pakistanis on TV, they ask ‘who are these?’ I myself
disdain them because I’m a cleaning addict. What kind of a Muslim are those? They are
Muslims and unclean.” He is exaggerating, by claiming that the guy he saw on TV needs
to get shaved for 10 hours, so that he could explain how dirty and uncared the guy was
looking.
In Turkish mosques, rugs usually cover both male and female prayer rooms from
wall to wall. Therefore, mosque attendants always take their shoes off before entering
these sections. Another unwritten rule in Turkish mosques concerns always keeping the
socks on at all times in order not to spread any kind of foot infection such as athlete’s
foot, etc. Therefore, the issue of hygiene was a recurrent theme especially among the
regular attendees at the mosques. Samet tries to explain the background of this attitude
and attention to hygiene by the mosque community. He says, “We observe this a lot
during Friday prayer. Someone from an Arab country has his ritual washing, and then he
walks into the room without his socks on, and you know that usually leads to athlete’s
foot. This is a huge scandal among the Turks in the community. ‘How do they do that,
etc.’ They warn Arabs in a drastic ways, ‘go put your socks on,’ Some Arabs take it
personally. So you see elderly men crying, or saying that they got kicked out from the

	
  

172	
  

mosque… (…) I mean this whole issue of cleanliness is a huge obsession. In Turkey, you
can see the hadith “Cleanliness comes from faith” written in every mosque. Because
religion and culture got so intermingled, an opposite practice is seen as un-Islamic. So
people would say ‘What kind of Muslims are these? How come they don’t take off their
shoes?’ etc.”
Exemplifying what Samet described as the attitude of the Turkish community,
Vahap, who calls his local Turkish mosque his second home, argues that Turkish
traditions and customs are different as Turks are more respectful, and well-mannered.
“For instance their cleanliness… I find our culture cleaner. They do ritual washing, and
then walk up the stairs in bare feet. They don’t care and enter the prayer room. When I
ask ‘Why are you doing this?’ they get offended because they are used to what they do.”
Yahya also makes a similar observation calling Turkishness a brand in the U.S. He says,
“ When you go to a Turkish mosque, it smells nice. You can take an American friend to
the mosque with satisfaction. But when you go to the mosque of Arabs or Pakistanis, they
are dirty. You’d get uncomfortable. You couldn’t go inside. (…) Prayer is about
cleanliness; it comes from the faith itself. If you have the faith, and pray then how would
you explain the dirtiness. There is something missing. That’s why Turkishness is a brand
here.”
Several studies have shown the prevalence of negative portrayals of Islam in the
American media including movies, TV shows and news reporting in the post-9-11 era
(Steuter and Wills 2010, Jackson 2010, Powell 2011, Smith 2013) Complaining from the
image of Islam associated with violence and Muslims depicted as terrorists in the
American media, some immigrants hold Arabs responsible for that. Umut, a secular
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young man asserts that whenever he talks to Americans, he tells them that he is Muslim
on purpose because he wants to let them know that not all Muslims are like those they see
on TV. “They think all Muslims are bad; they are all Arabs and terrorists. So I tell them
that I’m Muslim, that I don’t approve [what’s being done in the name of Islam] and that
it’s not a good thing. I try to add few things such as in Islam, only God can take life,
individuals are forbidden from that. I explain as much as I can. I try to say that it was the
doing of a terrorist group, that it could be political.” Mesude, who is happy neither with
the violence of ISIS nor the way it gets covered in the Western media as the main
representation of Muslims, says, “Well now we have ISIS! They are beheading people.
The entire world is watching. They are saying ‘these are Muslims!’ Three-four years ago,
I was going to New Jersey. I got on a bus, and sat at the front seat. I didn’t know the
address, so I showed it to the driver. He said, ‘are you Russian?’ I said, ‘no, I’m Turkish’
He said, ‘oh my god, Muslim?’ I said, ‘Yes,’ and he said ‘oh my god, again. So I said,
‘why oh my god?’ I got furious. He said, ‘Turkish Muslims are beheading people.’ Back
then, Hezbollah was risen; they were burying people alive in Turkey.21 So I said, ‘no, no
Turkish [Muslims]; Arab [Muslims].’” Trying to distance herself from the violent image
of Islam, and in an effort to demonstrate that it is a wrongful generalization, Mesude is
not hesitant of drawing a bright boundary between herself and Arab Muslims. What is
also interesting in these responses is the fact that despite their awareness of the negative
images circulating in the media, the respondents do not hold the American media
responsible for such caricaturization of Muslims, as they also hold such negative views of
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non-Turkish Muslims. So their accusations are directed to Arabs, who are representing
Islam wrongfully and not the American media.
Finally, there are few immigrants who do not perceive a bright boundary as the
majority of immigrants do. These are usually the ones who have individual contacts with
Muslims from other cultures, either as neighbors or as parents whose kids attend the same
school. Basing her opinion on her observations and interactions with her Muslim
neighbors, young pious woman Merve says, “I don’t know about others, but [my
neighbor] seems similar as a Muslim. They go to the mosque during Ramadan. (…) Her
husband wants her to cover her hair. She says to me, ‘You are hijabi, my husband wants
me to be hijabi, but I’m not ready, so I’m stalling him.’ Other than that, she tries to take
her kids to their mosque. She says it gets more difficult as they grow older and you can’t
force them. But in general it’s the same. I mean as far as I know from my neighbor.”
Damla, a secular woman who was born in Turkey and moved to America with her family
at the age of 15, tells me she had a revelation regarding other Muslim cultures after she
started to have interactions with them in the U.S. She states, “I used to work with Arabs.
Some of them were Palestinians, some of them were Syrians. Because I grew up in
Turkey, I guess, I was thinking that Arabs were all hijabi, like those in Saudi Arabia. I
didn’t know that Arabs were like people in Turkey, before I came here. That’s a
commonality for instance. Palestinian, Jordanian, Lebanese, Syrian. [They are] all
members of secular states. Not all of them are covered. Not all women cover their hair.
Not all of them pray five times a day. Also, there were many Christians among them, I
didn’t know that either. When we first met, they used to ask me if I were a Muslim or
Christian at first. I used to find that weird because in Turkey 99 percent of the people are

	
  

175	
  

Muslim. Later I learned that there were many Christians. But in terms of culture, it’s hard
to say that we are similar. Well, on the façade, we might look similar. But we are
different, very different. I don’t know how to explain it. Well, when you come to think of
it, our cuisines are different. Theirs is too spicy, their desserts are too sweet.” Having a
chance to get to know other Muslim cultures, Damla manages to break down the
prejudices she learned in Turkey. Although she finds cultural differences, they are small
details in the cuisine such as spices, etc. whereas for the majority of Turkish immigrants
the boundary is more visible, deeply rooted and persistent.

Conclusion
The modernization project of Turkey, which has its roots in the late Ottoman
period, has gained significant momentum following the establishment of the Republic in
1923. The military elite, which later became the political elite, initiated a series of
reforms including the adoption of the Latin alphabet, the metric system and Western
calendar, and the abolition of the office of Ottoman Caliphate in an effort to dissociate
the new Republic from the legacy of the defeated empire. These reforms were
accompanied by an official discourse that defined Turkish national identity as modern,
Western, Muslim yet secular and in contrast to Muslim Arabs who are portrayed as the
cultural, political and religious other, accompanied by a feeling of superiority and lack of
respect. While claims for a Muslim Turkish identity became more widespread from the
1980s onwards, they were not devoid of the feeling of superiority. Moreover, this attitude
has been carried over by the AKP government as the rightful heir to the Ottoman Empire
and model Muslim country, despite their attempts of rapprochement with the Islamic
world.
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The majority of Turkish immigrants I interviewed have a strong sense of cultural
difference from Muslim Arabs, and the symbolic boundary they perceive is bright and
persistent. When asked to share their views on other Muslims, they immediately think of
Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula. While many immigrants have a clear understanding of
the markers of the boundary, some immigrants only have a feeling that Arabs are
culturally different but cannot elaborate or give examples in order to explain the claimed
difference. A few immigrants resort to high school history textbooks that portray Arabs
as traitors, backstabbing the Ottomans during the WW1. For some others, it is the claim
for religious superiority that sets two cases apart, which has less to do with five
obligations of Islam but is more related to the Islamicate culture of Turkey perceived as
modern. An abstract notion of “Turkish woman” who is modern, educated, and bestowed
with certain rights, which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, also emerges as
a strong symbol of difference. The perception of Turkey as a European, democratic state
without religious coercion is also underlined while explaining why there is a symbolic
boundary. For some immigrants who had personal encounters with Arabs either in
mosques or while visiting their countries, issues such as hygiene become markers of
differentiation. While these encounters have contributed to perceived social distance, a
few immigrants who had regular contacts with Arabs hold rather positive views about
them, creating the assumption that more systematic contact at school, workplace and in
daily life with Arabs might bring some change to perceived social distance especially for
the children immigrants raised in the U.S. However, for those born and socialized in
Turkey, the boundary is highly likely to remain very bright.
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Chapter 6: Gendering the Boundary: Sexuality, Equality and the Issue of
Femininity/Masculinity
On a Friday morning in early August, I make a phone call to one of the mosques I
was frequenting in New York City to see if they were going to hold a community
gathering that evening. The imam answers my call, and kindly invites me over for the
gathering, adding that there would also be a mawlid reading for a newborn baby in the
community. As I arrive later in the evening, I find the women’s quarter, which is the
basement, in the mosque packed. Food, provided by the newborn’s family, is to be served
before the start of the mawlid reading, which would be followed by the imam’s regular
Friday preaching. So the kitchen is buzzing with women placing delivered food on plastic
plates, and pouring down water in plastic cups. The dinner includes lahmacun (thin
Turkish pizza with minced meat), ayran (traditional Turkish yoghurt drink), and baklava
(dessert), the latter is accompanied by Turkish tea. As the community is also gathered for
a religious celebration of the birth of a baby, part of the imam’s Friday preaching focuses
on the issue of raising Turkish children in America, which is a very hot topic in the
community, resonating from almost every interview I had with Turkish immigrant
parents.
That evening I meet a young woman named Ayfer, a fresh face among the
mosque attendants. She is in her late thirties and has been living in the U.S. for fifteen
years. She agrees to do an interview, and invites me over to her place, which is only few
blocks away from the mosque building. As we leave the mosque on our way to her
apartment, she makes a quick phone call. Then she informs me that her mother-in-law is
having a Turkish female guest over, and they are about to have some tea. She asks if I
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would be interested in doing the interview at her in-law’s place. I jump at this generous
offer. ‘The blind asks for an eye, and Allah gives him/her two,’ is a Turkish idiom
describing my situation. I was looking for a potential respondent but ended up with three.
So we take a short walk from the mosque to her apartment building. She lives in the same
building as her mother-in-law Umay, so instead of going to Ayfer’s place, we knock on
her in-law’s door.
Umay opens the door and welcomes us, her hair in a messy shape. Apparently she
is in the middle of dying her hair. She asks to be excused and goes to wash her hair. As
she walks back to the bathroom, Ayfer takes me into the living room. I greet Mesude, the
female guest Ayfer was referring to, and two teenagers in the room. One of them is
Ayfer’s daughter who has come to the U.S. with her parents as a baby, and the other is
Mesude’s niece who was born in the U.S. They are both in high school. Mesude has been
living in the U.S. since 2001. The room that we are in is not too big. There are too long
sofas facing each other, a coffee table in the middle, and a couch for two on the third side
of the coffee table, right in front of the window panel. A study desk, covered with several
books, is pushed up against the wall next to one of the long sofa. Ayfer offers me Turkish
coffee and some chocolate. Soon Umay emerges from the bathroom, and I start with the
interviews. At the beginning, I pop each question, and all three adults, Ayfer, Umay and
Mesude, answer them by taking turns. However, soon the exercise turns into a small
version of a focus group as differences in their opinions begin to surface, and they start
replying to each other’s arguments and comments.
As the discussion moves over to issues regarding gender relations in the United
States, the women engage in an interesting conversation about the boundaries of female
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sexuality. It starts as Ayfer, who works in a bridal shop that caters to non-Turkish
Americans, makes a comment about one of her customers who was recently at the shop to
try on wedding dresses. She says that she always asks brides-to-be if they ever lived with
the groom before. It turns out that they do, and actually many have been living together
for several years. But the bride at the shop that day has been living with the groom for
only two months. This surprises Ayfer. “A first!” she yells, and adds, “I also told her that.
I said, ‘This is the first time I see people living for two months together.’ People live
together for long years, but they don’t get married. Why? Because they get bored from
each other. [When] there is no marriage contract, he says, ‘bye,’ and she says, ‘bye bye.’”
At this point, everybody in the room is listening to Ayfer carefully. She savors this
attention and uses it as a teaching moment about the boundary that is marked by Turkish
women’s sexual propriety. Addressing everyone but targeting the teenagers she
continues, “There is no like our culture. I always tell this to everyone. Those girls who
accompany the bride all listen to me. I ask these girls, when the bride is trying on her
dress, if they are married. They all say no.” Mesude’s niece tries to interrupt and says
quickly, “No one is getting married anymore.” Ayfer faces her and asks, “Do you ask
them why they are not getting married? I do.”
This time Umay, Ayfer’s mother-in-law interferes, and says, “They all experience
it when they were little. They don’t get married. She hangs out with this one, and then
with the other one. She keeps saying next. Therefore they don’t want to tie the knot with
someone. To be able to get rid of him when they get mad. It would be more difficult to
get rid of a man when you are married. But still, our culture is more reasonable. For us, of
course, not for Americans.” Ayfer, taking courage from her mother-in-law’s supporting
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comments, gives another lecture to the teenagers, explaining the appropriate course of
action in order to tie the knot. She says, “They are so at ease because they can live with
their boyfriends. But how is our culture? A girl and a boy cannot live together until they
get married. Therefore what happens to the man? He feels obliged to get married. When I
tell them [the girls at the shop] about our culture they all say what a great culture it is.”
Talking about sexuality is hard, especially in front of children. That explains the
reason why Ayfer and Umay, adult women not foreign to the notion of sexuality, cannot
refer to it openly but rather make insinuating remarks about it. For instance, Umay refers
to sexual intercourse as “it,” implying that Americans are sexually promiscuous as they
lose their virginity at a very young age. Ayfer, on the other hand, takes a different route,
and talks about sexuality not using any pronouns, but referring to the notion of living
with a boyfriend without a marriage contract as she presumes that sexuality would be part
of that relationship. She tries to warn off the teenagers about the consequences of
premarital sex, telling them that choosing to behave like Americans would not only mean
going against the norms of Turkish culture, but would also cost them a husband.
Sexuality is the elephant in the room that nobody dares to call out openly, but instead
makes use of alternative ways to talk about it.
Having moved to the United States, Ayfer and Umay are faced with a new regime
of sexuality in which women could engage in premarital sex like men and not get
stigmatized for it. However, they do not want their children, growing up integrated into
the American culture in many other ways, to appropriate the sexual norms of the
receiving society. Emphasizing sexual norms of the home country and warning them of
about the potential consequences of premarital sex, they are both invoking ethno-cultural
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boundaries and telling children that they have to control their sexuality until marriage.
Thus, they are reproducing the gender boundary of the home country in the United States,
which puts limits and sanctions on female sexuality while leaving male sexuality at ease.
As I will explore in more detail in sections to come, controlling female sexuality is a
highly important and recurring issue among Turkish immigrants I interviewed, especially
for the ones raising daughters. Moreover, this perception also gets reflected in the way
immigrants construct and define the notion of the Turkish woman. Imagined as modern
yet sexually moral, the Turkish woman emerges as the signifier of two important yet
different ethnic boundaries.

Modern yet Sexually Moral: The Turkish Woman as a Symbolic Boundary
Interviews with immigrants reveal that the notion of the Turkish woman as a
fixed, homogenous category constitutes a significant marker of two distinct symbolic
boundaries: the first boundary emerges between immigrants and non-Turkish Muslims,
and the second one between immigrants and Americans. The content of and the meanings
attached to these markers depend on the group with which the boundary is imagined.
When it comes to the boundary between immigrants and other Muslims, the Turkish
woman becomes the emblem of Turkish modernity. Taking several distinct forms, this
differentiation mostly rests on the arguments of personal freedoms (negative rights) and
legal rights (positive rights), and defines Turkey as a modern, civilized and developing
country.
Since the turn of the 20th century, women have become the symbol of nationalist
movements in their claim for “legitimacy, national identity, cultural authenticity, reform
and development.” (Cagatay and Nuhoglu-Soysal 1995: 264). Yuval-David and Anthias
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(1989:7) indicate that one of the ways by which women come to participate in the
nationalization processes is “as signifiers of ethnic/national differences – as a focus and
symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and
transformation of ethnic/national categories.” Imagined as the mothers of the nation,
women are expected to play certain gender roles and their sexuality becomes an
important concern for men (Nagel 1998: 254). Turkish nationalism, in an effort to break
ties with the defeated Ottoman regime, has defined itself as a Western and secular
movement, while incorporating women’s rights into its political discourse and agenda
(Cagatay and Nuhoglu-Soysal, 264). Although this move had repercussions on the
emergence of a local feminist movement for years to come, it created the image of the
Republic as a modern, Western-oriented political regime, in other words, a complete
antithesis of other Muslim nations. Evidently, this perception is reflected in the
imaginations of Turkish immigrants when they refer to “women” as the marker of the
boundary between Turkey and non-Turkish Muslims.
When defining this boundary, some immigrant women focus on the aspect of
personal freedoms and underline the fact that women in Turkey enjoy liberties such as
dressing the way they please (in other words the lack of religious coercion to wear hijab),
accessing the public space, and driving automobiles, which are believed to be denied to
women in other Muslim nations. Deniz, a non-hijabi religious woman, argues that
although the situation in Turkey is a bit complex due to the ruling Islamic government, it
is still a country of freedoms compared to Arab nations. Although she has never been to
an Arab country in her life, she has solid views about women’s status there. “I’ve never
been to an Arab country but from what I hear, I know that women cannot walk around
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uncovered, and that they are not free, and that women’s freedoms are confiscated. But I
have never heard of something like that in my country.” Also underlining the issue of
personal freedoms, Semanur, a young pious woman, calls Turkey more democratic due to
lack of religious oppression which would force everyone to follow religion and live
according to the holy book. She argues that in Turkey people can live the way they would
like to and adds an anecdote from her personal experience:

“If you would like to live religiously you could, if you don’t then you
wouldn’t. But in Arab countries everybody has to live religiously. For
instance, I went to Medina once, women had to wear blacks. I was dressed
up in a creamy color and people started to warn me, ‘wear black,’ they
said. Therefore, they are more oppressive; we’re more at ease. Nobody
would pressure others to live religiously. We are three sisters, two of us
are hijabi, and one isn’t. I mean there is no such pressure in my family.
People live the way they want to. Therefore we are more democratic
compared to them.”

Semanur chooses to exemplify the democratic nature of Turkey, which she
believes is what differentiates Turkey from Muslim countries, by referring to the lack of
religious coercion on women. Bilge also approaches the boundary from the perspective of
personal freedoms yet her views are a bit more complicated. One of the reasons why her
family immigrated to the United States was the hijab ban in Turkey, preventing young
women entering university campuses and following classes while wearing their hijab.
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Therefore, she finds some similarities between Iran where women have to cover their
hair, and Turkey where female hijabi students had to take the cover off in order to study
or find employment in government offices. Yet, she still draws a boundary between the
cultures of Turkey and other Muslim nations, especially with Iran and Saudi Arabia,
which she claims put a limit on women’s freedoms. She argues, “Yes there is a difference
because I don’t think Turkey has the mentality of imposition in terms of religion. I mean,
I have never lived in Iran but if you are traveling to that country, you have to cover your
hair. Even if they are not Muslims, or even if they don’t have faith. But that’s the rule of
that country, so everybody has to get dressed accordingly. Since I haven’t lived there I
won’t be able to go into detail but Turkey is maybe more democratic compared to other
countries. If we think from the perspective of women’s status… In Saudi Arabia women
cannot drive. I mean it’s not a problem if she doesn’t want to drive but she should have
the right to do it.” These three women who happen to have higher levels of religious
orientation do not hesitate to draw a boundary between Turkey and other Muslim
countries where the image of Turkish woman painted as “free woman” emerges as the
signifier of this boundary.
Another aspect that immigrant women discuss when defining the boundary is the
issue of legal rights. In other words, what constructs the women of Turkey as modern and
therefore different from their counterparts in other Muslim countries are not only the
personal freedoms they enjoy, but also the positive rights granted by the state and
protected by the constitution. Establishing legal equality before the law between sexes in
Turkey, these rights grant women –among other things– the right to education, work,
reproduction and/or run for a political office. Pelin, a non-hijabi woman with a high level
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of religious orientation, underlines this fact. Believing that Turkish people look at certain
matters in a more enlightened way compared to other Muslims, meaning they try to
harmonize both tradition and modernity, she makes the following comment:

“For instance, they are restricting everything too much. Think of Iran, a
woman cannot go to shopping alone nowadays. But it’s not like that in
Turkey. We are more enlightened [emphasis is mine]. We give them that
opportunity. Many women are in the work force. There are women in the
political parties, in the parliament. They don’t have that.”

Referring to Turkish people as “more enlightened” invokes the discourse of
development, and creates the binary of modern Turkey and un-modern Muslim countries.
Umay, who has learned how to read and write after she immigrated to the U.S., asserts
that what Turkey has and other Muslim nations don’t is the women’s right to education.
She says, “Arabs don’t invest in education but we do. In Arab countries, they only study
religion, the Qur’an. They do not go to school; they wear headscarf. Once a girl turns 18,
she has to get married. Arab people continue this old culture. But in Turkey, girls get to
study at college, at English schools. Turkey is changing. We cannot compare Turkey to
Arab countries. No.” Canan complains from the fact that Americans used to confuse
Turkish women with Arabs when she had first moved to the United States over twenty
years ago. She says if she gets a chance to explain Turkey to Americans, this is what she
would tell them: “Turkish women live democratically. While in the past Turkish men
were having two or three wives and several children that is not the case any more.
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Women are too valuable. They are independent and women’s education has been very
important for the last 20 years in Turkey, and women can stand on their own feet. [I
would tell] that there are no families with many children and women only give birth if
they want to. I would also say that women are very successful in their careers.” Women
receiving education, joining the labor force, having professional jobs, and fewer children
all fit into the narrative of modernity and these respondents are happy to underline that
fact. Moreover, all the characteristics that are attributed to Turkish women are believed
not exist among their non-Turkish Muslim counterparts. Therefore, the image of Turkish
woman, holder of important legal rights equally as men, emerges as the symbol of
Turkish modernity and hence the marker of symbolic boundary.
For some male respondents, the way the ideal behavior of men towards women is
defined, also feeding from the modern/un-modern dichotomy, constitutes the boundary
between Turks and non-Turkish Muslims. Sabri, a pious Muslim, believes that Islam
attributes greatness to women. He says, “Our Prophet particularly orders for instance in a
hadith that ‘the most favorable, the most acceptable, and the most faithful among you is
the one who treats his wife good.’” However, his positive remarks on the importance
given to women by Islam are interrupted by his friend Fuat’s arguments regarding the
behavior of Arab men towards women, which he presents as proof to the fact that they
are distorting the image of Islam.

“That’s how it is in real Islam but Arabs are distorting it. Arabs would
behave in a way that would benefit them the most. I was working in Libya.
They would all talk about Muslim-ness, but for instance, he made the
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woman sit in the back even when the front passenger seat was not
occupied. The young woman sat in the back. There was this Toyota pickup. The woman was in the back, and he was driving. Why don’t you have
her sit next to you in the front? No, because women are supposed to sit in
the back. Excuse my French, but you take her into your bed at night. Why
don’t you have her sit next to you in the car? Is this Islam? Is it written
anywhere in Islam?”

His rhetorical questions are answered by a third friend in the conversation, by
Yahya, who indicates, “No, this has nothing to do with Islam. It’s their customs and
traditions. Arabs have mixed their customs and traditions with Islam and exported it as
Muslim-ness.” Yekta, a business owner who has a low level of religious orientation,
makes a similar observation based on the Arab customers frequenting his restaurant. He
strongly believes that Arabs are very different from Turks. “Like day and night
different,” he says, and continues, “Different in every way. They are different
sociologically too. For instance, their relations with women, their behaviors towards
women… Such [weird] things do happen. [When they are making a reservation] I ask
them how many they will be and they would say three. Then, eight people would show
up. A male, two boys, and the rest would be women. They don’t count the women. They
could be that extreme.” Although these men do not necessarily support gender equality,
and it is not clear how far their definition of “good treatment of women” is to be
stretched, they nonetheless point at a symbolic boundary between themselves and Arab
men. The way Turkish manhood is constructed and defined, which treats women as their
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equals in certain aspects especially in the public space, and which is automatically
juxtaposed to the Arab manhood, sets the boundary. In this case, the Turkish woman,
rather than turning into a marker, becomes the object of man’s behavior, which in turn
constitutes the boundary.
As I mentioned earlier, the image of the Turkish woman constitutes two distinct
yet opposing boundaries. While the perception of a modern, educated woman with rights
and freedoms forms the boundary between Turks and non-Turkish Muslims, where the
latter is usually embodied in an abstract notion of the Arab, the notion of Turkish woman
as the symbol of chastity, purity and morality constitutes the boundary between
mainstream Americans and Turkish immigrants. Revealing itself in the concerns over
controlling female sexuality in the U.S., this boundary not only differentiates Turks and
Americans but also lays out the gender norms, such as dating with the intention of getting
married, or abstaining from sex until marriage, which Turkish women are expected to
uphold in America. Establishing a symbolic boundary by referring to female sexuality is
not peculiar to Turkish immigrants, as research has shown that other immigrant groups
including Arab Americans and Filipinos have also enacted this boundary in order to
claim cultural superiority (Espiritu 2001, Ajrouch 2004). Moreover, Espiritu (2001)
indicates that while nonimmigrant families may also regulate their daughters’ sexuality,
immigrant families choose to do that by relating the matter to ethno-national pride and
identity. Influenced by the namus regime immigrants learned back home, the Turkish
claims for female morality and purity serves to kindle feelings of cultural superiority visà-vis Americans.
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Namus (honor), the way it is understood in Turkey, consists of a set of values and
norms that control female sexuality and regulate relations within society (Sirman 2006,
Tahincioglu 2010, Bora and Ustun 2005).22 Although it is usually treated as a
“traditional” concept, namus continues to be applied to “modern” women’s sexuality and
actions (Kandiyoti 1998, Sirman 2006). In the pre-Republican period, namus was
controlled by men inside the domicile, and by the veil when the woman went outside.
Contrary to popular predictions, in the Republican period, it did not wither away, but
continued to exert its influence in different forms (Kandiyoti 1997, Berktay 1998).
Moreover, during the nationalization processes, the woman has become the symbol of the
nation, where her namus automatically became that of the nation (Kadioglu 1998, Sirman
2002, Bora 2005). In this new order, the responsibility to control the sexuality of the
“new” woman, who has to live first for her family, then for her patrie, is left to the
woman. It is not only expected of her to make her sexuality invisible in the public space,
but also to protect it due to the “love” she feels towards her family and her patrie
(Kandiyoti 1997, Berktay 1998, Sirman 2006, Tahincioglu 2010). The issue of namus
turns out to be an important concern for immigrants in the U.S., also becoming one of the
major signifiers of the boundary between Turkish immigrants and the mainstream
American society.
The symbolic boundary becomes more visible especially when discussing childrearing practices and the protection of children from certain gender norms in the United
States. Concerns over their children’s premarital sexuality motivate Turkish parents to
take some early measures where they try to limit their children’s socialization with their
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  I will refer to the set of values and norms that control female sexuality as the “namus (honor)
regime” in the rest of this chapter.	
  

	
  

190	
  

peers. Some of these measures include not allowing their children to sleep over at their
American friends’ houses, or not letting them attend birthday parties, in order to
minimize their exposure to American culture that is perceived as normalizing intimate
relations among sexes. Begum, a secular woman and mother of two school-age
daughters, indicates that she wants her children to hang out with Muslim kids more than
others because their moral values are closer to hers. She says, “Now they have a Hispanic
friend, but their moral values are different. The family is too relaxed. That makes me
scared because here I’m alone and I can lose the control. I mean, I’m not judging, it’s
their life, that’s how they grew up, but here we are trying to have them grow up under
control.” When asked to elaborate what she means by calling this family ‘relaxed,’
Begum makes the following observation:

“First of all, it’s regarding sexual issues. [Girls] can have a boyfriend at a
very young age. I don’t know if you had a chance to see, but there are
several TV shows about 16 year old pregnant girls. (...) Sexuality is in the
foreground. Being sexual. I mean, I don’t want my kid to cover her hair,
but I wouldn’t like to have her walk around showing half of her breasts.
(…) These Muslim friends are hijabi. [The] mothers wear hijab, and some
of them wear burka. When I was in Turkey, I used to think that [such
people] were [religious] fanatics when compared to Turkish families. But
now I see that it’s different, as I get to know them. I was prejudiced. Here,
it’s mandatory that you pick a side; you either befriend those on the other
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side [meaning Hispanics in her neighborhood], or this side. You try to
make the best decision for your kids.”

Begum fears that her daughters, born and raised in the U.S., will adopt a more
“relaxed” attitude when it comes to sexual relations. She does not want them to get used
to this laissez-faire intimacy she finds widespread in America, which condones not only
premarital sex but also having a baby out of wedlock. Her confrontation with the
American cultural norms, which do not stigmatize premarital sexual relations unlike
Turkey, has forced Begum to reconsider her own perceptions about pious Muslims,
especially non-Turkish ones. While she had previously situated non-Turkish Muslims on
the other side of the boundary, it got shifted once she faced the challenges of raising
children conforming to Turkish gender norms in the U.S. Although she does not want her
daughters to become hijabi, she chooses Muslim friends over others, knowing that they
too would be following norms controlling female sexuality. Deniz, a mother of two
children, also shares similar concerns. Arguing that their neighborhood is not a good fit
for raising her children, she is afraid of her daughter’s friends having influence on her as
they spend so much time together at school. She perceives these friends as too “relaxed”
in terms of their outfits and their behaviors. She remembers the day they ran into some of
her daughter’s friends from school making out in the park. Deniz says she doesn’t want
her daughter to normalize such behavior, and she tries to explain that such attitudes
would not suit them, and their family wouldn’t accept it. Trying to inculcate religious
belief to solve the matter, she hopes that her daughter will refrain from engaging in
intimate or sexual relations because of her religious faith.
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This concern over sexuality is not something peculiar to pious parents. Seculars or
immigrants with low-to-mid levels of religious orientation may also tend to draw a bright
boundary when it comes to their children’s chastity and morals. For instance, Asya, a
secular woman with two young adult daughters, complains about the restrictions she had
to endure as a young woman while growing up in a small city in Turkey. “In my youth,
when I was walking to the university, I would walk bowing my head down,” she says and
continues, “My cousins would tell me, ‘You didn’t say hi.’ But it’s not possible to see
anyone when you are walking like that. But had they seen me walking my head held high,
they would come and say ‘Why are you walking like that looking at people?’ I grew up
with neighborhood pressure.” Pleased to see that things have changed in Turkey since
those days, and the youth have come to enjoy more freedoms, she still thinks it is
essential and imperative to put some limit on them. Sexuality is one of the borders that
she mentions when contemplating about freedoms. She says:

“Well, sexuality here is too much… I’ve seen things. I don’t see it as
freedom. I wouldn’t call it freedom. It’s too extreme, I mean a girl going to
high school is having an abortion and they call it freedom. I wouldn’t
accept that as freedom. I defend freedoms, but it has to be in tandem with
morals. They have to run parallel. That’s what I defend. Of course it’s not
like that everywhere. There are those among Americans who are against it
but the American freedoms understood in general sense is not freedom for
me. I don’t know what to call it. It’s not freedom but more like
degeneration.”
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Although she complains about the pressures of living in a small, closed, and
conservative environment in her youth in Turkey, where even looking up while walking
down the street would raise questions about one’s chastity, Asya believes there is no
issue of freedom as far as premarital sexual relations are concerned. Defining the state of
sexual freedoms in the U.S. as degeneration, she draws a bright boundary between the
image of a moral Turkish woman refraining from sex until she gets married, and her
promiscuous American counterpart. Regarding her concerns over her daughter who
finished college in another state she says she was worried sick for four years. She only
prayed that her daughter would not have bad friends. “Thank God she came home the
way she left,” and bursts into laughter, referring to her assumption that her daughter
abstained from sexual intercourse while she was in college.
The boundary regarding female sexuality also becomes evident when parents
discuss the issues of dating and marriage practices for their children. Although they are
not necessarily fond of arranged marriages, and wish their children would find a spouse
with whom they would happily settle down, they do not like the idea of them dating
several different people for that holy goal either. Pelin is against the notion of dating
when you are a teenager. She finds the idea of 13-14 years old teenagers dating a bit odd.
“When they come to a certain age, then it’s okay. But when they have both their feet in
the ground. I’m against marrying them off to someone unwillingly. I absolutely don’t
have such an idea. But here I can see how wrong it is. For instance, 13-14 year olds go on
a date with someone, then break up and go on with another one. Then, it loses its
specialness.” Cahide, a pious woman with two teenage daughters, is approving of dating
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done only with the intention of marrying. Although she wants her daughters to get to
know the potential son-in-law before they got married, she is against random dating and
flirting. When asked what she understands of dating, she indicates, “I mean it’s more like
talking. I don’t think dating could happen without marriage in mind.” Although both
parents approve of dating at a certain age, their understanding of the concept does not
involve romantic relations. What they expect from their children is to get to know their
potential husbands without getting intimate sexually. Moreover, allowing a teenage
daughter to date with a boy is difficult for the Turkish family to explain others. However,
once the child reaches adult age and starts dating, it could be justified as an innocent act
for finding a marriage partner.
While the concern over controlling female sexuality is mostly mentioned by
parents who have daughters, Semanur also takes up on this issue. She finds it difficult to
explain to her son that when it comes to “certain issues,” some people from other cultures
are more “relaxed” and therefore different from them. She believes the problem will
aggravate, as her son gets older, starts noticing things around him and imitates other
people. When I ask her to explain the sort of things she does not want her son to imitate,
she goes shyly:

“To be honest, they are a bit more relaxed when it comes to propriety. We
try to be more careful when it comes to that. Because they are too relaxed,
I don’t want to place my kid within them. (…) I don’t know how to say
this. I see it in the park, and they don’t refrain from doing things in front of
their children. It happens in front of their children. I don’t like such things.
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We are at opposite ends in terms of our clothing. Many women are not
covered, and I don’t really care about that much but it really bothers me
when they have intimate moments in front of children. When I see
something like that I change my walking path and walk on a different
street because I don’t want my child to see that. I don’t want him to
perceive it as normal. He shouldn’t normalize it. He has to understand that
it’s immoral and should not be done. It gets more difficult as children start
growing up. Here, unfortunately girls aged 11 get pregnant. Many families
let their children loose. We try to control them: where are they going, with
whom, what are they eating and drinking? What kind of families do their
friends have? We pay attention to such things.”

Despite the widespread concern over early pregnancies, none of the respondents
considered sex education as a possible solution to this important problem. Rather, they
were talking about their fear of losing control over their children and strategies developed
to prevent it. While the issue of pregnancies was brought up many times, the main
concern of the parents was controlling the sexuality of their children. In the face of sexual
norms that do not stigmatize premarital sexual relations unlike in Turkey, parents were
drawing a boundary between mainstream Americans and Turkish immigrants where the
image of Turkish woman as the chaste and moral opposite of her American counterpart
became the marker of that boundary. Why was this a major concern especially for parents
that had daughters? It is because the namus regime does not necessarily control male
sexuality. Moreover, in cases where the man falls off the wagon and becomes
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promiscuous, he would not necessarily get punished for his actions. Therefore, the
protection of namus forms a major concern not for men but for women, as the namus
regime continues to rule over many immigrant women’s and their daughter’s sexuality in
the United States.

Challenging the “Namus” Regime: Opportunities in the New World
There are other immigrants who also pick up on the issue of relations between
sexes in the U.S. Although they find them more relaxed and less stigmatized than the
situation in Turkey, it does not necessarily mean that everyone approves of them. Azade,
a young mother of two, asserts that relations between men and women in the U.S. are
highly different from those in Turkey. “Here people live comfortably, the way they want
to,” she says and continues, “In Turkey, when a woman is in a relationship, she perceives
the man as her future, so she behaves accordingly. Here there is this thing: ‘I will try [it]
with this person, and if it doesn’t work out, then I’ll break up.’ It is very simple. But in
Turkey, women want to get serious: ‘Let’s get engaged.’ We see the relationship as
leading to marriage. But that’s not the case here. Let’s live and if everything goes well, if
we get on well, then we’ll get married. Here, there is that comfort for instance.” Although
she calls this liberal form of dating “comfort,” she does not approve of such fleeting
relations where women go out with different men until they find out the right one as she
identifies as a Muslim Turkish woman trying to conform cultural and religious norms.

Her arguments resonate with the views of Pelin and Cahide mentioned earlier,
who would approve of their children dating when they are adults, and only with the
intention of marrying afterwards. By perceiving dating only as a prerequisite to marriage,
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these women, who have mid-to-high levels of religious orientation, are tightly adhering to
the norms of the namus regime, where the ultimate goal is to control female sexuality.
Women are not allowed to have fleeting relations with men, as they have to preserve their
bodies and save their chastity for their husbands. Therefore, any dating available for
women has to have the ultimate goal of marriage. Even then, the notion of dating does
not include any premarital sexual relations.23 However, for some people, this regime
complicates the relations between sexes where both men and women stop imagining the
possibility of establishing non-sexual relations as they are conditioned towards perceiving
and assessing each other only as marriage partners. Semra, a hijabi young college student,
points at this complexity. While she does not approve of flirting and laissez-faire
intimacy, she welcomes the possibility of establishing friendships with the opposite sex
that would not necessarily involve affection. Thinking of her female friends in Istanbul
she says, “Whenever they speak to a man, they try to make themselves admired. But here
that wouldn’t be the first thing that comes up to your mind when you talk to a man. Here,
a man and a woman first meet through their intelligence. It’s not important if they like
each other physically. It’s essential that they find harmony intellectually.”
Semra also refers to the gender norms prevailing in her pious social circle in
Turkey, which would not approve of a friendship between opposite sexes, unless it is a
serious one destined to turn into marriage. This cultural norm conditions not only women
who seek admiration but also men who can only think in terms of romantic love and
marriage when it comes to relations with the opposite sex. “From elderly women’s point
of view…well older women would say it’s a sin, it is haram,” Semra says and bursts into
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  For the pious, this regime rules over both sexes where men as well as women are supposed to abstain
from any contact with the opposite sex but the social repercussions would still be harsher on women than

men in case of a breach. 	
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a laughter. She continues, “If only people could trust, I mean, if only their mentality
would be like ‘She is not helal24 for me, I wouldn’t see her like that, I’m only having a
conversation,’ we could overcome this but I don’t think this kind of thinking would be
adopted in Turkey. Here there are people who only think that they are just having a
conversation, nothing more, so they can get into contact with and this is a huge
advantage. It’s a huge advantage for humanity, and you can feel it here. You feel more at
ease here. You can trust to the other side. You know he won’t take any missteps if you
don’t give him the feeling… In Turkey, ugly things may happen even though you don’t
give the feeling.” Semra is arguing that back in Turkey, encounters with the opposite sex
are loaded with expectations of eventual matrimony, and she feels relieved from such
pressure in her interactions with Muslim men in the U.S.
Fire and gunpowder do not sleep together, is a famous Turkish proverb, also
found in Christian Mediterranean cultures, implying that when left alone, a man and a
woman could not refrain from having sexual relations. The namus regime seems to be
built on this proverb, ruling out the possibility of establishing relations among adults
unless it is for conjugal purposes. Yet, Semra challenges this notion and criticizes its
strict application. Although she is definitely not advocating women’s freedom of dating,
she is still supporting the idea of establishing friendships with the opposite sex that do not
involve romantic feelings. By doing that, she is opening up a crack in the namus regime
where she criticizes her peers and older generations in Turkey for courting the idea of
romantic relationship whenever relations among opposite sexes are considered. As long
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It means religiously allowed, and the opposite is haram, meaning religiously forbidden.
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as people know that they are not helal for each other sexually and respect that idea, they
would manage to have a friendship without any romantic edge.
While Semra is opening up a small crack in the namus regime, there are
immigrant women who are hammering on its walls in the U.S. by staking a claim on their
sexuality and sexual relations. These are usually the immigrants who describe Turkish
culture as intrusive and find comfort in the notion of personal space. Despite the fact that
they are enjoying the lack of control over their sexuality in America, the moment they go
back to Turkey, even for a short visit, they cannot help but fall back in the hands of the
namus regime. Esin is a woman in her mid-fifties who had married twice in Turkey. She
lives with her non-Turkish, non-Muslim boyfriend in New York without any plans of
marrying him in the near future. Although her adult son who also lives in New York
knows about her relationship and living arrangements, her family back in Turkey does
not. So when her boyfriend makes the suggestion of traveling Turkey together and living
there for a while, she finds herself at an impasse. While she does not want to turn down
her boyfriend, she also does not want to come under fire from her family. She says:

“Our country is a very historical one, it’s a lovely place, easy to live. For
instance, now my boyfriend tells me, ‘What if we go there with you and
live without marrying each other?’ Well, my family wouldn’t lean towards
the idea of me living with a man whom I didn’t marry. If he happens to
live with my mother in the same house, none of them would be happy. So
my family wouldn’t be happy.”
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Afraid of her family’s reactions, she keeps this question hanging in the air
between them, and when I visited her a year later it was still on the table and she was still
reluctant to do it. However, away from all the gender norms that would control the
sexuality of a fiftyish woman, Esin enjoys the personal space she found and continues to
live with her boyfriend in New York.
Ekin also finds the gender norms that regulate relations in the U.S. highly
different from those in Turkey. She has moved to the U.S. after marrying a Turkish man
who had been living in the States over decades. She has a son from her first marriage and
he lives with them. She tells the story of a Turkish friend in New York who never got
married but decided to have a child using sperm from a sperm bank. Ekin indicates, “She
said she wouldn’t get married after a certain age, and she wouldn’t find the right guy
before her reproduction system wears out so she wouldn’t have a child. So she had her
baby. Doing something like this in Turkey means having to challenge the society all the
time.” Fascinated by her friend’s control over her sexuality and reproduction, Ekin thinks
had this friend been living in Turkey, her sexual choices would have been under question
at every step of the way.
In a similar vein, Serra, who had immigrated after getting a divorce in Turkey,
discusses the personal space and the freedom that she enjoys as a woman living in
America. Aware of the stigma carried by divorced women in Turkey, she says the reason
why she came to the U.S. is to change her life. She didn’t want to live in Turkey as a
divorced woman. She was working as a secretary, and she thinks she might have chosen
to stay in Turkey had she had a different occupation. While working as a secretary and
being a divorced woman have their own separate stigmas usually implying sexual
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availability, Serra chooses to escape from the effects of both stigmas combined. She also
touches upon the gender norms that regulate divorced women’s sexuality in Turkey, as
she explains the reasons why she decided to move out of the country.

“Now, people have this perception in Turkey. When you are a divorced
woman, your married friends wouldn’t want to hang out with you. Well
that was never the case with my friends but still there is the idea. It’s been
25 years so I don’t know if it changed in Turkey. But [they would think]
‘you are a divorcee, and I’m a married woman. If you come to my house
you might seduce my husband.’ Men would think, and I’m talking about
men of my generation, ‘she is a divorcee she must be burning [with
desire].’ You know they make such hideous remarks.”

Such remarks are born from cultural norms regulating female sexuality, and
assume that single women would protect their chastity and refrain from sexual
intercourse until they got married. While it is easier to keep unmarried women’s sexuality
under control through the namus regime, which includes norms and taboos about
virginity and expectations for the wedding night, it becomes highly problematic when it
comes to divorced women who have already lost their virginity. In order to take their
potential sexuality under control, they are often portrayed as promiscuous women ready
to sleep with anyone they lay their eyes on to. Unfortunately, such dreadful remarks that
Serra wanted to escape from by moving to the United States found her in New York at a
Turkish business where she had worked for a while. Serra remembers that day vividly.
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“I was working in a Turkish restaurant in Brooklyn. One day my boss the
owner of the restaurant, [and I thought] he was a very nice man, he said,
‘There is a man and he likes you a lot. He has a job, and is very smart. It’s
been a few months since you are here. You are a divorced woman. A
divorced woman would be promiscuous.’ I have never heard that term
before. I didn’t understand what he was trying to say. He asked, ‘Have you
been with anyone?’ I said, no. Would I tell you if I had been? My private
life is none of your business. Stupid man.”

Her Turkish boss shows not only the audacity of intervening in her personal
space, but also attempting to take her sexuality under control by trying to fix her in a
relationship. Knowing that the norms about staying chaste would no longer apply to a
divorced woman, he is using another tactic, which is labeling her as wanton, ready to
sleep with anyone that comes across her way. If she wants to stay clear of such
accusations, she has to control her sexuality. In order to assure others that she is doing
exactly that she needs to re-marry. As the examples I discussed in this section
demonstrate, it gets difficult to control Turkish female sexuality in the United States, a
country that does not stigmatize premarital sexual relations to the extent that Turkey
does. Turkish women may choose to move in with their boyfriends, have children using
sperm donations, or have relations outside marriage, as they no longer feel the control of
the namus regime, which had controlled their sexuality for so long while they were living
in Turkey. This does not mean that all Turkish women living in the U.S. who suddenly
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faced with new norms on sexuality decide not to conform to the namus regime. To the
contrary, many immigrant women that I spoke with, regardless of religious orientation,
were loyal followers of the namus regime, which they wanted to inculcate in their
children as well. However, there are women who manage to use this new opportunity to
escape from its tight grip, and have a life that is beyond their capability had they stayed
back in Turkey.

Discussing the Notions of Femininity, Masculinity and Gender Equality
According to Kandiyoti (1988), the “patrilocally extended household,” where
several generations live under the same roof, commonly seen in agricultural societies
including the Muslim Middle East, and South and East Asia, forms the basis of classical
patriarchy (278). In this structure, both young men and women in the family remain
under the supervision of the male head of the household. Classic patriarchy also includes
characteristics such as “male domination, son preference, restrictive codes of behavior for
women, and the association of family honor with female virtue” (Moghadam 2004:143).
In this heteronormative model, the husband and wife are expected to play certain roles
presumed to be in accordance with their biology, in other words sex assigned at birth
(Ibid, 139). While the man, who is the main authority in the household, is expected to
become the breadwinner, the wife takes on responsibilities such as nurturing and care
giving to the children, husband and home. While strengthening family is an important
concern in the Middle East, the Turkish case demonstrates that the notion of classical
patriarchy has been destabilized under the economic forces since early 1950s, but
especially after 1980s as women with different social class backgrounds have started to
join the workforce (Kandiyoti, 1982; Ozbay, 1995).
	
  

204	
  

Immigrants’ perception of femininity and masculinity are heavily influenced by
essentialist arguments that view both sexes as having different dispositions, and as a
result, different gender roles. Automatically drawing a symbolic boundary between
women and men, these perceptions also lay the basis for immigrants’ understanding of
the notion of gender equality. In other words, when asked, immigrants choose to use
essentialized characteristics or socially defined gender roles to underline the differences
between sexes. While men are usually defined as calm, strict, tough, inattentive, and
superficial, women are perceived as affectionate, emotional, considerate, compassionate,
delicate, and soft.
Hazan, a young woman with a high level of religious orientation, defines women
as affectionate, emotional, self-sacrificing and faithful to the person they love. She thinks
men appear strict even if they feel emotional on the inside. Carrying the responsibility of
earning a living for their family, men are required to look tough. Their socially defined
gender role conditions their public face. She adds, “Of course life is a partnership
nowadays, and both sides are working but still man is always a step forward. [His wife]
might be making more money than him, but he has to work regardless. The woman may
stop working but he has to do it forever. That’s a responsibility and a man carries its
weight.” She believes that a man’s responsibility to earn a living and remain the main
provider of the family no matter what is inscribed in his gender role. This role he is
enforced to play toughens him up along the way.
Cihan believes that the differentiation between the sexes lies in their dispositions
such as women being thoughtful. Considering her husband’s attitude, she says, “He
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wouldn’t think of calling his mother, for instance. I remind him of that, ‘call your
mother,’ or ‘you haven’t spoken to my parents for a while, why don’t you give them a
call?’ Men are absent-minded or when they have a spouse, they get a bit more passive but
we are inclined to think in more detail.” Buse asserts that Islam created men and women
with different dispositions. When asked to elaborate she states, “A woman thinks of
everything, but a man usually views things superficially. That’s why they are not equals.
He is content with the part he sees but a woman always thinks of everything.” She gives
the example of a man who would be content with covering a bare window with
newspapers to block outsider’s gazes because for a man what is essential is to get the
window covered. However women would be more attentive. For instance, they would
think about the color of the curtain matching their furniture. “So women think such
issues,” she says and continues, “They are very thoughtful. But men always think
superficially. They are always result oriented.” In these examples, both women are
referring to the God/nature given dispositions as the main marker of the gender boundary
and supporting the idea that women and men are inherently different from each other.
It is not just immigrants with higher levels of religiosity that hold on to the gender
boundary based on essentialized characteristics. There are also seculars, or immigrants
with lower levels of religious orientation, who also make similar differentiations. For
instance Suna, a highly educated secular woman, laughingly says that her son always tells
her that she is more like a man, more like a dad. “I’m more dominant to be honest. He is
softer. But he always meddles like a mosquito buzzing,” she adds referring to her
husband. Equating softness with femininity while dissociating herself from it, Suna is not
challenging the gender boundary, but rather reproducing it by situating herself on the

	
  

206	
  

other side. Canan, a secular woman, also underlines the gender boundary by claiming that
while the mother would have the main role in child-care, the father would play an
important part in disciplining the children and teaching them to differentiate right from
wrong. In other words, men are not expected to give child-care because it is essentially
seen as a female role. Moreover, since being tough and strict are associated with
masculinity and not femininity, they are invited to play their part in parenting only where
the disciplining of the child is concerned.
For some immigrant women, the word ‘woman’ automatically signals the notion
of a mother, as if it is not possible to think of a woman not becoming one. According to
Asude a woman is “a good mother; a good wife.” She asserts that being a woman means
being able to make your children happy. Therefore, she thinks, the largest part of
responsibility falls on women. Although she does not deny the role of a father in the
upbringing of a child, just like Canan, she limits his role to disciplining the child. “When
a man becomes a father, he has to look tough,” she argues. While he is playing his part as
a tough male figure, in other words “the discipliner” of the family, the mother remains
soft, understanding and compassionate. When I ask what the word ‘woman’ signifies to
her, Tomris, a retired veterinarian in her seventies utters only one word: “State.” Then,
she starts to elaborate: “I think woman and mother are the same. As you know mother is
the prime minister, president, and minister of defense, doctor, secretary, and servant all at
once. All these are merged in her. (…) Man is the head and woman is the neck. This is a
saying from Elazığ. Man is the head but woman is the neck that turns him around.”
Although she never had children of her own, but mothered her deceased husband’s
children from his first marriage, she still holds onto the image that a woman is primarily a
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mother. Moreover, while she is acting the “state” running all the departments necessary
for the survival of the family, and is the actual wheel that steers the husband, she still has
to pretend and make her husband believe that he is the one who is in charge. Regardless
of how much steering she is doing in the family, she still has to maintain the image of a
soft, delicate, and compassionate woman standing next to her tough, calm and strict
husband in the public eye.
The notion of gender equality is a complicated matter, mostly shaped by
immigrants’ perception of femininity and masculinity and their understanding of gender
roles. While the majority of respondents assert that women and men are not equal, in
cases where they are in favor of gender equality, their understanding of the concept does
not necessarily mean equality in terms of gender roles and norms. Moreover, those who
do not support the idea of gender equality in the first place differ in terms of their reasons
as to why there is no such equality. As I mentioned earlier, immigrants’ definition of the
sexes is heavily influenced by essentialist arguments claiming innate differences, which
is unsurprisingly reflected in their understanding of gender equality. As a result, denying
gender equality on the grounds of nature or God-given dispositions occupy a prevalent
place among immigrants.
While his friend, comparing Turkish and American cases, comes to the
conclusion that the situation of women in the latter is not any better than the former,
Yahya, a man in his mid-fifties, indicates that there is equality but also hypocrisy in the
U.S. When asked to elaborate he says:
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“For instance, women would say, ‘we want equality, we want to be equal
with men,’ so you would say, ‘okay, here is a bag weighing 100 pounds,
lift it and carry it if you’re equal.’ So she would say, ‘No I cannot lift it.’
What kind of equality is this then? God has created human beings. You are
not equal physically. Right? Aren’t you physically equal? But I cannot use
my physical superiority against you. I need to use my brain. All right?
Women would say they are equal when it suits them. When it doesn’t, they
would say they are not equals. Actually, this is where equality lies:
Woman at home, and man outside, and they are both working. One may
work less or more than the other, that’s irrelevant. But they are both equal.
One of them is earning livelihood for the child, and the other is feeding it.
But they say, ‘I will go outside and take a ride around,’ There is no such
thing. If you are going out, you’ll go out as a family.”

According to this view, innate characteristics such as the differences in physical
strength rule out the possibility of establishing equality among sexes. Moreover, it also
proves that seeking out equality is a redundant and hypocritical attempt since these
differences are the work of nature. Wouldn’t women and men be created in similar
strength had they been meant to be equal? Moreover, confining women in the household
and defining her responsibilities accordingly, Yahya comes up with a new definition of
equality where women and men both work in parallel environments that is best suited to
their dispositions.
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In a similar vein, Semanur, a pious young woman, does not believe in gender
equality as she asserts that women and men are born with different dispositions.
However, in terms of rights, her opinion regarding the matter has changed tremendously
after she learned more about her religion. She says, “I used to think women had less
rights but as I learned my religion, I realized that our religion gives us certain rights. A
woman doesn’t have to vacuum the apartment or do the dishes. Our religion does not say
that. She is only responsible for protecting the house. But they are perceived as women’s
tasks in our culture so people assume our religion also says that. Men have to bring bread
and provide for their woman. That’s why they are not equal. If they are both working,
man has to help woman in housework. If the woman is not working, then she should be
helping her husband. There needs to be equality from that aspect.” She argues that gender
norms are not religiously dictated, but rather culturally adopted. Therefore, when she
does not vacuum the apartment, or clean the dishes, she would not be going against her
religious belief, but cultural norms. Moreover, her claim for equality in shouldering the
housework when both partners are employed without a more general claim for gender
equality is not uncommon among Turkish immigrants.
Another widely held perception by immigrants supports the notion of
complementarity of sexes. Having its roots in the belief that there are innate differences
between the sexes, it argues that because of these differences women and men
complement each other, thus forming a harmonious whole where each part is functioning
in its distinct role. Kuvvet, a pious young man asserts that he views the matter from a
religious perspective and not from a legal one. He says, “Everybody has equal rights,
but… I mean these are entities that are impossible to be equal. Maybe some features of
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women are superior to men, whereas some features of men are superior to women. I don’t
think we need to look for equality.” He thinks women are superior when it comes to
motherhood because men cannot show the same level of compassion to their children.
And as for men’s superiority, he argues that men can stay calmer when faced with
negative developments. He says, “If you ask me, ‘which is superior,’ no side is superior.
But they are not equal.” While he rejects the idea of man being superior to woman, he
does not believe in the notion of gender equality either. Therefore, he comes up with a
model where the heterosexual couple, having superiority in distinct areas, manages to
balance and complement each other thus forming a well-functioning marriage union.
The emphasis on balancing each other is also underlined by Canan, a secular
woman who works as a Turkish instructor to children at a local organization in her spare
time. Not believing in gender equality, she thinks God has created men more powerful,
and respectable and thus superior to women. Since equality between the sexes is never
achievable, she believes, the couple should seek a balance instead. However, echoing
Kuvvet, she underlines the fact that from a legal perspective, men and women are equal.
Moreover, she also believes that although men are superior to women in terms of power
and respect, women should have an equal voice when it comes to decision-making in the
household. She says, “They both have the right to speak at home. It is not that it’s the
man who’d be calling the shots always. If there is a problem, if there is a decision to
make, it will be taken jointly. But men are built more strong.” Although her views might
seem contradictory, they are not. She thinks women and men are legally equal, meaning
they should have the same educational, and working rights, etc. But when it comes to
power and prestige in the household, men are (and should be) superior to women. Any
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woman has to accept that fact and continue her life accordingly because the society
insists on men achieving that status in the household. This is the only basis for the
establishment of a peaceful union for couples. However, the man should always take the
opinion of his wife into account when making decisions, even if he would go his way in
the end, so the harmony could be maintained in the union.
Despite the size of “no gender equality” camp, there are immigrants who assert
that men and women are indeed equal. But it is essential to understand the meanings
attached to this term. For some immigrants, gender equality means having joint decisionmaking processes in the household. Cahide, a pious woman with two daughters argues
that women and men are equal based on a hadith by the Prophet. She says, “He says that
he wants to pray. He gets permission from his wife, from our mother Ayse. There is so
much that we don’t know. Because we don’t know our religion, we find it odd. I mean
when you say spouse… Why would you scold your wife? A wife. They see woman… I
think that’s because of the way their mothers have raised them.” Blaming mothers who
raise their sons making them believe that they are superior, she indicates that at home,
they take all their decisions together. “We take decisions together. It’s not like, ‘it’s my
way,’ ‘no it’s my way.’ There is democracy. For instance we ask our children. We get
their opinions. Everybody should have a say. It’s everyone’s joint decision. That’s how it
is. That’s what I think. I don’t know of others. Men, women… all equal.”
Vahap also perceives equality as both partners having a voice in the decisionmaking processes. He confesses that it was not how he used to think before, but his views
have changed. He says, “I used to think the head of the household was man. You know,
because he is strong. It’s never a woman’s place to say a thing. Like that. Well, I was
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wrong. Now, if my wife tells me ‘this is going to happen like this,’ and if I find it
meaningful, well I also get to say what I think, and then we will decide together. This is
equality. But, saying things like ‘you know nothing, but I do,’ well, that wouldn’t work.
Well, the woman will take a dislike to you.” Although he did not change his views on the
argument that men and women are born with different qualities and dispositions, he
supports the idea of equality when it comes to decision-making in the household.

Pelin, a working mother of two, perceives innate differences between men and
women’s dispositions. However, she vehemently argues that men should take more
responsibility in housework and childcare. She says, “When you say equal… Well, this is
how I think. Since I’m working, I would like to have my husband help me. I would like
to have him share many of the tasks.” [Such as?] “Especially at home. I would like him to
take care of the children. I think all fathers should do that. Now since most of the women
are working I would like them to be equal in that. Equality in other issues… Let me say
this, for instance a woman could never get as strong as a man, she may not lift things, but
that’s different. But in other issues I think they should be sharing responsibility.” When
she hears the word equality, she thinks of physical characteristics, which she believes
would set the two sexes apart. But that is not the only meaning of the term for her. As a
working mother, buried under double shift, one at home and the other at work, she
supports and demands equality when it comes to division of labor in the household.
Finally, for some immigrant women, gender equality signals equality of
occupational skills. Rejecting the idea that women are not cut out for certain jobs, these
women claim that there is no limit to the things women could do. If anything, they are

	
  

213	
  

more capable than men because on top of everything they do at work, they also manage
to raise children and take care of the household. Begum, a college graduate young mother
of two, says, “I see myself as a woman really because a woman can do anything. There is
nothing she cannot do, unlike men. They could do but they wouldn’t want to. Women are
different… You raise a child, you work, and you become everything. You clean the
house also, you work, and you raise a child. There is nothing you couldn’t do.” She
thinks half of woman is a man. “Divide a woman into half it makes a man,” she laughs.
However, she also cannot refrain from attributing certain essentialized characteristics to
the sexes. She says women think differently because their dispositions are different from
those of men. Echoing Cihan, she argues that women are inclined to think in more detail
about matters than men. While a man would think more in abstract terms, five hundred
thousand possibilities would cross a woman’s mind. “I mean, women are so different,”
she stresses.
Asya, a college graduate with some level of religious orientation, says she grew
up like a man and bursts into laughter. Although she refuses to draw a boundary when it
comes to occupational skills, she still defines childcare and housework as feminine
responsibilities.

“I’ve always told my husband. I’m worth of four men like him. Of course
in terms of motherhood and housekeeping a woman is a woman but I don’t
believe in the saying women cannot do some of the things men do. I mean
a woman can do anything a man could do. We have seen them do. I did it.
I can do anything men around me could do. There is no superiority
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because of that. Maybe they are superior because of their physical build
but not mental build (laughs).”

Although these women support the idea of equality when it comes to occupational
capabilities, they still believe in the notion of innate differences between the sexes, which
in return feed their perception of gender roles. The majority of respondents seem not to
consider the forces of socialization, how categories of femininity and masculinity are
constituted, and how cultural norms produce gender identities and gear children towards
their gender roles from very early on. These complicated responses show that the issue of
gender equality is a highly complex matter, and reducing it to a “yes, they believe in
equality,” or “no, they do not” binary would only simplify and ignore diversity in
people’s approach. It is true that the majority believes women and men are born with
different (God or nature given) characteristics, which make them dissimilar and as a
result rule out the possibility of achieving gender equality. However this perception does
not stop many from claiming equality in legal terms, in occupational skills, in the
decision-making processes at home, and in the division of labor in the household. As
Bora and Ustun (2005) also demonstrate in their research on family in Turkey, people
tend not to see any issues when it comes to equality in the public space, i.e. education
rights, etc. (83). However, for the private realm and relations among sexes, there is a
strong resistance in terms of redefining gender roles and gender equality due to a widely
held belief in distinct dispositions among sexes. Turkish immigrants in the U.S. seem to
have carried over their understanding of gender relations and gender roles that they
learned in Turkey.
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When asked how they perceive gender relations between Americans, several
immigrants –usually women– mention that the situation is better than Turkey as women
have more rights in the U.S. The major difference they claim to exist between the two
societies concerns the issue of violence against women. There is a belief that laws
regarding violence are strictly implemented, abusive husbands are apprehended, and
survivors of domestic violence are protected by the state in the U.S. While Mukadder
argues that it is difficult to harm women in the U.S. as people fear penal consequences,
Aliye asserts that there are serious penalties not only for physical violence but also for
verbal abuse. Tomris, who was subjected to violence by her stepson in New York,
indicates that after the incident she called the police and stayed at a women’s shelter for
about a month. There she met other –mostly American – survivors of domestic violence
one of whom had a medical doctor as husband, which greatly surprised her. Umut asserts
that domestic violence is a problem in the U.S. as well, however there are mechanisms in
place that support women. “It happens here, too,” he says and continues, “but since there
are heavy penalties people keep themselves under control.”
Some immigrants define gender relations in the U.S. in more egalitarian terms
when it comes to gender roles. Umay thinks Turkish men would expect their wives to
prepare their dinner every night, and would cause a scene if they did not, whereas
American husbands would make a fuss and go and eat outside if the wife is not home or
is working late, etc. Mesude agrees and adds approvingly, “Here, they cannot command
[their] women.” Ekin believes there is no distinction between men and women in the U.S.
since unlike Turkey there is no pressure on women. She thinks women learn to play
certain gender roles since they were children in Turkey. Ridvan indicates that he did not
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used to believe in gender equality but his perception changed after he moved to the U.S.
“If you asked me twenty years ago, I would reply differently,” he says and continues, “It
was hard to see women working [in Turkey]. Here, when you see a woman on a grader or
a truck you realize that there is not much difference between men and women. I mean
there are some differences but in terms of life style [there is not].” Although these
immigrants, based on their personal experiences, make bold generalizations for people
both in the U.S. and Turkey, moving to the U.S. and facing with different gender
dynamics have either altered their views, or –even it did not– force them to recognize the
possibility of having gender relations differently constructed from the ones they were
socialized in their home country.

A few immigrant women argue that there are some similarities between the U.S.
and Turkey as the latter has -to some extent- caught up with the former. Asya thinks
gender relations in big cities in Turkey are similar to those in the U.S. She asserts that so
much has changed since she left, as Turkish women do not have to walk streets with their
heads bowed like she used to decades ago. Cihan makes the claim that things are
changing in Turkey, as people from her generation have adopted gender relations similar
to those of Americans. She argues that women no longer stay at home as was the case a
generation ago, but instead study, marry, have children and continue to work just like
women in the U.S. Canan also makes a similar observation, underlining the fact that
Turkish women no longer give birth to numerous children, but rather have fewer kids and
join the workforce. The fact that more women are entering the workforce does not
challenge established ideas about gender roles, and none of these respondents are making
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such a claim. However, by arguing that things are changing and more women in Turkey
are joining the workforce compared to previous generations, these women are using the
discourse of development and making the claim that Turkey is a modern (or at least
modernizing) nation.

Domestic Goddesses and their Male Helpers
While American society underwent a tremendous change with women’s
increasing participation in the labor force from 1960s onwards, the transformation of the
gendered division of domestic labor did not keep pace with that. Today, American
women take care of about two thirds of routine household chores which include
“housecleaning, meal planning, cooking, dishwashing (or loading the dishwasher),
cleaning up after meals, grocery shopping, laundry (washing, ironing, and mending
clothes), caring for sick family members, yard work, car maintenance and repairs,
outdoor and household maintenance, taking out the garbage, paying bills, and
transporting family members” (Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010: 769). Research has
shown that several factors such as gender ideology, available time, relative power and
available resources predict couple’s share of labor participation at home (Coverman and
Sheley 1986, Ross 1987, Starrels 1994, Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). For
Turkish immigrants, the division of labor in the household is closely associated with the
definition of gender roles they had adopted in Turkey. As I demonstrated in the previous
section, the majority of the immigrants hold essentialist views about sexes. Therefore,
meanings attached to femininity and masculinity shape what is expected from the married
couple, in other words constitutes their gender roles. However, that is not the only
determinant of who does how much of what inside home. Similar to the American case,
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the working schedules of partners, the availability of hired or volunteer help, and the
level of demand coming from the wife also play a significant role in determining the
structure of the household division of labor.
As for the immigrants I interviewed, it turns out that the majority of men do little
to nothing at home, whereas the majority of women shoulder the house chores on their
own. Women who do not have their husbands around as the men work long hours and
sometimes the weekends too, and who do not have means to afford domestic help, are
forced to do the housework alone. Some others, on the other hand, choose not to ask their
husband’s participation even though they are at home and available for burden sharing. In
the U.S., while domestic work and childcare are regarded as primarily the women’s
responsibility, the husband’s contribution is defined as “help” underlining its optional and
temporal nature (Sanchez and Thompson 1997, Coltrane 2000). Help is also selective,
meaning it consists of tasks that are seen manly such as mowing the lawn, or doing house
repairs rather than regular household chores such as cooking and cleaning (LachanceGrzela and Bouchard 2010) Several Turkish immigrants –both male and female- mention
husband’s contribution using the notion of “help” when discussing division of labor in
the household. Moreover, echoing the American case, their understanding of “help” has
three important characteristics: temporality, conditionality and selectivity. As I will
demonstrate in the following section, husband’s help is usually not consistent. In other
words, his wife cannot expect his regular contribution to the housework, as he offers his
labor from time to time. Second, this labor is conditional, which means either the wife
has to ask for it, or the husband has to see that he has no choice but take part especially
because his partner’s hands are full with other stuff. Third and finally, “help” is selective,
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where the husband would not take on any house chores, but instead choose the ones that
would not compromise his masculinity such as shopping, taking out the trash, loading the
washer or barbecuing but not ironing clothes or mopping the floors or more importantly
taking care of the children.
Demir, a highly educated young man, indicates that they do not have a division of
labor in the household that they arrange on purpose. He says, “The one who has more
time takes care of the household. But it is mostly my wife who does it. But I was always
lazy for such things. I try doing my best in helping. I do help but she takes care of 70
percent of the workload, I can say. But this is not because I think that’s her role. It’s just
that this is a personal characteristic, and my laziness when it comes to household chores.
Maybe she is feeling obliged to do them instinctively, I don’t know. She does them more.
But we are both working. We both contribute to the household, financially. Sometimes
one of us contributes more. That’s all.” It is interesting to see how his answer goes from
‘whoever has more time does more,’ to ‘my wife takes care of pretty much everything,’
in a second. Although he confesses that he is lazy when it comes to housework, his wife
does not have that choice and he still relates his wife’s labor inside the household to her
instincts. Vahap, a man with elementary school diploma, also says he does housework
when he feels like it. Although his wife never tells him to do anything, he sometimes
washes the dishes, or does some ironing. “My wife is too self-sacrificing. She runs
around, she struggles [for life]. She took our kids to schools for years. She cooked, she
did the shopping, she had all those responsibilities,” he says. So sometimes when he sees
some dirty dishes left in the sink, knowing that his wife will do them once she gets home,
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he feels helpful and does them himself. But his wife cannot count on Vahap’s
participation in the housework because the help he offers mostly depends on his mood.
As for the immigrant women, there are several dynamics at play regarding their
share of housework. While the majority of them are shouldering the housework and
childcare alone, there are those who could get occasional support from their husband,
especially for certain chores. Almost all female respondents agree that men should be
more active in the household, whereas women in the work force have louder voices
which is understandable as employed women are more likely to have egalitarian views on
gender roles (Fan and Marini 2000). Women who are unemployed usually end up being
the ones who take care of the household and children. While some are reluctant to take
steps to change things around, others are left without a choice as their husbands work for
very long hours, and sometimes come home after the rest of the family has gone to bed.
“He has to help out in certain things,” says Cahide who is not employed. Her husband is
the superintendent of the apartment building they are living at, and when I ask her if he
participates in the housework Cahide replies, “I don’t think there is much left for him,”
and starts laughing. He does shopping, but Cahide is reluctant to let him in the kitchen for
cooking or doing the dishes. She laughingly says, “Well, my husband is a bit messy so I
don’t trust him much. When he cooks, he creates such a mess in the kitchen, for instance
the mess on the oven. I can’t have that. The food should be ready but the kitchen has to
stay clean. That’s it.” For Cahide, her husband’s shift in the kitchen creates additional
chores for her as she cleans up the kitchen after his use. So, rather than telling him not to
mess up, or to clean up after his use, Cahide chooses not to let him in the kitchen, and to
do everything by herself.
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Buse, a young mother whose husband works for very long hours and is barely at
home, argues that her situation is not that different from many Turkish women that she
knows around.

“As far as I can see, it all ends with woman. I mean she is the one who
turns things around. She is the one who takes care of the children. Man
only works. He only brings money because the working conditions are
very heavy here. He doesn’t get a time frame allocated for his family. So
men only work but women carry the most of the responsibilities in terms
of helping with children’s homework, helping them socialize, and taking
care of the house. That’s how I am, and that’s how the majority of women
around me are.”

Women who are working for long hours are usually aware of the double shift and
the workload twice as heavy as their husband’s. Some of these women are more proactive
and openly ask for their husband’s participation in the housework. Some others cannot
find the opportunity to negotiate because their husbands come home late and by the time
they are home, the food would be ready and the children in bed. Aliye, a young mother of
two, who runs a grocery store with her husband, tells me that while she was pregnant
with both her children, she had severe health problems so her husband was helping her
with the dishes, vacuuming the apartment or doing the laundry. But now, although they
work together, she comes home earlier than him, and he arrives only after she and the
children have gone to bed. She makes the following observation regarding her double
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shift: “For instance, we are working here. My husband works, and so do I. But in addition
to that, I also work at home. I help kids with their homework. I do house cleaning. I
prepare dinner. I do the laundry. Everything is on me. I work more than him actually. I
think I have more labor in this family than his.” When I ask had she want him to be more
involved she replies, “Of course! I would like him to help me how I’m helping him out
here at this shop.” Although she carries the burden of housework and childcare alone,
from time to time, she enjoys evenings spent with her friends at a bar or a movie theatre,
as her husband stays home and takes care of the children. Maybe she does not get the
ideal deal, but she has some sort of a breathing room at least.
Women who are working and whose spouses are around more tend to be more
eager in asking for their participation in domestic work. The level of support depends on
the nature of the relationship between partners and how busy the schedule of the woman
is. Canan who works as a nurse indicates that her husband helps her a lot because she is
working for long hours. She says, “God is witness. He is my right-hand man, and I’m his
right-hand woman. We support each other. We complete each other. That’s how we
should be. For instance if I’m working long hours, he would load the dishes sitting in the
sink to the washing machine. He takes out the trash. He does the market shopping. He
wouldn’t let me do it. He takes weight off of my shoulders. What else could he do?
Obviously he is not going to do ironing or mopping the floors, is he?” and starts laughing.
Although she is content that her husband is doing some of the chores at home, her
workload is much bigger and includes more time consuming tasks than his. Moreover, his
share in the housework does not include items such as ironing or mopping the floors,
which are categorized as feminine duties.
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Suna, who runs a business with her husband, says she usually does the cleaning of
the house but her husband also does it whenever she asks. “Some of the things I do not
ask him to do because I believe he would not do a good job there,” she says and
continues, “But he also cooks, and he does it good. He usually does the shopping because
I’m most probably busy doing something else. He is not into gardening, so it’s usually on
me. He sometimes feed the cat.” Suna does not get the feeling that she is doing most of
the stuff at home, or that she is getting a raw deal. “But maybe we can talk about this
again when I’m cleaning the house,” she adds laughingly.
The issue of not letting spouses take on certain responsibilities in the household
with the assumption that they would not do it good resonates in another interview. Dilara,
who had immigrated to the U.S. with her husband as a married couple, had a master’s
degree, and has been working since then, says she had established a routine based on the
model she saw in her family back home. She says, “We grew up in a traditional society
and I’m maintaining that. Sometimes I don’t like it but we keep doing it. I went to school,
worked, and cooked meals when I get home. I did laundry, cleaned the house, and I’m
paying the bills. I make bank statements. I’m responsible from all documents. My
husband only goes to work. He sits in front of the television, and that ‘s it. You are
equally tired but you have to clear the table, and do the dishes. Then you have to do your
homework or do research. He is an understanding person. He is young and modern but
our relations are similar to those between my grandparents (laughs).” Dilara indicates that
she has strong feelings for gender equality, and is aware of her double shift. She blames
herself for their current household order, for setting it that way from the beginning, but
she says she could not help it. She explains why: “He is not going to do a good job. He is
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not going to do it like I’d do (laughs). One time he left a colored sock inside the machine
full of white laundry, everything went purple. I don’t want anyone to change the place of
things in my kitchen. I have to find things where I left them. And if I try to explain things
to him, it would take me 30 minutes. So it’s easier for me.” Instead of investing her time
and energy into motivating her husband to participate in housework, who might be
resistant to such a transformation, she chooses to take on all the work herself.
Turkish immigrants predominantly see housework and childcare as the
responsibilities of women. In households where the wife is not employed outside home,
she unquestioningly assumes all these roles. For those women who are employed, the
situation is a bit more different, as they become responsible from not one but two distinct
shifts, making them more likely to demand their husband’s contributions at home.
However, if the husband is working for long hours, sometimes double jobs, and is not
around too often, it gets very difficult for women to make such demands. Some women
choose not to ask their husband to contribute at home if they think the emotional costs of
changing their husband’s attitude over the issue is higher than the cost of doing these
chores on their own. The burden of housework and childcare is most dearly felt by
employed women and by those who delay their career plans, such as learning English or
getting a training to become a nurse, until after their children grew up.

Where is a Woman’s Place? On Employment Outside Home
During the first half of the 20th century, the majority of the Turkish population,
corresponding to 80 percent, was living in rural areas under the rubric of classical
patriarchy. Ozbay (1995) indicates that two factors, internal migration and education,
have started to change this social structure as men (and women to some extent) started to
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increase their education levels, and decided to migrate to large cities hence escaping the
control of their elderly fathers (101). During the period between 1950-1980, an increasing
number of men started to work as blue collar workers in the cities, whereas the
participation of women in the workforce was quite low. The reasons explaining this low
female rate include “the relatively stable income of blue-collar workers, early marriage
for women, a high proportion of pre-school children, the absence of any child-care
facilities, and inadequate support from female kin” (Kandiyoti 1982). During this period,
becoming a housewife came to signify the higher status of the woman. So marrying off to
someone working in the city became the dream of young village girls, willing to leave the
hard work of village life behind (Ozbay 102). Meanwhile, a survey conducted among
women employed in the public sector in early 1970s showed that the majority of young
women wished to be housewives because of the double shift working outside the home
would involve (ibid). The economic downturn during the 1980s, with inflation rising and
wages diminishing forced more and more women to search for employment in the labor
force. Parallel with increasing work hours and demands which resulted in men paying
less and less attention to children and household, the burden of double shift increased for
women (ibid 106). In a study conducted on the notion of family in Turkey, Bora and
Ustun (2005) found that respondents were more likely to be in favor of women’s
employment when the woman in question was educated with middle-to-upper class
backgrounds. For those with lower education and class levels, it was imperative to link
the employment with economic need to earn money, in order to get approval (79).
Therefore, in households where the husband’s wage was deemed enough for the family,
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women who were not pursuing a career either pressured or willingly decided to leave
their job and to stay at home.
The issue of women’s employment outside the domestic realm is a crucial matter
among immigrants. While men are less likely to be enthusiastic about the issue, making it
conditional, women are more inclined to think positively about their employment
prospects. Based on their perception of gender roles, some immigrants, usually men,
argue that if the husband is making enough money to take care of the family, the woman
should stay at home and look after the children. She should not seek employment unless
the money is tight. The following conversation between Sabri and Yahya, as they are
discussing the issue of women’s employment, is a typical example of this perception.

S: “If you are asking me, yes they should have economic freedom. First of
all, our religion commands us to work. But women have certain status. If
we take a look at the conditions in 2013, a woman if she has children, 2 or
3 children, and her husband is working and has a reasonable income to
sustain his family… That’s how we grew up. My mother was not working.
She was working at home. That’s the toughest job in the world.”
Y: “They were working of course. Man works outside, and woman works
inside.
S: “That’s what I was saying. They are doing the toughest job.”
Sabri begins the conversation by saying that women should have economic
freedom but by the time he is done talking, he arrives at the conclusion that women
should be working at home, which is claimed to be a tougher job than her husband’s.
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While he seems to be against the idea of man banning his wife from getting her economic
freedom, which would deny him a claim for modern or civilized façade, he is also
arguing that despite that freedom women should choose to stay at home because raising
children is much more important than making money if the family is not in need of
anyway. In a similar vein, Kuvvet, a pious young man, asserts that Turkish women’s duty
in America is to take care of their children and domestic work. When asked if his wife is
working, he first answers no, then corrects himself by saying that she is working at home.
He even praises his wife’s work by saying her shift is more difficult than his because she
is working for 24 hours. He says, “I don’t prefer my wife to work. Here is the reason. I
always tell her that my children are more important than the money she makes outside.
But she has to stand on her own feet, I guess. Let me put it this way, if something
happens [to me] today, my wife should be able to stand on both feet. Therefore she needs
self-confidence, not economic freedom. She can do that as long as she has selfconfidence.” While he reduces her wife’s labor only to financial contribution that would
enhance the family budget, he also does not elaborate on the ways in which she could
develop self-confidence in a foreign country by spending most of her time at home.
Alp, a secular doctor, approaches the issue from a different perspective and,
bringing Freud into discussion, asserts that the reason why people have mental problems
in adulthood is because they did not learn how to love and be loved in their childhood. He
says, “[S]he has to stay at home and take care of her child, if it’s [financially] possible.
Our main problem here, I always tell my patients, the main reason for all these disorders
is the parents. It’s not me who is saying that, it is Freud. If you cannot give a child his/her
character until s/he is 5, and cannot give a good education until s/he is 11-12… (…) 98

	
  

228	
  

percent of all complications result from parents. Children who didn’t grow up with love
do not know how to show it. When there is no love, there is no society.” Claiming that
nannies, raising the children of working mothers’, would not care about affection but
only money he is arguing that in order for these kids to grow up with self-confidence, the
mothers should stay at home. As a single parent who had taken care of his daughter since
she was six years old, he does not bring the father figure in the picture and puts the entire
responsibility on women.
Yekta, a college educated man running a business with his wife, argues that
women’s involvement in the labor force is an important issue. He values their
contribution because life requires so many things from families. He says, “If the woman
doesn’t work, and they live a simple life where the woman doesn’t ask for too many
things, if she is fine with the money her husband makes, then choice should be hers. I
would also like to have it like that, me staying at home and my wife working. I’m against
discrimination.” He suggests that as long as the woman does not demand things beyond
family budget, she has the option of either staying at home or getting employment.
However, if she, imagined as a shopaholic, starts asking for more than the husband could
afford, then she should start seeking employment. In this imagination of couple’s
relations, the man who is ‘naturally born to be the breadwinner’ is portrayed as man
without ambitions, wants, or desires when it comes to consumer culture. They might be
willing to live in a better house, or drive a better car as a couple, and in all those
imaginations men might have a stake in his wife’s labor outside the house but Yekta
ignores that fact. Moreover, echoing previous respondents, he also treats women’s
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employment as a monetary contribution, not focusing on other aspects of working such as
increased self-esteem and social status.
As if to counter this perception, Cihan and Samet, a young pious couple both
college graduates, discuss how they made the decision to move to New York so that
Samet could pursue his degree. Cihan, who is writing her master’s thesis on theology at
an institution in Turkey, indicates that she is planning on taking the TOEFL exam, and
applying to doctoral positions in the U.S. However, she had to suspend her plans and find
employment because her husband’s fellowship was not enough to sustain a living in New
York City by their standards. Samet says he never tells his wife either to work or not to
work because that is her decision to make. He says his only concern is that his wife is
working in a job she is not too happy about. Because he knows she wants to have an
academic career, he says he asked her what to do. They could have moved to another
state where living standards were not as high as New York, but she insisted on moving to
New York, and suspending her academic dreams for a while. Cihan agrees because she
thinks the institution in New York would be more beneficial for her husband then those
in other states. Unlike Yekta’s perception where women find work for their needs, in this
case, it was the husband’s need that convinced Cihan to seek employment to support the
family.
There are also a few immigrant women who also perceive work merely as a
means of economic gains, and see it as primarily a male responsibility. Therefore they
also support the idea that women should stay at home to take care of their children or
make time for their hobbies, rather than find employment outside. Semanur, who is a
pious young mother and a student, wants to find employment after she graduates from her
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master’s program, but she is afraid of ‘losing her child’ if she does so. She also does not
think a woman should necessarily work. “That depends on the person you marry,” she
says. “If he is providing your needs, and is not offended by that, and if he is not rubbing
your nose in it, I think it’s not really important for women to work. If he can provide an
allowance, because a woman taking care of the house and children and making them
happy would be enough for the husband as long as he brings money. But if there are
economic troubles or if the man is not giving any allowance because he is the one who’s
working or if she is overburdened by economic troubles, then I think she should work.”
In a related manner, Serra, a fitness instructor and someone with a low level of religious
orientation, argues that women do not have to work. She says she would never work if
she had family fortune or married a rich man. She would concentrate on her hobbies
instead. Serra thinks the man should be the one who is making money, not the woman.
She also thinks that the woman should occasionally say to the man, even if she doesn’t
feel it that way, that she couldn’t have done it without him, and flatter him. She thinks
women saying things like ‘I’ve achieved this,’ is too damaging for men’s pride. So the
woman should play the part of a needy, powerless partner and keep boosting the
husband’s ego, so that he would not feel challenged by the successful career of his wife.
A single woman in her fifties, this might be a strategy Serra came up with after many
failed relationships.
The problem with all these accounts is their essentialization of men as the main
breadwinners of the household, and perception of women as accessories whose labor is
needed only when husband’s earnings are not sufficient. Moreover, they reduce women’s
labor into a mere vehicle of money-making, denying her other aspects of working outside
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that could be enjoyed by men such as having a career, having a social status, or feeling
productive outside of the household. Third, they pretend as if they are valuing women’s
labor in the household, which most often than not goes unrecognized and remain
unvalued because when it is done right, it’s unnoticeable. Cahide, a pious woman with a
high school degree and little work experience from Turkey, underlines this last point and
asserts that it is different when a woman is working. When asked what aspect is different,
she says, “In terms of her own freedom, let me say. Either here or in Turkey.” She thinks
a woman should never let anyone oppress her. She thinks that when you are a housewife,
nobody understands you. She says, “Actually being a housewife is more difficult. Really
it is more difficult. Because… in terms of material gains, and also if the other person does
not understand you… You should have a job. I think it’s better to have a job to go to.”
She believes that domestic work, despite how tiresome and time-consuming it is, is never
appreciated and always taken for granted. When the woman is employed, and her labor is
materialized in the form of wages, her contributions become visible. However, when your
labor is confined to the household, nobody cares how tired you are, because what you
produce entire day remains invisible.
Of the 32 immigrant women I interviewed, more than half (19) were employed
full-time, part-time or as freelancers at the time of the interviews. Of the remaining 13
women, two were retired with employment history and two were students. As for the
remaining nine, four respondents had work or internship experience either in Turkey or in
the U.S. In other words, only 5 respondents (around 15 percent) said they had never
worked. While a few female respondents said women should not be employed, the
widespread feeling among women was to the contrary, even among unemployed ones,
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who defined employment as a means to achieve increased self-esteem, social status and
economic freedom. Filiz is a young mother of three who studied for two years in college
in Turkey and left her studies after she got married. She says she couldn’t continue
because her husband did not want her to. In the U.S. she only worked for two months as a
babysitter. After she got pregnant her husband did not want her to continue working.
Although she had never worked properly, she thinks having economic independence is
very important. She says, “The leader is the one who earns the living. When the woman
brings it too, there are two leaders.” When asked to elaborate, she explains, “For instance,
if I ask money from my husband when he is not working... Think how difficult it is. But it
would be a lot easier to spend when you earn your own money. I mean. I think it’s better.
It’s always very nice for women to earn their own money.” Buse, who is high school
graduate and not working, argues that financial freedom would help women develop selfesteem. “I mean she shouldn’t have the idea of being dependent on a man. Maybe she is
dependent but she shouldn’t have the idea that it’s her only option. Therefore she should
have a minimum level of economic freedom.” Aliye, who runs a store with her husband,
dreams of taking ESL and then study nursing. She finds it sad to not have financial
independence as a woman. She argues, “It’s not just the financial aspect though. There is
nothing worse than getting confined in a house surrounded by housework, childcare, and
not to be able to get rid of them and have a social life especially for the woman’s
psychology, for her self-confidence, and for her to feel relaxed and happy. It’s very sad I
think.”
For Umay, a middle-aged hairdresser, standing on her own feet is highly
important to her. She indicates, “For example, when you go for shopping, spending your
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money without fear but with self-confidence is what being a woman is. It’s like you are
not spending your husband’s money, but your own. I make a great effort to earn this
money, and I’m spending it, and I’m standing on my feet. I’m a woman but I can stand
on my feet. That’s what I think.” As someone who has never done schooling in Turkey,
learned how to read and write in the U.S., completed a certificate program and found
employment, she highly values her economic independence.

She continues giving

her opinion on the matter:

“A woman should have self-confidence. She has to embrace her
femininity. If she is going to a hairdresser, she has to pay it with her own
money. She will have her manicure, pedicure, and make up [done], she
will go to the gym, and she will go to shopping. She will feel her
femininity. She is not going to hide behind a man. She will do things with
her own effort. She will say, ‘I can do this, I’m a woman but I can do this.’
Being a woman is not just about cooking, cleaning, doing the dishes, and
serving your husband. This is not what being a woman is.”

While she does not refute the gender boundary in its entirety by deeming
housework as women’s responsibility, she rejects the notion of a woman who is confined
into household and dependent on her husband. Ayfer does not agree with her mother-inlaw and she does not shy away from voicing her own ideas despite her in-law’s
unyielding support for women’s self-subsistence. She interrupts and says, “Regarding a
woman’s place… Well, maybe you’ll get angry with me. God has given men more and
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women less physical strength. I think a man should provide for everything. I’m not
saying that a woman should be confined to her home. I’m not saying she should not
work. But actually, a woman’s place is her house. You know the old saying, ‘it’s the
female bird that builds the nest.’” Although she has been working as a tailor in a bridal
shop in New York for many years, Ayfer retorts to the gender boundary and the
separation between public and private realms, and asserts that a woman’s place is not
outside but rather inside her home.
Mesude, who was listening in the entire conversation between Ayfer and Umay
intervenes in support of Ayfer. She indicates, “Well, that’s work too. I mean taking care
of children, cleaning, and cooking. Those are duties. Those are also work.” Ayfer, happy
that someone in the room finally agrees to what she is saying adds, “Of course. Women
work a lot. What about men? What do they do? They come home after work. All of them
would get rest. They would never help. Some men do help, even if their wives are not
working. But I think women are more delicate…” “Not everyone is like that,” Ayfer gets
interrupted again and this time it’s her daughter. Ayfer turns to face her and replies, “I get
that. There are women who have to work. But is it good for them? Look at us; we are all
working. But is it good for us? We are working both at home and at work. We are doing a
double shift.” Mesude cannot help but adds, “What double shifts? What double shifts?
We are doing all the shifts!” The reason why Ayfer is so willing to stay at home despite
her mother-in-law’s appreciation of making her own money becomes clear at the end of
the conversation. What Umay supports wholeheartedly comes at a cost, and Ayfer and
Mesude are aware of that. Umay, whose husband has passed away and children have
grown up, may no longer feel the burden of double shift that she used to do. But her
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daughter-in-law Ayfer, who is married and raising a daughter, still carries that burden.
Since her participation in the work force does not reduce her responsibilities at home,
where her husband does not invest his labor, staying at home and getting rid of one of the
shifts become much more attractive to her.

Some pious immigrants who support women’s employment underline the need to
have females in certain professions such as medicine and law, with whom pious Muslim
women would feel more comfortable. Berrin, who runs a kindergarten, argues that she
would prefer having a female doctor because she would be able to relate to her more.
That’s why she refuses the idea that women’s place is home, and they should not be in
the labor force. “That is bigotry, really bigotry,” she says. “If I don’t want women to be
in the workplace, then I cannot find a Muslim female gynecologist. I don’t have a right
for that. Why? Because I do not want women to work. Or I’m looking for a female
lawyer, or a female doctor, a female pediatrician. Whatever. Then I wouldn’t have the
right [to ask for one]. I think it’s very important.” Erkan, a pious man with an elementary
school degree makes a similar observation. He is upset because he couldn’t further his
studies, and for that he blames his parents who had several children but little means to
look after them. While he has no children, he mentions the educational success of his
nieces. He is delighted by the fact that they are college graduates, and one of them has
even become a doctor. Criticizing some of his family members who are not keen on
having their daughters study, he says, “Someone tells me [from Turkey], I can never
allow my daughter to study. Why? He says it would be bad. I said, ‘Look, it would be bad
if she doesn’t study. When your wife gets sick, would you take her to a male doctor or a
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female doctor? He said ‘female doctor.’ So I said, then have your daughter study. Those
who don’t study are bad. Could anyone who study be bad?”
There are some factors that limit Turkish women’s employment prospects in the
U.S. The husband’s gender ideology, having small children, lack of English proficiency,
and lower education levels constitute major obstacles. The majority of women that I
spoke with had arrived with poor language skills, however many of them were able to
take English courses and improve their proficiency levels and eventually find
employments. The ones who had never gotten employment in the U.S., understandably,
were the ones with the poorest English skills. It is also true that women who arrived in
the U.S. on their own either for educational purposes or because they received a green
card, rather than for accompanying a husband, and women who had at least a B.A. degree
are more likely to have employment, despite their poor English skills when they arrived.
The majority of women with at least college degree were already working in Turkey
before they decided to move to the U.S.
The discourse on modernization draws a picture where the modern woman is
expected to be demanding equality, and is willing to participate in the work force, which
would end her dependency on her husband and grant her economic freedom. However,
this expectation does not run in tandem with a perception that defines childcare and
housework as equal responsibilities of women and men. In other words, while the modern
woman is expected to work, she is also expected to take care of the children and do the
house chores. Since the definition of gender roles has not radically transformed, where
women are only invited to increase their shifts, the expectations for a modern woman
have not changed, but only increased. While she has to be tending to household tasks and
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caring for her children and husband, she also has to make her own living and contribute
to the family budget. The perception of work as a means to gain economic benefits only,
as well as the taken-for granted gender norms, shapes some immigrants’ perception that
women are not required to work outside because their job is to take care of the household.
It was only the female respondents who mentioned employment as means to achieve
social status and self-confidence. And even then, there were some reservations. Women
who do not get their husband’s participation in the domestic work and child care and do
not have the means to hire domestic help, and as a result are crushed under the burden of
double shift, may be willing to stay at home, especially if they perceive their job as a
means to contributing family budget but not a source of social status and pride.

Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the issue of gender boundary. It first examines how the
notion of the Turkish woman as a homogenous category comes to signify two distinct but
related symbolic boundaries for Turkish immigrants. The first one emerges between
Turkish immigrants and non-Turkish Muslims, where the Turkish woman, taking on a
nationalist mission, comes to symbolize Turkish modernity, development, and
civilization. The second boundary works to distinguish Turkish immigrants from
American society, and is based on the perception of the Turkish woman as sexually
moral, chaste and pure, and thus claims cultural superiority. While the majority of
respondents approve of the namus regime that controls female sexuality, there are some
women who have managed to escape from its tight grip. Challenging the namus regime,
these women manage to renegotiate gender norms by moving in with their boyfriends,
using sperm donations in order to have baby, or dating freely after divorce.
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Turkish immigrants’ perceptions of femininity and masculinity are heavily
influenced by essentialist arguments where they see men and women having different
dispositions that are either God or nature given. While men are usually defined as strict,
calm, tough, inattentive and devoid of any emotions, women are seen the opposite, as
considerate, affectionate, compassionate, considerate, etc. These perceptions lay the basis
of immigrants’ understanding of gender roles. Some immigrants perceive gender
relations among Americans as more egalitarian than the situation in Turkey. Men not
perceiving themselves as the main authority, and looking after themselves when the wife
is not around are some of the common themes mentioned by immigrants. However, few
Turkish immigrants claimed that the situation in big cities in Turkey has started to
resemble to that in the U.S. arguing that Turkish women are no longer sitting inside their
homes but rather joining the workforce just like their American counterparts. As for
gender equality, while the majority of respondents claim that they do not believe in it, as
women and men have different dispositions, it is more than a yes or no question for many
women. Although they hold strong views about women’s dispositions, women claim
equality in legal terms, in division of labor at home, in occupational skills, and in the
decision-making processes at home.
As for the division of labor at home, it turns out that the majority of Turkish
husbands contribute very little to house chores and childcare. Immigrant men perceive it
as women’s responsibility and indicate that they “help” their wives from time to time.
Moreover, this help is temporal, conditional and selective. Immigrant men offer their
contribution from time to time, making it difficult for their wives to rely on their labor at
home. Help is conditional as men only offer their labor when it is demanded or when they
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see no other option than doing it themselves. Finally, their help is selective including
tasks that are seen manly. Some of the factors that affect the structure of division of labor
at home include husbands’ work hours, the relational dynamics of the couple, and the
emotional cost of asking husband to do chores. And the situation with Turkish
immigrants is not too far off from the American case. According to Pew Research, 36.1
percent of American women with children under 18 indicate that they do more childcare
and housework than their husbands, whereas 13.6 percent says they do more childcare
and equal housework, and 16.9 percent says they do equal childcare and more housework
(PEW 2013). In other words, 66.6 percent of all women with children under 18 indicate
they do at least one chore (housework or childcare) more than their husbands. The lack of
macro-level policy change aiming to achieve a healthy work-life balance, such as giving
parental leave to men, etc. is also contributing to the current situation in the U.S.
(Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010).
Women’s employment outside is a crucial matter for immigrants. Men are less
likely to be enthusiastic about the idea, making it conditional, as they believe women’s
place is actually in her home and taking care of her children, so they argue that a woman
should only be working if the money is tight in the household. This holds true not only
for those with lower education levels, or higher religiosity levels, but also for those with
higher education and lower religiosity levels. As for women, despite a few voices who
argue women should not work, the dominant argument is to the contrary, arguing that
employment is the source of self-confidence, social status and economic freedom. This
view is also shared by women who had never worked in their entire lives. As the sample
demonstrates, more than half of the women in the study were employed as full-time, part-
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time or freelancers during the interviews. Moreover, many of these women were already
in the Turkish workforce before they immigrated. Once they are in the U.S. though,
several factors such as the husband’s gender ideology, having small children, lack of
English proficiency and level of education shape their employment prospects.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Recent attacks carried out by radical Islamist groups in European capitals such as
Paris, Brussels, Berlin, and American cities of San Bernardino and Orlando have not only
claimed many civilian lives but also revealed once again the troublesome nature of
Muslim presence in the U.S. and Western Europe. Following the attacks, statements
questioning the compatibility of Islam with Western values have resurfaced in the press
and social media. Newt Gringrich, a Republican politician who ran for the Republican
presidential nomination in 2012, said in a Fox TV interview right after the attack in Nice,
France in July 2016, “Western civilization is in a war. We should test every person here
who is of Muslim background, and if they believe in Sharia, they should be deported.
Sharia is incompatible with Western civilization.” Leaving the content of actions that
would be considered as belonging to Sharia unclear, he asserts that modern Muslims who
have given up Sharia are welcome to become citizens, but the American government
should be persistent about defining the enemies (Fox News 2016).
Right-wing politicians in Western Europe have voiced similar arguments
following rising attacks in Europe. After the Christmas market attack in Berlin in
December 2016, far-right Dutch politician Geert Wilders blamed the European elite for
turning a blind-eye toward Islam out of political correctness, and called for deIslamization of the entire Europe (Parfitt 2016). In a similar vein, Italian right-wing party
leader Matteo Salvini called for Europe to rethink its migration policies, and claimed the
problem was not the individuals but Islam which he finds incompatible with European
values (King 2017). While not all political actors voice their concerns as radically as the
ones just mentioned, it is true that Islam has been stigmatized, and the presence of
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Muslims has been viewed cautiously both in the American and European contexts. Since
the September 11 attacks in New York, Islam has gradually emerged as one of the major
political cleavages and persistent boundaries in western mainstream societies.
My main motivation to conduct this research was to understand how Turkish
immigrants have experienced the challenges of living in a predominantly non-Muslim
country where Islam has been associated with negative symbols and meanings in the
political discourse, media narratives, and daily language. Although many studies
exploring Muslim experiences in the U.S. after September 11 have been conducted, they
are mainly focused on Muslim Arabs and South Asians rather than Turkish immigrants,
who constitute a highly small and rather invisible Muslim group in the U.S. Moreover,
while there is an abundance of academic research on Turkish immigrants, the bulk of the
literature focuses on immigrants in Western Europe where they form highly visible
minority groups. Therefore, this research had two objectives: First, to produce knowledge
on the experiences of Turkish immigrants in the U.S., and second, to provide a
comparative angle vis-à-vis the literature on Turkish immigrants in Western Europe.
Compared to Western Europe, the setting of this research provides a rather
different context for Turkish immigrants for several reasons. To begin with, Turkish
immigrants in the U.S. tend to have higher levels of education and occupational success
than those in Western Europe. In addition, while Turkish immigrants in Europe, carrying
the ethno-national and religious stigma, have been perceived as Muslim “others,” those in
the U.S. are not singled out as such. Finally, despite the widely shared belief in the U.S.
that Islam is associated with terrorism and violence, Turkish immigrants are not
perceived as culturally incompatible with the mainstream society as they are
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predominantly recognized in Western Europe, nor are they usually viewed as threatening.
Therefore, this project explores the experiences of Turkish immigrants in a Western but
not European context with its own historical, political and social dynamics.
Before I started this research, my assumption was that Turkish immigrants with
higher levels of religiosity had been more negatively affected by the September 11
backlash than immigrants with lower levels of religious identification. In a similar vein, I
was expecting to see pious immigrants identifying and interacting with other Muslim
groups in the U.S., and therefore cultivating a transnational Muslim identity, whereas I
thought secular Turkish immigrants would not be engaging in such relations and
identification processes. Both of my assumptions were proved wrong, as my research has
shown that categories of secular and religious should not be taken for granted as people’s
experiences are varied depending on other factors such as their (Arabic sounding) names,
gender, outfits, etc. As for the second assumption, this research has shown that the power
and role of ethno-national boundaries perceived by immigrants should not be
underestimated, and higher levels of religiosity would not necessarily result in higher
levels of identification with other Muslim groups.
This dissertation research mainly examined the symbolic boundary-making
processes of first-generation Turkish immigrants in New York and New Jersey, where
Islam has been tainted with negative meanings and symbols. By focusing on the
characteristics, nature, and salience of ethno-national, religious and gender boundaries
that immigrants perceive and experience in the U.S., it examined the possibilities of
social inclusion and assimilation/integration of immigrants into the mainstream society.
Having identified the markers, permeability and endurance of these boundaries, this
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project contributes to the literature and debates on immigration, identification, integration
and symbolic boundaries. Finally, this dissertation has also generated some future
research questions that would contribute to our understanding of transformations in the
structure of symbolic boundaries: How does second-generation Turkish immigrants
conceptualize their identification as American? What kind of boundaries do they
perceive? How different are these boundaries from those defined by first generation
immigrants? Do children of pious immigrants manage to overcome the ethno-national
boundary vis-à-vis other Muslims, which their parents have sharply defined? This chapter
concludes this dissertation by discussing how the initial research questions are answered
by data and analysis, and by exploring how research findings speak to the literature on
boundaries in general, and Turkish immigrants in particular.

Research Findings and Discussion
This research project was first motivated by the question of how Turkish
immigrants were coping with the stigma associated with being Muslim in the U.S. in a
post-September-11 environment. As I conducted preliminary interviews with Turkish
immigrants in New York and New Jersey, four major sets of research questions had
emerged that constitute the backbone of this dissertation. The first set of questions deal
with immigrants’ perception of their ethno-national identity, the possible stigmatization
of it, and the nature and salience of ethno-national boundaries for Turkish immigrants in
the U.S. The second set focuses on the experiences of immigrants in the aftermath of
September 11, the religious boundary they encounter, and the organization and
institutionalization of Turkish Islam in the U.S. The third set of questions is about
Turkish immigrants’ relations with and perceptions of other Muslim groups in the U.S.
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and the (im)possibility of establishing a Muslim identity that trumps ethno-national
boundaries. The fourth and final set interrogates how gendered differences affect
immigrants’ life experiences in the U.S. in general and of September 11 backlash in
particular. In the below section, I will be reflecting on the research findings based on data
analysis and will be offering some conclusions.
Despite the strong negative public opinion about the U.S. in Turkey, the majority
of Turkish immigrants have expressed positive views about Americans and about their
experiences in the United States. The notion of personal space came up as an important
and positive aspect of life in the U.S. in several interviews. Mainly understood as keeping
respectful distance from private matters of other people, personal space was usually
mentioned as an extended realm of freedoms where immigrants manage to fulfill their
aspirations or live their lives as they please without the unsolicited interference of others.
Personal space not only allows immigrants to pursue the dreams that they were not able
to follow back in Turkey, but also allows them to maintain the cultural and religious
practices that they imported from the home country. For immigrants with lower levels of
religiosity, America represents expanded personal space and lack of interference in their
personal matters by others. For the pious, on the other hand, it represents not just lack of
interference in their personal affairs, but an expansion of religious freedoms even
compared to Turkey. This expanded personal space allows pious immigrants to claim that
they can live religiously without any public or governmental interference. If they want to
wear hijab to school or work, to get prayer rooms at their workspace, to get permission to
leave the classroom early during Ramadan or to not send their children to school on the
first day of religious holidays, their American bosses, colleagues, teachers, etc. try to
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meet such demands. That is why even those who have negative memories from
September 11 backlash make the claim that there are no limitations when it comes to
practicing Islam in the United States. Immigrants find Americans respectful of their
religious belief, in some cases even more respectful than some of their co-nationals back
in Turkey, especially regarding the issue of hijab. Moreover, the majority of immigrants
do not find their religious faith and American identification incompatible, as religion and
religious practice were rarely brought up during discussions of feeling American.
Although the current political atmosphere in the U.S. prevents Islam from becoming part
of the American mainstream, Turkish immigrants, including the pious, manage to cross
that boundary individually.
One of the reasons why Turkish immigrants feel at ease in New York and New
Jersey is the lack of stigma associated with their ethno-national identity. Moreover, at the
institutional level, the U.S. census defines Turkish immigrants as Caucasian and therefore
as white. While Turkish immigrants in Western Europe have to deal with ethnic stigma,
those in the U.S. enjoy being incorporated into the superior racial category. Although
many immigrants are somewhat confused about their race and do not perceive themselves
as “textbook white” (meaning having pale skin color, light-colored eyes, etc.), when
asked they are more likely to feel affiliated with whiteness than with other racial
categories. Therefore, race never becomes a significant issue in immigrants’ narratives
and a marker in the boundary they perceive vis-à-vis the mainstream society. Moreover,
there were some stories of immigrants encountering law enforcement, such as for driving
without a license or for speeding, where they were let off easily. Although they did not
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relate these rather positive experiences to their perceived racial status, I think it is safe to
assume that being categorized as white benefited them on such occasions.
Although they hold mainly positive views about Americans, the immigrants also
tend to draw symbolic boundaries based on their cultural norms and values. These
perceptions are usually drawn from their lived experiences and encounters with
Americans. One of the major markers of this differentiation is the pride they take in
Turkish cuisine. Intimate family relations are also highly valued and perceived as
different from the American mainstream. Although immigrants were fond of
experiencing extended personal space in the U.S., they also cherished having close
relations with their children, to the extent of invading their personal space. Finally,
socialization in Turkey was perceived as a significant foundation for a symbolic
boundary marker, constituted by values and norms, defining who they are. Although
socialization in Turkey emerges as a barrier that stops many from identifying as
American, several first-generation immigrants were eager to call themselves Turkish
American, arguing that they are citizens and therefore are officially granted the right to
use the term.
The majority of Turkish immigrants are aware of the negative attitudes toward
Islam in the American mainstream. They also believe that September 11 intensified the
association between Islam and terrorism, which gets more solid with each new attack,
such as the Boston marathon bombing which took place during the data collection period.
When I first went into field expecting to hear horror stories of the September 11 backlash,
I was surprised to find that unlike Arab Muslims, Turkish immigrants did not have a
sense of collective discrimination or a widespread feeling of fear in the aftermath of the
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attacks. Although there were respondents who were living in the U.S. at the time and had
either become the target of bias incidents or heard about their happening to others, the
majority of Turkish immigrants were oblivious to the experiences of other Muslims in the
U.S., especially the effects of the governmental backlash. I was also surprised to find that
Turkish immigrants, mainly those who did not have any negative experiences during the
backlash, were identifying with other New Yorkers rather than with Muslims. There were
even those who made the claim that coming from a country that had a long history of
terrorist attacks had prepared them to the trauma of September 11, so they were less
affected than Americans who did not have experiences on a similar scale.
At the beginning of this research, when I hypothesized that Turkish immigrants
with lower levels of religiosity would not identify with other Muslims in the U.S., I was
expecting to find pious immigrants having developed relations with other Muslims and an
overarching, transnational Muslim identity. As I started collecting data, I realized that
this was not the case, as the majority of Turkish immigrants (including pious ones), have
a strong sense of cultural difference from other Muslims, especially Muslim Arabs.
Unlike the symbolic boundary vis-à-vis the mainstream Americans, these perceptions
were not necessarily drawn from personal encounters and experiences with them, but
rather based on historical and cultural narratives that the immigrants were socialized to
believe in Turkey. While few recounted the narrative of backstabbing Arabs, told in
history textbooks, the majority of respondents pointed to cultural differences such as
coming from a modern and democratic country where people –especially women– were
not oppressed by religion and enjoy certain rights. Only a few immigrants who had
personal encounters with Arabs (e.g., at their children’s school) held positive views of
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them. And some were making strategic decisions to prefer other Muslims to non-Muslim
groups (such as Hispanics) as they wanted to restrict their children’s exposure to the
sexual norms prevalent among U.S. youth. However, for the majority of immigrants, the
feeling of superiority vis-a-vis other Muslims emanating from perceived cultural
differences constitutes a highly bright symbolic boundary almost impossible to get
blurred.

Both ethno-national boundaries discussed in this research, the ones vis-à-vis
Americans and other Muslims, respectively, use the notion of Turkish women as a
homogenous category and symbol of differentiation. In comparison to Arab Muslims, the
Turkish woman is celebrated for her modernity and the freedoms she enjoys. In
comparison to mainstream Americans, the Turkish woman is defined as a moral, chaste
and pure contrast. Both boundaries attribute cultural superiority to Turkish-ness through
the symbol of Turkish woman defined as modern yet sexually moral individual. This
ideal womanhood not only constitutes a major symbolic element in ethno-national
boundaries but also defines the norms concerning women’s sexuality. While the majority
of immigrants seem to have carried this ideal with them from Turkey, there are
immigrant women who have managed to challenge its tight grip. With the help of their
expanded personal space in the U.S. and distance from relatives in Turkey, these women
have come to question certain ideals regulating gender relations and norms controlling
female sexuality.
As for the gender ideology, it turns out that majority of Turkish immigrants rely
on essentialist ideas for interpreting notions such as femininity and masculinity, and thus
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reject the notion of gender equality due to the perceived distance and differentiation
between genders. While that is the case on the surface, a further exploration of gender
relations reveals that women believe in and demand equality in certain aspects including
legal rights, decision-making, occupational skills and the division of labor in the
household. Although they define men and women as having different social roles, which
are based on their essentialist perceptions of gender, they still demand equality when it
comes to practical life because they do not feel they are inferior to men in terms of
occupational or decision-making skills, and because they feel the burden of house-work,
more so if they are employed, in their daily lives. The perception of work as the source of
self-confidence, economic freedom, and social status is quite widespread among Turkish
women, even among those who have never been employed in their lives. Although many
underline the importance of having an occupation, factors such as the husband’s gender
ideology, poor English skills, having small children, and level of education influence
their employment prospects in the U.S. Moreover, the absence of policies in the U.S.
intended to ameliorate the work-life balance, a contrast to some Western European
countries, contributes to the persistence of the immigrants’ ideology regarding gender
roles and the division of labor at the household.
This research has found that, unlike their counterparts in Western European
societies where ethno-national and religious boundaries are too bright to be able to cross
individually, immigrants in the U.S. enjoy the possibility of crossing such boundaries in
their daily lives and through encounters with Americans. Aside from a few immigrants
who make essentialist claims as to why they do not feel American, the majority of
respondents refer to the notion of socialization in Turkey as the main cultural barrier that

	
  

251	
  

prevents them from calling themselves American. However, the widely accepted
narrative of America as a country of immigration provides room for some immigrants to
make the claim that they are American, or at least – using a hyphenated identity –
Turkish American. Further research will be needed in order to explore whether or not
future generations will be much more at ease in terms of referring themselves American.

Contributions to Academic Literature
Setting its focus on the symbolic boundary-making processes by people of
immigrant-origin in a receiving society, this research project situates itself within the
immigration, identity and assimilation literature. Rather than studying immigrant
identification and processes of belonging in the majority society from a macro-level
perspective, this project adopts a micro-level and ground-up approach by examining the
markers of perceived difference and meanings attached to them by immigrants. In their
review article on boundaries, Lamont and Molnar (2002) make the following observation
regarding immigration and boundaries: “The literature is in need of greater
systematization, particularly when it comes to specifying boundary processes, ranging
from symbolic boundary-work to how social boundaries are transported by immigrants
from one national context to another” (175). While this project by no means claims to
offer such systemization, it contributes to the literature on boundaries that are both
constructed anew in the receiving society and transferred from the home country.
The grounded nature of the project, which explores markers of perceived social
distance, contributes to our understanding of the assimilation prospects of immigrants
into the mainstream society. It not only locates the meanings of the boundary, but also
helps comprehend its salience and endurance. Studying immigrants’ life experiences in
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the receiving society contributes to our understanding of their perceived distance based
on their daily interactions with the mainstream society and other minority groups (e.g.,
Arab Muslims). As Epstein (2010) indicates, “it is from the personal narratives of the
people we study that we gain insight into meaning of their situations beyond their
objective circumstances” (151). The discovery of certain markers (such as cultural
values) constituting two distinct types of boundaries (not bright/very bright) regarding
two distinct groups (American mainstream/Arab Muslims) by the same immigrant group
indicate the importance of following a micro-level and grounded approach to the study of
identification and assimilation.
The fact that the boundary perceived vis-à-vis Arab Muslims is bright, whereas
the one imagined against the American mainstream is not, can also be seen as a strategy
by immigrants to position themselves closer to the mainstream by claiming perceived
distance, hence superiority, from a stigmatized Muslim group. The use of this strategy by
newly arrived immigrant groups to destabilize the boundary experienced in the society is
not unheard of in the U.S. history of European immigrants, including Italians, Irish and
Jews, who arrived in the U.S. in the 19th and early 20th centuries and were perceived and
categorized as belonging to inferior races by the American mainstream (Brodkin 2008).
Confused about their position in the racial hierarchy, the immigrants tried to solve their
“inbetweenness” by becoming white (Roediger 2005). To do so, they went to great
lengths to distinguish themselves from African Americans, who were experiencing a
bright and persistent racial boundary in the society. Orsi (1992), in his study on Italian
Harlem, argues that immigrants from Southern Italy, in order to get dissociated from the
stigma of non-whiteness, have distanced themselves not only from African Americans
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but also Puerto Ricans in their neighborhood. In a similar vein, Roediger in his book
Wages of Whiteness (2007) indicates that it was the “public and psychological wages”
offered by whiteness that motivated Irish laborers to try to become recognized as white
and therefore position themselves against their African American co-workers (137).
Against this backdrop, it is possible to argue that the boundary-making practices by
Turkish immigrants vis-à-vis Arab Muslims showcase a similar process of sharply
distinguishing one’s in-group from a culturally stigmatized minority group in the United
States.
Although this project is based in only one geographical location (the northeastern
United States), it still contributes to the debates on the importance of context regarding
the role of boundaries on immigrants’ assimilation prospects. Since boundaries are pathdependent, the characteristics of the receiving society and immigrant group play a
significant role in the nature of boundaries constructed (Alba 2005). Building on research
on Turkish immigrants and boundary-work in Western Europe, this research offers a
comparative angle by generating empirical knowledge on boundaries in a historically and
structurally different geography. It also demonstrates how the nature of boundary and
processes of belonging might differ for Turkish immigrants in a non-European yet
Western context. This project also speaks to the new assimilation theory (Alba and Nee
2003), which conceptualizes assimilation through changes in the nature of boundary
between immigrant group and mainstream society. In an effort to understand Turkish
immigrants’ assimilation prospects into American society, this project examines the
nature of ethno-national, religious, and gender-based boundaries and their possibility to
change for new generations born in the U.S.
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Finally, this project also contributes to research on Turkish immigrants, where the
bulk of studies focus on immigrants in Western European societies. First, it offers
empirical knowledge on immigrants in a relatively understudied geography and
constitutes a comparative angle for research on Europe. Second, it builds on micro-level
and grounded data on Turkish immigrants, generating knowledge on meanings of
identification with receiving and sending countries. Third, it brings a new focus
especially to Turkish immigrant women, who are most commonly studied as
accompaniers (‘brides’) of migrant men in the literature.

Positionality
Positionality is an important aspect of any social research and every researcher
has to consider the effects of his or her presence in the community as it may have a huge
influence on the interviews and the research results (Sanchez-Ayala, 2012). Researchers,
just like any random person, grow up socialized in certain societal structures, adopting
their values, beliefs, symbols, and a mindset. Hence we are not in a position to claim
neutrality when it comes to interacting with other people. We bring our baggage into the
table and interpret events through our own value-loaded prisms. As a result, a good
researcher always has to reflect on the potential influences of his or her presence on the
study.
Having grown up in a Sunni-Muslim family in Turkey, I was not a total outsider
to the community that I studied. Speaking Turkish and being familiar with the history,
culture, ethnic and religious groups helped me tremendously when I first tried to gain
access into Turkish community. Many of my respondents were eager to talk to me when
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they learned that I was a student from Turkey. However, my status as a graduate student
also placed me in an elevated status in their eyes. In some cases they indicated their
admiration to me since I managed to come all the way from Turkey to study in a
language that was not my mother tongue. Since I’m fluent both in Turkish and English,
language was not an issue. Some 1.5-generation immigrants answered some of the
questions in English, especially when they felt their Turkish was not sufficient to
communicate their thoughts. Therefore, no meaning was lost in translation. I always
asked my questions about religious practices in a sensitive fashion, and kept reminding
my respondents that they can skip the question(s) if they don’t feel like answering them. I
always covered my hair when I went into the mosque, but I never tried to make them
believe that I was pious. In fact, I always left a portion of my hair visible, in order to
communicate the message that I was not hijabi in my daily life. The major difficulty I had
at the initial phases of the research was approaching adult men, as a few men turned me
down when I attempted to recruit them into my study. But that problem was solved once I
started to recruit men through referrals as my previous respondents showed the courtesy
of referring me to their male acquaintances who later agreed to meet and talk to me.
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